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Introduction
May 27, 2013
Improving the productivity, especially for the economies which are lagging
behind the industrialized world, is of crucial importance if these economies are to
become capable of improving the standard of living for their citizens. Developing
countries need to increase their output in order to reduce poverty as foreseen in
the Millennium Development Goals that all 193 United Nations member states
have agreed, at the Millennium Summit in 2000, to achieve by 2015. Identifying
the right policies to increase productivity in these nations has been a great
challenge for the economic science. Economic historians typically date modern
economic growth as beginning in England about 1780 and slightly later in the
United States and continental Europe (Prescott 1998). Until that time, most
of the major civilizations have had roughly the same standard of living and
the inequalities between nations were just beginning to shape. Nowadays, the
di¤erence in output per worker between the most developed countries and the
poorest ones have reached an order of thirty-fold1 . It could be thus argued that
nding an answer to what are the causes for the di¤erences in GDP per worker
across countries is even more relevant today.
This thesis aims to contribute to this fundamental objective, by providing a
theory of how property rights enforcement and the development of an e¢ cient
nancial system can raise output and improve the standards of living.
As Hall and Jones (1999) argue, the di¤erences in physical capital and educa-
tional attainment can only partially explain the variation in output per worker.
There is a large variation left in the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is
the part that cannot be explain by traditionally measured inputs. Measuring
TFP requires estimates of the factor inputs, which makes a quantitative analy-
sis of TFP not an easy task. Nonetheless, there is a common opinion among
macroeconomists that a theory of TFP is needed in order to explain the di¤erent
economic evolution among countries (Prescott 1998).
When considering economic development, this thesis is mainly concerned
with output levels and not growth rates. Levels capture the di¤erences in long-
run economic performance that are most directly relevant to welfare as measured
1A worldwide statistical partnership, the International Comparison Program (ICP), collects
o¢ cial data that makes possible to compare the output of economies controlling for di¤erences
in price levels. Based on the ICP data, the Penn World Table (PWT) provides additional
statistics which are widely used in the literature (see for instance Prescott 1998, Hall and
Jones 1999).
1
by the consumption of goods and services. Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and
Summers (1993) document the relatively low correlation of growth rates across
decades. A number of models of idea ows across countries such as Parente and
Prescott (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Eaton and Kortum (1995)
imply that all countries will grow at a common rate in the long run: technology
transfer keeps countries from drifting indenitely far from each other. In these
models, long-run di¤erences in levels are the interesting di¤erences to explain,
a fact also recognized by some of the cross-country growth literature2 .
This thesis is proposing a theory based on di¤erences in property rights
enforcement and on adverse selection. The theory is gradually developed chapter
by chapter, as follows.
Chapter one lays down the microeconomic foundations. It describes how
capital market imperfections (weak property rights and asymmetric informa-
tion) can a¤ect the size and productivity of rms and the performance of the
nancial system. Motivated by the empirical ndings in La Porta et al. (1998),
the chapter studies how these imperfections a¤ect the functioning of the credit
markets and the allocation of funds to rms, in an environment in which the
heterogeneous quality of rms and the rm size play a key role in determining
productivity. The basic argument is that capital markets deal with a variety
of problems that arise from asymmetric information about investment projects
between borrower and lender, and these problems are worsened with weak prop-
erty rights. The bad functioning of nancial markets involves ine¢ cient rm size
distribution, which in turn a¤ects aggregate productivity and per capita income.
The nancial intermediaries o¤er an optimal nancial contract to rms. This
contract supported in equilibrium sheds light on how property rights quality
a¤ects the rm size distribution. Information asymmetries and the heterogene-
ity in rmsproductivity generate the adverse selection problem, which plays a
crucial role in this theory.
The research presented in Chapter one is related to the literature on asym-
metric information in nancial markets3 . However, rm size in these papers is
generally exogenous, and their framework cannot produce predictions about the
rm size distribution, which is the main goal of this chapter. At the same time,
a rich research on the imperfect enforcement of credit contracts tries to explain
the empirical relationships between legal environment and business nance, but,
unlike this chapter, does not deal with adverse selection problems4 .
After Chapter one described how the nancial system allocates capital to
rms in the context of imperfect enforcement and asymmetric information,
chapter two is asking the following question: can this capital allocation (which
depends on the quality of property rights protection) have signicant aggre-
gate consequences? And if yes, then how much of the variation in output and
productivity observed in the data can be accounted by such a theory? To an-
2See for instance Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
3See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Webb (1991)
or Fisman and Krausz (2010).
4See, for instance, Allen (1981), Jappelli et al. (2005), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) or
Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2010).
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swer these questions, the second chapter proposes a general equilibrium model
where households members can either be workers or manage a rm, and credit
is needed in order to produce. The functioning of the nancial market is af-
fected by the imperfections studied in chapter one: weak property rights and
asymmetric information.
The question of aggregate e¤ects of limited enforcement in the framework
of nancial intermediation has been studied before. Notable contributions in-
clude Erosa (2001), Perera-Tallo (2003, 2011), Erosa and Hidalgo (2008) and
Amaral and Quintin (2010). The novelty of this chapters quantitative assess-
ment is that it explicitly takes into account the asymmetric information, one
of the main problems a¤ecting credit ows in the economy. The results indi-
cate that aggregate productivity is a¤ected in several ways. First of all, due
to lower enforcement, rms are constrained to operate at a non-optimal scale.
At the same time, informational imperfections determine a shift of resources
from productive to unproductive rms. As the nancial sector cannot distin-
guish rms individual productivity, it will allocate relatively more capital to
the less productive rms than in the case of perfect information. Overall, in the
numerical exercises, the model is able to account for signicant di¤erences in
output between developed economies (such as the United States) and middle-
income economies. Moreover, the results suggest that, in addition to improving
contract enforcement, reducing informational asymmetries can also contribute
to an increase in aggregate productivity. The numerical exercises indicate that
reducing informational asymmetries would, on average, further increase output
by up to 20%5 .
Although the model in the second Chapter is able to replicate fairly well
the di¤erences between middle income and developed countries in output per
worker, the generated di¤erences in TFP are small compared to what we see
in the data6 . Given that TFP may be interpreted as an index of technological
advancement, we ask the question what stops developing countries to adopt
more advanced technologies from developed countries. Chapter two shows that
weak property rights can cause a bad allocation of funds to rms, where better
(and more innovative) rms receive ine¢ ciently low amounts of credit. If this
is the case, then one could inquire whether this ine¤ective allocation of funds
acted as a barrier to the spread of new technologies. One way of modelling this
is by introducing a learning-by-doing process7 , where the advancement level of
the technologies used by rms in the past increases their ability to use more
advanced technology in the present. Thus, if property rights are weak, it could
be that the more productive rms accumulate less experience in production than
5 It should be taken into account that the model only allows to compare economies with
or without informational asymmetries (with no intermediate degree allowed). This gure
represents the average increase in output if all information about rm productivity in the
economy would become public. Hence, it represents an upper bound. Nonetheless, it suggests
that reducing informational asymmetries may pay o¤ in the long run.
6The model can generate a maximum variation in TFP of 30%. Note that here we refer to
the base model.
7For other models of learning-by-doing see, among others, Arrow 1962, Baldwin and Krug-
man 1988, Lucas 1988, 1993; Matsuyama 1992; Stokey 1988; Young 1991, Perera-Tallo 2011.
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they would under better enforcement. This could slow down their know-how of
using advanced technologies.
Chapter three investigates quantitatively this hypothesis and it turns out it
has non-trivial consequences for the technological gap across rms in the econ-
omy. In the enrichedmodel, this technological gap is not constant anymore,
but varies with the quality of property rights. Thus, a certain di¤erence in
property rights protection will feature an increased technological gap between
backward and advanced rms, which exacerbates the asymmetric information
problems. In turn, this amplies the total e¤ect of enforcement on the aggregate
productivity: while the model with exogenous technology adoption (treated in
Chapter two) is able to generate up to 30% variation in TFP, the enriched
model´s explanatory power reaches almost 50%.
There are several policy implications for developing nations that can be
derived from this work. First of all, the quality of property rights protection
may a¤ect in the long run the e¢ ciency of the nancial system, the size of rms
and ultimately the aggregate productivity. Strengthening property rights may
reduce capital market imperfections and contribute to an allocation of capital
that would be benecial for the highly productive and innovative rms. At the
same time, policies aimed at reducing informational asymmetries could further
improve access to capital for these rms, stimulating in this way the overall
e¢ ciency.
How does this t in the context of previous theories which try to explain
di¤erences in output and productivity? The uneven development is a very
complex phenomenon which has been approached from various angles. It could
be argued that a theory on the di¤erences in productivity may be assessed by
its ability to suggest policy measures that can be adopted by lagging countries
so as to increase their productivity. However, political economy considerations
indicate that the incentives of di¤erent social classes to implement these policies
deserve also to be considered.
Some theories focus on the institutions and government policies that are fa-
vorable to productive activities and encourage capital accumulation, skill acqui-
sition, invention, and technology transfer. For instance, Parente and Prescott
(2000) proposed as a candidate the strength of resistance to the adoption of
new technologies, which would depend upon the policy arrangement a society
employs. Hall and Jones (1999) pointed to corruption of government o¢ cials,
severe impediments to trade, poor contract enforcement, and government inter-
ference in production as relevant obstacles to higher output per worker. This
thesis follows a similar line of thought. While the idea that property rights
matter for development is not that recent8 , the main contribution of this thesis
could be summarized in providing a formal (general equilibrium) modelling for
how property rights quality a¤ects output and productivity in the presence of
asymmetric information. The proposed model tries to strike the right balance
between being simple enough to be easily explained intuitively (and allowing
for a closed-form solution), and at the same time capturing some features of the
8See for instance Hernando de Soto Polar (1989, 2000).
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real world so as to be suitable for a quantitative assessment.
The results of this thesis indicate that both the quality of property rights
and the asymmetric information have important consequences for development.
Some questions and possible future paths for research could be raised following
this analysis. First of all, if property rights have been shown to have signicant
e¤ects on the output and productivity of nations, then how are these prop-
erty rights determined and why they vary across countries? Acemoglu et all
(2005) provided some examples of how economic institutions, which shape eco-
nomic outcomes, are determined by political power, which is in turn determined
by political institutions and the distribution of resources in society9 . As their
framework is largely verbal rather than mathematical, and thus not fully spec-
ied, they identied constructing formal models incorporating and extending
their theory to be an important task ahead.
At the same time, the recent economic and nancial crisis a¤ecting the
world economy since 2008 suggests that reassessing the growing interactions
among national economies may also contribute to a better understanding of the
phenomena studied in this thesis. One possible way of advancing in this direction
could be to draw from theories of international trade and investment10 . These
e¤orts are left for further research.
9See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
10See for instance Krugman (1981).
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1Chapter 1
Property Rights Protection and Firm Size Distribution under Adverse
Selection
Recent empirical work suggests that rm size and the performance of the nancial system are
positively related to the e¤ectiveness of law enforcement. This paper provides a theory on how
the e¤ectiveness of law enforcement a¤ects the allocation of capital by the nancial system to
rms, and the distribution of rm size. The framework features asymmetric information, which
implies that the nancial contract should satisfy incentive constraints. Capital is not e¢ ciently
allocated because of two main reasons: i) the rm size, measured as the amount of factor of
production capital used by each rm, is smaller than the e¢ cient level (the level in the absence
of incentive constraints); ii) the portion of capital allocated by lenders to the most productive
rms is also smaller than the e¢ cient level, as they cannot distinguish among borrowers. There
are three types of equilibria depending on degree of law enforceability: i) When law enforcement
is e¤ective enough, the allocation of capital to rms is e¢ cient. ii) When law enforcement is
in a certain middle interval, the more productive rms are undernanced. iii) Finally, when
law enforcement is weaker than a certain threshold, all the rms receive the same amount of
capital, which involves an ine¢ ciently small size. Thus, more e¤ective law enforcement eases
the incentive constraints, improving the allocation of capital among rms and the rm size
distribution, which in turn a¤ects aggregate productivity and per capita production.
1. Introduction
One important research question in economics is why, in poorer countries, resources
are directed towards less e¢ cient uses more often than in developed countries. Evidence
suggests that less developed economies are characterized by low aggregate productivity
and small rms. Thus, Tybout (2000) illustrates that the emphasis on small scale pro-
duction correlates negatively with per capita income levels across countries. Moreover,
Kumar et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2006, 2008) found that rm size is positively related
to nancial development and law enforceability. Hall and Jones (1999) and Parente and
Prescott (2000), on their part, document important di¤erences in aggregate productivity
across countries.
In order to better understand the above observations, this paper proposes a theory of
how the e¤ectiveness of law enforcement a¤ects the allocation of capital by the nancial
system to rms, and the size distribution of rms in a framework of asymmetric infor-
mation. Our focus on nancial-market imperfections is motivated by evidence indicating
that nancial markets tend to perform badly in poor countries and that productivity is
Conversations and comments from Antonia Díaz, Marco Celentani and participants in the 4th
International IFABS Conference and Carlos III workshop were very helpful.
2positively correlated with indicators of nancial development across countries (see Beck
et al., 2000; Erosa, 2001). We also draw from the empirical ndings in La Porta et al.
(1998), who have demonstrated that the legal system and its enforcement a¤ects the way
nancial markets function. The basic argument in our paper is that the nancial markets
deal with a variety of problems that arise from asymmetric information about investment
projects between borrower and lender, and these problems are worsened with imperfect
law enforcement.
In our model the capital allocation is done through an optimal nancial contract2 that
a nancial intermediary (a bank) will o¤er to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs use the credit
to fund a project, but they have di¤erent productivity (ability) which is known only to
them, and this generates an adverse selection problem. To be more precise, there are two
types of rms (called good and bad), where the good type is more productive than the
bad type. Entrepreneurs can default and, in this case, nancial intermediaries can recover
only a fraction of their revenue. We interpret this recoverable fraction as the degree of law
enforceability of our economy. The imperfect enforcement and the adverse selection imply
that the nancial contract should satisfy incentive constraints. Firm size is measured as
the amount of the factor of production used by the rm: capital3. The e¢ cient allocation
would occur when rms maximize their prots without any incentive constraint. However,
in our framework, capital is not e¢ ciently allocated because of two main reasons. Firstly,
rm size is not the optimal one when compared with the e¢ cient allocation. Secondly, as
lenders cannot distinguish among borrowers, they allocate an ine¢ ciently large amount
of resources to the bad rms when compared with the e¢ cient allocation. In this way,
the good rms are undernanced compared to the e¢ cient allocation.
We study a menu of contracts which maximizes the prots of rms subject to two in-
centive constraints: i) the non-default constraint, which implies that rms have incentives
to repay their debts and ii) the revelation constraint, which implies that rms have incen-
tive to truly reveal their type. We examine how the optimal nancial contract o¤ered by
nancial intermediaries evolves as the degree of law (and contract) enforceability in the
economy varies. When the contract enforceability is e¤ective enough (but not necessarily
perfect), the incentive constrains are not binding and the allocation of capital to rms is
e¢ cient. When the contract enforceability is in a certain middle interval, incentive con-
straints are not binding for bad rms, but the revelation constraint is binding for good
rms, which implies that these have a suboptimal size when they are compared with the
e¢ cient allocation, and that the portion of capital devoted to good rms is smaller than
the one in the e¢ cient allocation. Finally, when the contract enforceability is weaker
than a certain threshold, both good and bad rms are constrained, the rst type by the
revelation constraint and the second by the non-default constraint. It turns out that in
this type of equilibrium both types of rms receive the same amount of capital, which is
ine¢ ciently low when compared with the perfect enforcement case.
After studying the equilibrium menu of contracts in partial equilibrium, and once check-
ing that equilibrium exists, we study the contract in a general equilibrium framework. In
2The classic references for optimal nancial contracts in imperfect nancial markets are, among others,
Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986).
3Further details on this measurement of rm size, as well as a discussion of alternative measurements of
rm size, are presented in section 2.1.
3such an environment, the results about the di¤erent intervals of the degree of contract
enforceability still hold. However, in the middle interval, bad rms are now overnanced,
while good rms are undernanced compared with e¢ cient allocation. Furthermore, per
capita output and productivity increase with the e¤ectiveness of law enforcement, since
more e¤ective contract enforceability eases the incentive constraints. We extend then the
framework to allow measuring rm size by the number of employees and we calibrate our
model using data for the US manufacturing sector. The results of the numerical exercise
suggest that the e¤ect of law enforcement on rm size is signicant. We also extend the
model to analyze the use by rms of own capital to nance production, and the use of
capital remaining after production as collateral.
Thus, we construct a theory that links the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement with
the functioning of the nancial market and the rm size distribution, which has impli-
cations for the aggregate productivity and the per capita output of the economy. The
theory emphasizes the role of asymmetric information problems (adverse selection) in an
environment in which the productivity of rms is private information. Our theory may
contribute to a better understanding of the empirical ndings of Kumar et al. (1999) and
Beck et al. (2006, 2008) about rm size being positively related to nancial development
and law enforceability. In our theory, the degree of law enforcement a¤ects the rm size
via the capital allocation by the nancial system to rms, with the more productive rms
su¤ering tighter incentive constraints than the less productive rms.
The key message of the paper is that asymmetric information in nancial markets may
be much more costly (lead to higher ine¢ ciencies) in countries with low enforcement than
with high enforcement due to the fact that these frictions afect the rm size distribution
and as a consequence agregate productivity. Erosa and Hidalgo (2008) is, to our knowl-
edge, the paper closest to ours. one of the main di¤erences is that they do not focus in
rm size distribution, the amount of output per rm in their model is xed. Furthermore,
these authors only assume asymmetric information after contracting. The case of ex-ante
asymmetric information, illustrated in seminal papers such as Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), seems quite relevant. Moreover, as it will become clear from the paper, from a
theoretical point of view, modelling ex-ante adverse selection in a general equilibrium is
not trivial (as the equilibrium features contracts maximizing each types payo¤ separately,
not the expected value across types).
In an inuential paper, Prescott and Townsend (1984) have provided a general frame-
work that allows the study of Pareto optima and competitive equilibria for economies
with adverse selection. They show that equilibrium with adverse selection exist only un-
der certain condition. If e¢ ciency requires cross-subsidies across types, then equilibrium
will not exist. The equilibrium in this paper does not feature cross subsidies so that the
results in the paper are consistent with the analysis in Prescott and Townsend.
From a broader perspective, our research is related to the literature on asymmetric
information in nancial markets and to the literature on imperfect enforceability of con-
tracts. Asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers leads to credit rationing in
Stiglitz andWeiss (1981). Bester (1985) investigates the conditions under which credit can
be rationed in markets with imperfect information. Besanko and Thakor (1987) explore
the role of market structure in credit allocation when there is informational asymmetry.
Webb (1991) designs long term contracts that can be used in competitive nancial markets
4to separate entrepreneurs of di¤erent abilities. Fishman and Krausz (2010) investigate
how adverse selection restricts the start o¤ investment of rms in order to borrow at
more favorable terms in the future. However, these papers usually feature a xed rm
size. Therefore, rm size in these papers is exogenous, and their framework cannot deliver
predictions about the rm size distribution, which is the main goal of this paper. In a
related line of literature, when banks face asymmetric information about loan quality, en-
dogenous borrowing constraints will restrict the growth of rm size, like in Albuquerque
and Hopenhayn (2004).
Arellano et all (2007) use di¤erences in contract enforcement to explain why rms have
di¤erent ratios of debt to assets across countries. There is a rich research on the imperfect
enforceability of credit contracts which tries to explain the empirical relationships between
legal environment and business nance that have been documented in recent papers4.
The role of imperfect contract enforceability in shaping nancial contracts was analyzed,
among others, by Allen (1981), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), Ellingsen and Kristiansen
(2010) or Jappelli et al. (2005). However, these former contributions do not deal with
adverse selection problems.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we present the model and ana-
lyze the e¢ cient allocation of capital. In section 3 we examine the equilibrium menu of
contracts, while in section 4 we study the e¤ect of the degree of law enforceability on
the nancial market performance and rm size under partial equilibrium. We prove the
existence of equilibrium in section 5. In section 6 we analyze the e¤ect of the degree of
law enforceability on the nancial market performance and rm size under general equi-
librium. We conclude in section 7. Proofs and some technical details are collected in the
appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. Technology
There are two types of rms, good and bad, indexed by j 2 fg; bg. The productivity of
these rms is indexed by the parameters j, where g > b. The portion of good rms is
, being (1   ) the portion of bad rms. Firms revenues5 are given by j R (kj), which
depends on the productivity of each rm j 2 fg; bg, and on the amount of capital kj.
R (k) is a continuous function on its domain, strictly increasing in both arguments and
satises: R (0) = 0, lim
k!+1
R (k) = +1, lim
k!0
@R(k)
@k
= +1 and lim
k!+1
@R(k)
@k
= 0.
We measure the rm size of a particular rm by the amount of the factor of production
used by the rm: capital6. The stock of factor of production capital used by rms has
been estimated in the empirical literature studying the productivity at rm level (see for
instance Gal, 2013 and the references therein). Nevertheless this does not mean that the
results of the paper do not apply to other measurements of rm size. Note that in order
4See, for example, Djankov et al. (2008) and the references therein.
5In fact the function j R (kj) not only includes the revenues but also the remaining part of capital after
production.
6Throughout the paper we will refer to the factor of production capital used by the rm as simply the
capital of the rm.
5to simplify and following the literature on adverse selection and credit markets7, we have
assumed that there is a unique factor of production: capital. However, the result about
rm size of the paper can be easily extended for the case in which rm size is measured by
the number of workers. Some empirical studies used sales as a measurement of rm size
(e.g., Beck et al., 2006). In our theoretical model sales would correspond to the revenues
of the rm, which are also monotonically increasing with capital. This means that if we
would dene rm size by the amount of sales, all the results of the model with regard to
rm size would hold.
In order to simplify and following most of the literature, we do not distinguish between
revenues in strict sense and the capital that remains after production. We assume also
that rms do not have own capital (that is, the capital used by rms, kj, is entirely
nanced through a nancial intermediary). However, we extend the model to incorporate
own capital, and the use of remaining capital after production as collateral, in subsection
7.1.
The contract o¤ered by the nancial intermediary to each type j of rms consists of a
quantity of capital kj o¤ered at a price (interest rate) ij. When the contracts are o¤ered,
the nancial intermediary knows the revenue function of each type but cannot distinguish
the type of each rm. However, each rm is aware of its own productivity, giving rise to
an ex-ante asymmetric information problem. For simplicity we assume that both rms
and nancial intermediaries are risk neutral.
Each rm of type j uses the capital according to its productivity j to generate a revenue
(including the remaining part of capital after production) of j R (kj). Law enforceability
is imperfect in the sense that the rms either fulll the contract paying the principal plus
the interest rate (1 + ij)kj or they default: they refuse to return the loan. When a rm
defaults, the nancial intermediary can take the fraction  of the revenue of the rm up
to its debt, dened as (1 + ij)kj, that is, in case of default the nancial intermediary
can take from the rm the amount min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg. As in Erosa and Hidalgo
(2008), we interpret the recoverable fraction in default () as the degree of law (contract)
enforceability. When  = 1, contracts are perfectly enforceable: the nancial intermediary
may take the whole revenue of the rm up to its debt if the rm refuses to pay back the
loan. When  = 0, the nancial intermediary cannot appropriate any revenue of the rm
if she decides to default.
We assume that when a rm defaults, the nancial intermediary incurs bankruptcy
costs  jR(kj).The bankruptcy cost  j R(kj) may be interpreted either as a cost of
enforcing the contract when rms default or as an information costs: a cost of type
verication. In any case, bankruptcy cost will not a¤ect the contract at equilibrium, since
we will show that default does not occur at equilibrium. The unique role that plays the
bankruptcy cost in the model is to guarantee the existence of equilibrium (see section 5
for details).
Financial intermediaries are perfectly competitive. The nancial intermediaries pay the
interest rate r to collect funds from depositors. This interest rate will be called from now
on the deposit interest rate. We will assume in sections (2) to (5) that there is partial
equilibrium and, consequently, the interest rate paid to depositors, r, is an exogenous
7See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Webb (1991), Fishman and
Krausz (2010).
6variable.
2.2. E¢ cient Allocation
We will call e¢ cient allocation the allocation that occurs when each rm maximizes
its prots without any incentive constraint. This allocation coincides with the one in the
equilibrium when law enforcement is perfect ( = 1). In this case, there is no default
in equilibrium and nancial intermediaries charge rms the deposit interest rate without
any borrowing limits. The maximization problem of the rm is the typical problem of a
competitive rm8:
max
k
j R (k)  (1 + r)k
When there are no incentive problems, rms choose an amount of capital in which the
marginal revenue of capital is equal to its marginal cost. We will call the solution of the
above problem optimal capital or optimal rm size of rm type j and we will denoted it
by kj :
kj = argmax
k
j R (k)  (1 + r)k , j
@ R
 
kj

@k
= (1 + r) (1)
Since R (k) is strictly concave,
@ R(kj )
@k
is strictly decreasing, which implies (together with
the assumptions that lim
k!0
@R(k)
@k
= +1 and lim
k!+1
@R(k)
@k
= 0) that kj is well dened and
unique. Obviously, the optimal size of good rms is larger than the optimal size of the
bad rms: kg > k

b . Furthermore, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that the
optimal level of capital of the rm is a decreasing function of the interest rate r.
We will take the capital allocation in the e¢ cient allocation as our benchmark. We
will call ine¢ cient any other allocation di¤erent from the e¢ cient allocation. We will say
that a rm has an ine¢ ciently small size or that it is undernanced, if her size (measured
as the amount of capital) is smaller than its optimal level: kj < kj . We will say that
good rms receive an ine¢ ciently small portion of capital if the portion of capital which
receives such type with respect to all the rms is smaller than the portion that receives in
the e¢ cient allocation : kg
kg+(1 )kb <
kg
kg+(1 )kb
. We will say that a rm size distribution
is ine¢ cient if it is di¤erent from the one in the e¢ cient allocation.
3. Equilibrium
When a nancial intermediary o¤ers a lending contract to a rm, she has two informa-
tional problems: rst, she does not know whether the rm is going to fulll the contract
or not, and second, she does not know the type of the rm. To overcome these problems,
8Alternatively, we could also dene the problem of maximization of the rm in the e¢ cient allocation
such that rms (the agents) maximizes prots subject to the non-negative prot condition of the nancial
intermediaries (the principal):
max
k;i
j R (k)  (1 + i)k
s:t: : (1 + i)k   (1 + r)k  0:
Obviously, the result of this problem is the same as the one in the main text.
7nancial intermediaries should give incentives to rms to fulll the contract and to reveal
their true type. Thus, there are two types of incentive constrains: i) the non-default con-
straint : rms should have incentives to repay the loan; and ii) the revelation constraint :
rms should have incentives to correctly reveal their type.
The rst incentive constraint is the non-default constraint: rms should be better o¤
fullling the contact and paying the nancial intermediary than defaulting:
j R (kj)  (1 + ij)kj  jR (kj) min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg 8j 2 fg; bg (2)
If a rm defaults, the nancial intermediary seizes the fraction  of her revenue up to its
debt, that is the nancial intermediary gets min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg. Thus, the prot
of the rm in case of default is equal to jR (kj) min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg. If the rm
fullls the contract, she gets her revenue minus the payment to the nancial intermediary:
j R (k)   (1 + ij)kj. This incentive constraint means that the rm is better o¤ paying
to the nancial intermediary, in which case she gets jR (k)  (1 + ij)kj, than defaulting,
in which case she gets jR (kj)  min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg. Another way to write the
non-default constraint (2) is as follows:
min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg  (1 + ij)kj 8j 2 fg; bg (3)
The above equation means that rms have incentives to fulll the contract if the payment
of rms to nancial intermediary in case of default, min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg, is larger
than in case of fullling the contract, (1 + ij)kj.
Note that if a rm defaults is because the payment in case of default,min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg,
is smaller than the payment in case of fullling the contract (1 + ij)kj (see non default
constraint 3). This implies that if a rm defaults then its payment to the nancial inter-
mediary is j R (kj):
min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg = j R (kj)
Remark 1 Since the payment of the rm to the nancial intermediary in case of default
is always j R (kj), we will substitute from now on the mathematical expression of the pay-
ment of the rm to the nancial intermediary in case of defaultmin fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg
by j R (kj).
Thus, we may rewrite the non default constraint (2) as follows:
j R (kj)  (1 + ij)kj  (1  ) jR (kj) 8j 2 fg; bg (4)
The second incentive constraint is the revelation constraint: rms should have incentives
to reveal their true type:
jR(kj)  (1 + ij)kj  max fjR(kj0)(1  ); jR(kj0)  (1 + ij0)kj0g
8j; j0 2 fg; bg j 6= j0 (5)
If, for instance, j is the bad type and j0 is the good type, then the above incentive
constraint says that the bad type rm should be better o¤ signing the contract destined
to her own type (receiving jR(kj)   (1 + ij)kj as a payo¤), rather than pretending to
8be a good type (in which case she gets the maximum payo¤ between pretending being a
good rm and defaulting jR(kj0)(1   ) or pretending being a good rm and repaying
the loan bR(kg)  (1 + ig)kg). The same should be true for the good type rm.
Finally, another constraint that any contract should satisfy is that expected (average)
prots of nancial intermediaries should not be negative. In order to dene the expected
prot of nancial intermediary, we will use the indicator function j(ij; kj;) to denote
the range of interest rate and capital at which the rm of type j will not default (see
non-default constraint 4):
j(ij; kj;) =

1 if j R (kj)  (1 + ij)kj  (1  )j R (kj)
0 if j R (kj)  (1 + ij)kj < (1  )j R (kj) ()
j(ij; kj;) =

1 if j R (kj)  (1 + ij)kj
0 if j R (kj) < (1 + ij)kj
The above indicator function means that if j = 1, the rm fullls the contract, while
if j = 0, the rm defaults. Thus, the expected prot by nancial intermediaries is as
follows:


g(1+ig)kg + (1-g)(- )gR(kg)-(1+r)kg

+ (6)
(1-) [b(1+ib)kb + (1-b) [(- )bR(kb)] -(1+r)kb]  0
The revenue of a nancial intermediary from a contract is equal to (1+ij)kj when the
rm fullls the contract (j = 1) and jR(kj) when the rm does not fulll the contract
(j = 0). The costs that a contract generate for the nancial intermediary consist in
the payment to depositors, (1+r)kj, plus the bankruptcy costs when the rm defaults
(j = 0), which are  jR(kj). Note that the bankruptcy cost is always incurred by the
nancial intermediary. This fact is not incompatible, as we will see later, with the outcome
that the nancial intermediary shifts the bankruptcy cost to rms through higher interest
rates.
Denition 2 A menu of contracts f(ig; kg); (ib; kb)g is an equilibrium menu of contracts
if it satises the following conditions:
1. The nancial intermediary non-negative prot condition (6) holds.
2. The revelation constraints (5) holds.
3. 8j 2 fg; bg there is no other contract (i0j; k0j) for the type j in which the rm j is bet-
ter o¤jR(k0j) min

j R
 
k0j

; (1 + i0j)k
0
j
	
> jR(kj) min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg
and in which nancial intermediary gets at least zero prot j(1+ij)kj+(1-j) [(- )gR(kj)] 
(1+r)kj and in which the revelation constraint (5) holds for j0 6= j.
4. There is no other menu of contracts f(i0g; k0g); (i0b; k0b)g, in which nancial intermediary
gets at least zero prot (6) and in which jR(k0j)   min

j R
 
k0j

; (i0j + 1)k
0
j
	 
jR(kj) min fj R (kj) ; (1 + ij)kjg 8j , being the last inequality strict for one of
the types, and in which the revelation constraint (5) holds.
9Thus, a menu of contracts is an equilibrium if it satises the non-negative nancial
intermediary prot condition (6) and the revelation constraint (5), and it is not possible
to nd, for one or both rm types, a better contract where non-negative nancial inter-
mediary prot condition (6) is satised. Note that the revelation constraint always holds
when nancial intermediary o¤ers the same contract to both types. When the nancial
intermediary o¤ers di¤erent contracts to di¤erent types, the revelation constraint should
hold in order that the types self-select themselves and chose the contract that is designed
for each of them.
When there is adverse selection, there are two possible types of contracts: i) the sep-
arating contract, which is commonly dened in the literature as an equilibrium in which
each type has a di¤erent contract and; ii) the pooling contract, in which all the types
have the same contract and in which one of the type, typically the more productive type,
is cross-subsidizing the other type. A standard result in the literature of adverse selection
is that the pooling contract is never equilibrium. The intuition of this result is that, the
more productive type is cross-subsidizing the less productive. Thus, it is always possible
that a principal o¤ers a contract in which the more productive type is better o¤ than
in the pooling contract and the less productive type is worse o¤. Note that the reason
why separating equilibrium may exist and pooling equilibrium does not is not because the
separating equilibrium o¤ers a di¤erent contract to each type and the pooling contract
o¤ers only one type of contract. The crucial reason is that in the separating equilibrium
there is no cross-subsidy across types and in the pooling equilibrium there is cross-subsidy
across types. This is the reason why we introduce in the paper a more general denition of
pooling and separating equilibrium than in other papers of the literature. More precisely,
we dene the separating equilibrium as an equilibrium in which the zero prot condition
of nancial intermediary holds separately for each type of rm and the pooling equilib-
rium as a contract in which both rm types receive the same contract and the zero prot
conditions do not hold separately for each rm type. That is, the zero prot condition
holds jointly for all the types but the expected prot of nancial intermediary for one
of the types is negative. This means that the pooling equilibrium, according with our
denition, is an equilibrium menu of contracts in which one of the types cross-subsidizes
to the other type. The particular framework of this paper implies that it is possible to
have a separating equilibrium in which the nancial intermediary (the principal) o¤ers
the same contract to both rms types (the agents), as we will see in section 4. Given our
denition of separating equilibrium, this does not contradict the standard result which
says that there is no equilibrium in which one agent cross-subsidizes others, what we call
pooling equilibrium.
Denition 3 A menu of contracts f(ig; kg); (ib; kb)g is a separating equilibrium if it is
an equilibrium as dened in denition 2 and the nancial intermediary non-negative
prot condition (6) holds separately for each type. That is, the following equation holds:
8j 2 fg; bg j(1+ij)kj + (1-j)(- )jR(kj)-(1+r)kj  0.
Denition 4 A menu of contracts f(ig; kg); (ib; kb)g is a pooling equilibrium if it is an
equilibrium as dened in denition 2 in which both agent receive the same contract (ig; kg) =
(ib; kb) and in which the nancial intermediary non-negative prot condition (6) does not
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hold separately for each type. That is, 9j 2 fg; bg j(1+ij)kj + (1-j)(- )jR(kj)-
(1+r)kj < 0.
Lemma 5 At equilibrium the zero prot condition of nancial intermediary holds sep-
arately for each type of rm: 8j 2 fg; bg j(1+ij)kj + (1-j)(- )jR(kj) = (1+r)kj.
(proof in appendix)
The intuition of the above lemma is that if a nancial intermediary o¤ers a contract to
a type making prots from it, then it is always possible that other nancial intermediary
can o¤er a contract to that type in which the rm is better o¤. Thus, it is not possible
either that the nancial intermediary has positive prots or that one type cross-subsidizes
the other type. Thus, there is no pooling equilibrium.
Corollary 6 The equilibrium is never a Pooling equilibrium.
Lemma 7 There is no default at equilibrium.(proof in appendix)
Thus, default can never be better than fullling the contract. The intuition is that
since nancial intermediary makes zero prots and the equilibrium is separating, the
bankruptcy cost in case of default is passed to the defaulting rm at the equilibrium.
Thus, if there is a contract in which the rm defaults, it is always possible to o¤er a
contract which the rm will fulll, sparing the bankruptcy cost, which makes the rm
better o¤.
Note that the fact that there is not default at equilibrium does not mean that the non
default constraint is irrelevant. The reason is that the non default constraint implies a
borrowing limit: in order to guarantee that rms do not default, nancial intermediaries
only lend to the rms up to the limit in which rms do not have incentives to default,
called the non default borrowing limit, as we will see below.
Lemmas 5 and 7 imply the following corollary
Corollary 8 The interest rates of contract for both type of rms, good and bad, are equal
to the deposit interest rate ib = ig = r.
Since nancial intermediaries have zero prots in the contract of each type (lemma 5),
and default does not occur at equilibrium (lemma 7), it follows that the interest rate that
nancial intermediary charges should be equal to the depositors interest rate. The above
corollary implies also that the non-default constraint may be rewritten as follows:
j R (kj)  (1 + r)kj  (1  )j R (kj) 8j 2 fg; bg (7)
Figure 1 displays the non-default constraint (7): the rm has incentive to fulll the
contract when the curve that represents the prots when fullling the contract, jR (kj) 
(1 + r)kj, is above the curve that represents the prots when defaulting (1  )jR (kj).
The non-default constraint may be rewritten as follows:
j
R (kj)
kj
 (1 + r) 8j 2 fg; bg (8)
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The above constraint means that the rm will fulll the contract if the average payment
(return per unit of lent capital) to nancial intermediaries when the rm defaults is higher
than when the rm fullls the contract. This constraint is also displayed in gure 1. It
follows from the properties of the revenue function R (k) that the average revenue R (k) =k
is a decreasing function in k9. It is apparent from gure 1 that the non-default constraint
implies a borrowing limit, dened as the level of capital at which the non-default condition
is satised with equality and denoted by kndj :
kndj
Def, j
R
 
kndj

kndj
= (1 + r)
Since the average revenue is decreasing, the default constraint is satised when the amount
of capital that the rm j receives is lower than kndj (as shown in gure 1):
j
R (kj)
kj
 (1 + r), kj  kndj 8j 2 fg; bg (9)
Thus, kndj is the maximum borrowing limit such that the rm does not default. We will
call kndj the non-default borrowing limit. Abusing of notation, lets dene k
nd
j (r; ) as the
function that relates the non-default borrowing limit kndj of rm type j with the interest
rate r and the degree of law enforceability :
kndj (r; )
Def, j
R
 
kndj (r; )

kndj (r; )
= (1 + r) (10)
Since the average revenue of capital R(k)=k is a continuous, di¤erentiable and decreasing
function in <++, the Implicit Function Theorem entails that the function knd (:) is well
dened, continuous and di¤erentiable in <++. Furthermore, the non-default borrowing
limit increases with the degree of law enforceability  and decreases with the interest
rate r. Thus, as displayed in gure 2, the non-default borrowing limit depends on three
factors:
 The degree of law enforceability : a rise in the degree of law enforceability in-
creases the payment to nancial intermediary in case of default (see left hand side
9Note that:
@
h
R(k)
k
i
@k
= [R0(k)k  R(k)] 1
k2
Using the Taylor Theorem and the fact that R(k) is concave and R(0) = 0:
R(0) = R(k) R0(k)k + 1
2
R"(k)k2 ,
R0(k)k  R(k) =  R(0) + 1
2
R"(k)k2 =
1
2
R"(k)k2 < 0
where  is a constant between 0 and 1.
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of equation 8 and gure 2.a below), which implies lower prots for the rm in case
of default (see right hand side of equation 7 and gure 2.a above). Thus, better law
enforcement encourages the fulllment of the contract, increasing the non-default
borrowing limit.
 Productivity : higher productivity implies larger payment to nancial intermediary
in case of default (see left hand side of equation 8 and gure 2.b below). Thus, higher
productivity encourages the fulllment of the contract, increasing the non-default
borrowing limit.
 The interest rate r: a rise in the interest rate increases the payment to nancial
intermediary in case of fullling the contract (see right hand side of equation 8 and
gure 2.c below), which implies lower prots for the rm in case of fullling the con-
tract (see left hand side of equation 7 and gure 2.a above). Thus, a higher interest
rate deters the fulllment of the contract, reducing the non-default borrowing limit.
Since higher productivity encourages the fulllment of the contract, the non-default
borrowing limit is higher for the good type than for the bad type:
kndg (r; ) > k
nd
b (r; )
Thus, as the good type rm has higher productivity, she gets a larger amount of capital
than the bad type rm at the same interest rate. Thus, if nancial intermediaries would
have information about the rm types, the good type rm would get a better contract
than the bad type: it receives more capital and pays the same interest rate as the bad
type rm. This means that the good type rm has never the incentive to pretend to be
a bad type. Only the bad type rm has incentives to not reveal her type since the non
default borrowing constraint is looser for good type rm. Thus, the capital that bad rms
choose is either the optimal capital (if it is possible), or the non-default borrowing limit:
kb(r; ) = min

kndb (r; ) ; k

b (r)
	
Hence, the prot function of bad rms is as follows:
b(r; ) = max
k2[0;kndb (r;)]
bR (k)  (1 + r)k = bR (kb(r; ))  (1 + r)kb(r; ) (11)
With this, we characterize the optimal contract for the bad type.
For the good type, we need to take into account both the non-default constraint and
the revelation constraint; we will start with the latter. We have seen that, due to perfect
competition in the nancial sector, nancial intermediaries o¤er to the bad type rm
the best possible contract such that the nancial intermediary gets zero prot and the
non-default constraint is satised for the bad type rm. This means that if a rm of the
bad type asks for the contract of the good type, it is because she plans to default. If she
wouldnt plan to default, she would be better o¤ accepting the contract o¤ered to her
own type.
Lemma 9 If the revelation constraint of the bad type is binding, then
max fbR(kg)  (1 + r)kg; (1  )bR(kg)g = (1   )bR(kg). That is, the bad type can
only prefer the contract for the good type if she defaults. (proof in appendix)
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Good and bad rms always pay the same interest rate, however good rms receive more
capital than bad rms when law enforceability is e¤ective enough. This does not mean
that, when bad rms receive lower capital, it is necessarily because they are identied
as bad type (and refused to be given more capital). In fact, when law enforceability is
e¤ective enough, bad rms chose at equilibrium a lower level of capital than good rms
and revelation constraint is not binding. The problem arises when the law enforcement
becomes weak. In this case bad rms would get higher prots getting the same amount of
capital as good type rms and defaulting, rather than getting its optimal level of capital
and fullling the contract. When this happens, the revelation constraint is binding and
a¤ects the allocation of capital at equilibrium. Thus, the revelation constraint for the
good type is never binding and the revelation constraint for the bad type is as follows:
bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb  (1  )bR(kg) (12)
Lets dene the revelation borrowing limit krv as the capital o¤ered to the good type at
which the revelation constraint is satised with equality for a given kb:
krv
def, (1  )bR(krv) = b = bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb , R(krv) = b
(1  )b
Since the revenue function R(k) is strictly increasing, the revelation borrowing limit is
well dened. Furthermore, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem and (11) that
the revelation borrowing limit is an increasing function of the degree of law enforceability
 and a decreasing function of the interest rate r. We will denote such function krv (r; ):
krv (r; )
def, (1  )bR (krv (r; )) = b (r; ) (13)
It follows from the fact that the revenue function R(k) is increasing that the revelation
constraint is satised only if the amount of capital is smaller than the revelation borrowing
limit:
bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb  (1  )bR(k), k  krv
Figures 3, 4 and 5 display the revelation constraint. The revelation borrowing limit
depends on:
 The degree of law enforceability :. There are two e¤ects of the degree of law en-
forceability: i) A direct e¤ect: an increase in the degree of law enforceability reduces
the prots of bad rms when not revealing their true type, and hence diminishes
the incentives to dissemble their type. Thus, better law enforcement increases reve-
lation borrowing limits. ii) Furthermore, there is an indirect e¤ect: if bad rms are
constrained by the non-default borrowing limit, a rise in  increases the non-default
borrowing limit and the prots of bad rms when they truly reveal their type, thus
increasing the revelation borrowing limit.
 The interest rate r: an increase in the interest rate reduces the prots of bad rms,
and therefore the payment of bad rms when they truly reveal their type, reducing
their incentive to do so.
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Lemma 10 If the non-default constraint is binding for the good type, then the revelation
constraint of the bad type is not satised. (proof in appendix)
The above lemma means that the revelation constraint is always tighter for the good
rm than the non-default constraint. In other words, the revelation constraint is the one
which is relevant for the good rms.
Corollary 11 The non-default constraint is never binding for good rms.
Thus, when the non-default constraint is binding for good rms, the revelation borrow-
ing limit is smaller than the non-default limit. Since the revelation constraint is always
more restrictive that the non-default constraint, the non-default constraint is never bind-
ing for the good type in equilibrium.
To sum up, if f(ig; kg); (ib; kb)g is a menu of contracts, then ig = ib = r and kb and kg
should be the solutions of the following optimization problems:
kb = argmax
k
bR(k)  (1 + r)k
s:t: bR(k)  (1 + r)k  (1  )bR(k)
(14)
kg = argmax
k
gR(k)  (1 + r)k
s:t: bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb  (1  )bR(k)
(15)
An equivalent way to rewrite the above menu of contracts is as follows:
kb = argmax
k
bR(k)  (1 + r)k
s:t: kb  kndb
(16)
kg = argmax
k
gR(k)  (1 + r)k
s:t: kg  krv
(17)
With these, we fully characterise the optimal menu of contracts.
4. Law Enforcement and Firm Size Distribution
In this section we examine how the degreee of law enforcement a¤ects the equilibrium
menu of contracts found before. We have seen in the previous section that better law
enforceability loosens the incentive constraints since it reduces the payment of rms when
they default or do not truly reveal their type. This means that better law enforceability
expands the borrowing limits of rms, both the non-default borrowing limit (which a¤ects
bad rms) and the revelation borrowing limit (which a¤ects good rms). In this section
we analyze the relationship between the degree of law enforceability and the rm size
distribution.
Lets dene ndj as the degree of law enforceability at which the type j rm satises the
non-default constraint (7) with equality for the optimal level of capital (dened in 1):
ndj
Def, jR
 
kj
  (1 + r)kj = (1  ndj )jR  kj , ndj  (1 + r)kjjR  kj 
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We will call ndj the non-default degree of law enforceability for the type j. If the degree
of law enforceability  is above the non-default degree of law enforceability for the type j,
then this type of rm does not have incentives to default when she maximizes prots (she
chooses the optimal capital kj ). When  is below 
nd
j , rm of type j will default if she is
allowed to chose any amount of capital without constraints. This is why, if  is below ndj ,
rm of type j will be constrained at equilibrium. Using the denition of optimal capital
(see equation 1), it yields:
ndj =
R0
 
kj

kj
R
 
kj
 = "R  kj  < 1 (18)
where "R (kj) denotes the elasticity of rm revenue with respect to capital, and the in-
equality comes from the assumption that R(k) is a strictly concave function and R(0) = 0.
Lets dene rv as the the degree of law enforceability at which the revelation constraint
(12) is satised with equality for the optimal level of capital (dened in equation 1):
rv Def, bR(kb )  (1 + r)kb = (1  rv)bR(kg) ,
rv =
bR(k

g)  [bR(kb )  (1 + r)kb ]
bR(kg)
< 1
We will call rv the revelation degree of law enforceability. Using the denition of optimal
capital (1) and the denition of non-default degree of law enforceability (18), it follows
that the revelation degree of law enforceability rv is larger than the non-default degree
of law enforceability for the bad type:
rv =
R(kg) R(kb )
R(kg)
+
(1 + r)kb
bR(kg)
=
R(kg) R(kb )
R(kg)
+
bR
0(kb )k

b
bR(kg)
rv =
R(kg) R(kb )
R(kg)
+ ndb
R(kb )
R(kg)
=
R(kg) R(kb )
R(kg)
(1  ndb ) + ndb > ndb (19)
where in the second equality we use the denition of optimal capital (see equation 1)
and in the third equality we use the denition of non-default degree of law enforceability
(equation 18). When  is above rv, bad rms do not have any incentive to accept the
contract designed for the good type and, consequently, the revelation constraint is not
binding at equilibrium. When  is below rv, revelation constraint is binding. Since rv
is larger than ndb , when the degree of law enforceability is in the interval [
rv; 1] neither
the non-default nor the revelation constraint are binding for the optimal capital of both
rm types, which means that the e¢ cient allocation is the equilibrium. Figure 3 displays
the case in which the degree of law enforceability is in the interval [rv; 1]. In such case
neither the non-default limit for the bad rms, nor the revelation borrowing limit for good
rms, are binding. Figure 3 displays also the prots of bad rms when they decide not
to truly reveal their type and the degree of law enforceability is equal to rv (see dotted
line). In this last case the revelation borrowing limit coincides with the optimal capital
for the good type. We may summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 12 When  2 [rv; 1], neither the revelation nor the non-default constraints
are binding, thus kb = kb and kg = k

g . That is, the rm size distribution is e¢ cient.
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When the degree of law enforceability is in the interval

ndb ; 
rv

, the non-default con-
straints are not binding for the optimal capital of both types, but the revelation constraint
is binding. This implies that the the size of the bad type rm is optimal: it receives at
equilibrium its optimal amount of capital. The good type receives an ine¢ ciently small
amount of capital (smaller than its optimal level) that is determined by the revelation
constraint (that is, by the revelation borrowing limit: kg = krv). Thus the size of the
good rms is ine¢ ciently small. Figure 4 displays the case in which the degree of law
enforceability is in the interval

ndb ; 
rv

. In this case the non-default limit is not binding
for the bad rms, and therefore the capital of these rms reaches its optimal level. How-
ever, good rms are constraint by the revelation borrowing limit, which is tighter when
law enforcement is weaker ( is smaller).
Since the revelation borrowing limit krv is increasing in the degree of law enforceability
(see 13), the amount of capital that good rms receive is increasing in the degree of law
enforceability. We may summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 13 When  2 ndb ; rv the non-default constraint is not binding but the
revelation constraint is binding, thus kb = kb and kg = k
rv < kg. That is, the size of
bad rms is optimal while the size of good rms is ine¢ ciently small. Furthermore, krv
is increasing in .
Note that according with the above proposition when  2 ndb ; rv the capital of the
bad rm is the same as in the e¢ cient allocation but the amount of capital of good rms
is smaller. This implies that the fraction of capital devoted to good rms is smaller than
in the e¢ cient allocation:
kg < k

g
kb = k

b

) kb
kg
>
kb
kg
)
kg
kg + (1  )kb =

 + (1  ) kb
kg
<

 + (1  )kb
kg
=
kg
kg + (1  )kb
Thus, it follows from proposition 13 that good rms receive an ine¢ ciently small portion
of capital:
Corollary 14 When  2 ndb ; rv good rms receive an ine¢ ciently small share of the
capital: kg
kg+(1 )kb <
kg
kg+(1 )kb
.
When  < ndb , the optimal capital of bad rms does not satisfy anymore the non-default
constraint. The optimal contract of the bad rm (14) may be rewritten as follows:
max
k2[0;kndb ]
bR(k)  (1 + r)k
Since the revenue function is concave and the non-default borrowing limit is smaller than
the optimal capital, the capital of the bad type is her non-default borrowing limit:
kb = k
nd
b
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Since we have seen that rv > ndb , when  < 
nd
b the revelation constraint is binding for
the good type:
kg = k
rv
Lemma 15 If kb = kndb  kb then kg = krv = kndb :
The above lemma says that when the non-default constraint is binding for the bad
type, the revelation borrowing limit is equal to the non-default borrowing limit of the
bad type. That is, when the non-default borrowing constraint is binding, the borrowing
limit of both the good and the bad type is the non-default borrowing limit of the bad
type. Thus, when  < ndb the capital of the good and bad rms is the same, and
equal to the non-default borrowing limit of the bad type. Such limit is increasing in
the degree of law enforceability . Figure 5 displays the case in which the degree of law
enforceability is smaller than ndb . In this case the non-default constraint is binding for the
bad rms and therefore, the capital of these rms is equal to the non-default borrowing
limit. The revelation constraint is binding for the good rms and their capital is equal to
the revelation borrowing limit. It turns out that the non-default borrowing limit for bad
rms coincides with the revelation borrowing limit. Figure 5 shows that when bad rms
are borrowing-constrained, their prots when concealing their type are superior to their
prots when revealing their type, for any capital larger than the non-default borrowing
limit. Thus, the revelation borrowing limit coincides with the non-default borrowing limit
for the bad type. Figure 5 displays also the prots of bad rms when they decide not
to reveal their type and the degree of law enforceability is equal to ndb (see dotted line).
In this last case the revelation borrowing limit and the non-default borrowing limit for
the bad type coincide with the optimal capital for the bad type. These results may be
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 16 When  2  0; ndb  the non-default constraint of the bad type and the
revelation constraint are binding. Furthermore, kb = kg = kndb < k

b . That is, the rm
size of both good and bad type is ine¢ ciently small. Finally, kndb is increasing in .
Note that according with the above proposition when  2  0; ndb  the capital of the
bad and good rms are the same, but the capital of the good type rm is larger than the
capital of the bad type rm in the e¢ cient allocation. This implies that the fraction of
capital devoted to good rms is smaller than in the e¢ cient allocation:
kb < k

g
kb = kg

) k

b
kg
< 1 =
kb
kg
>
kb
kg
)
kg
kg + (1  )kb =

 + (1  ) kb
kg
<

 + (1  )kb
kg
=
kg
kg + (1  )kb
Thus, it follows from proposition 16 that good rms receive an ine¢ ciently small portion
of capital:
Corollary 17 When  < ndb good rms receive an ine¢ ciently small share of the capital:
kg
kg+(1 )kb <
kg
kg+(1 )kb
.
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Summarizing, the allocation of capital to rms depends on the degree of law enforce-
ability . There are three di¤erent types of equilibrium:
1. When law enforcement is e¤ective enough,  > rv, incentive constraints are not
binding and both good and bad rms chose their optimal level of capital. That is,
rm size distribution is optimal.
2. When law enforcement is in a middle interval,  2 ndb ; rv, bad rms are not
constrained but good rms are constrained by the revelation borrowing limit. This
means that bad rms choose their optimal capital but good rms are undernanced,
that is, their rm size is smaller than their optimal one. An improvement in law
enforcement, loosens the revelation constraint and increases the capital allocated to
good rms.
3. When law enforcement is weak,  < ndb , bad rms are constrained by the non-
default borrowing limit and good rms are constrained by the revelation borrowing
limit. This means that both bad and good rms are undernanced and are smaller
than their optimal size. Furthermore, good rms receive an ine¢ ciently small share
of the capital. An improvement in law enforcement loosens the default and revelation
constraints and increases the capital allocated to both rms.
5. Existence of Equilibrium
Corollary 6 says that pooling equilibrium does not exist, where pooling equilibrium
is dened as a menu of contracts in which both rm types receive the same contract
and there is cross-subsidy across agents. As we have explained, the intuition of this
result is that when good agents are cross-subsidizing bad agents, it is always possible
by the principal to o¤er to the good agent a better contract than the pooling contract.
Furthermore, separating equilibrium may not exist either. The reason is that, under
certain circumstances, it is possible to o¤er a pooling contract in which agents are better
o¤ than in the separating contract. When this happens, it does not exist any equilibrium
contract. In order to rule out this undesired possibility, in this section we analyze the
pooling contract and we compare the prots of the good rm in the best of such contracts
with the prots of the good rm at the (separating) equilibrium, to determine whether
the (separating) equilibrium exists. The conclusion is that if the bankruptcy cost  is
high enough, the equilibrium always exists.
To check whether (separating) equilibrium exists we will compare the separating equi-
librium with the best possible pooling contract. Such pooling contract will be called
pooling quasi-equilibrium and it is dened as follows.
Denition 18 A contract (i; k) is a pooling quasi-equilibrium contract if it satises the
following conditions:
1. The nancial intermediary non-negative prot condition (6) holds;
2. The nancial intermediary non-negative prot condition (6) does not hold separately
for each type. That is, 9j 2 fg; bg j(1+ij)kj + (1-j)(- )jR(kj)-(1+r)kj < 0;
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3. There is no other pooling contract (i0j; k
0
j) in which the nancial intermediary non-
negative prot condition (6) holds, but not separately, 9j 2 fg; bg j(1+i0j)k0j+(1-
j)(- )jR(k
0
j)-(1+r)k
0
j < 0 and in which both agents are better o¤, 8j 2 fg; bg
jR(k
0)   (1 + i0)k0  jR(k)   (1 + i)k, being the last inequality strict for one of
the types.
Thus, a pooling contract is a pooling quasi-equilibrium if there is no another pooling
equilibrium in which the agents are better o¤, being one of them strictly better o¤.
Lemma 19 In any pooling quasi-equilibrium (k; i) the bad type rm defaults: bR (k)  
(1 + i)k < (1  )bR (k). (proof in appendix)
We have dened the pooling contract as a menu of contracts in which both types
have the same contract and there is cross-subsidizing across agents (see denition 4).
Note that if there is no bankruptcy in equilibrium, the zero prot condition of nancial
intermediaries implies that the interest rate is equal to the deposit interest rate (see
corollary 8), which implies that there is no cross-subsidy across agents, which means that
the contract is not a pooling equilibrium according to our denition. Thus, the only way
in our model to have cross-subsidy across agents is that one of the types defaults and the
nancial intermediary passes the unpaid debt of the defaulter plus the bankruptcy cost
to the other type. Since the bad type has less revenues and consequently pays less in case
of default, such type always has more incentives to default than the good type.
Lemma 20 In any pooling quasi-equilibrium (k; i) the good type rms fulll the contract:
bR (k)  (1 + i)k  (1  )bR (k). (proof in appendix)
The intuition of the above lemma is that given the fact that the bad type is going always
to default (see lemma 19) and given that her revenues are smaller than those of the good
type, the bad type is going to pay always less than the good type. This means that the
good type is going to cross-subsidize the bad type. Thus, the nancial intermediary is
going to pass the bankruptcy cost of the bad type to him. If the good type defaults as
well, the nancial intermediary will pass to the good type both the bankruptcy cost of
the bad type and her own bankruptcy cost. This means that if there is a pooling contract
in which the good type defaults, it is always possible to nd another contract in which
the good type does not default and she is better o¤ due to the fact that she spares herself
her own bankruptcy costs.
Note that lemmas 19 and 20 together imply that the good type cross-subsidizes the bad
type and that the nancial intermediary passes the bankruptcy costs of the bad type to
the good type through higher interest rates.
The separating contract is not an equilibrium if there is a pooling contract in which the
good type is strictly better o¤ than in the separating contract. Thus, to prove existence
of (separating) equilibrium, it is enough to prove that the prot of the good type rm
in the separating contract is higher than in the best possible pooling quasi-equilibrium.
We have seen in lemmas 19 and 20 that in any pooling quasi-equilibrium the good type
fullls the contract and the bad type defaults. Thus, the best pooling quasi-equilibrium
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for the good type is as follows10:
Poolingg (;  ) = max
k;i
gR(k)  (1 + i)k
s:t: gR(k)  (1 + i)k  (1  )gR(k)
(1 + r)k  (1  )(   )bR(k) + (1 + i)k
(20)
The rst of the above constraints is the non-default constraint for the good type, since
we have proven in lemma 20 that good types do not default at pooling quasi-equilibria.
The second constraint is the zero prot condition for nancial intermediaries, which takes
account of lemmas 19 and 20 that in any pooling quasi-equilibrium the good type fullls
the contract and the bad type defaults.
Proposition 21 For any  there is  such that if  >  then 8 2 [0; rv] ; Separatingg () 
poolingg (;  ). (proof in appendix)
Thus, when the bankruptcy costs are high enough, the separating contract is an equi-
librium.
The results of this section are summarized in the following table:
6. General Equilibrium
In this section we extend the model in order to analyze the e¤ect of imperfect law en-
forcement on rm size distribution in a general equilibrium environment. This approach
will allow us to analyze the e¤ect of law enforcement on per capita production and aggre-
gate productivity. In order to do this, we keep all the assumptions in the model, stated in
section 2, and we add two elements needed in order to extend the model from a partial to
a general equilibrium framework: i) We incorporate to the model agents that own capital.
We need this modication in order to determine the interest rate r which is no longer
an exogenous variable, being determined in the capital market in which the demand of
capital by rms should be equal to this supply of capital. We have analyzed the demand
of capital by rms but we have not introduced yet the supply of capital. In order to do
this we need to incorporate to the model agents that own capital. ii) We will introduce a
sunk cost. The reason is that the rms technology up to now presents decreasing return to
scale, which means that it does not have an optimal size in general equilibrium: the lower
the amount of capital of each rm, the more productive each rm is. The introduction
of a sunk cost will imply that each rm type has an optimal rm size and, consequently,
there exists a well dened e¢ cient rm size distribution.
10We could allow the nancial intermediary to use mixed strategies,
in which case the best pooling cuasi-equilibrium would be as follows:
max
k;i;
gR(k)  (1 + i)k
s:t: gR(k)  (1 + i)k  (1  )gR(k)
(1 + r)k  (1  )(   )bR(k) + (1 + i)k
where  is the probability that the nancial intermediary incurs bankruptcy costs and obliges de-
faulters to pay the fraction  of their revenues. Since the results do not change at all with mixed
strategies, we do not include them in the paper in order to simplify the exposition.
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We will assume that there is a continuum of risk-neutral agents indexed in the interval
[0; 1], each of them with k units of capital. Thus, k is also the per capita capital. Agents
may chose between depositing their funds with a nancial intermediary or creating a rm.
We will refer to the agents that chose to create a rm as entrepreneurs and to the ones
that deposit their capital with a nancial intermediary as depositors. To create a rm,
a sunk cost of k units is required11. After investing the sunk cost in creating a rm,
entrepreneurs receive a productivity shock j 2 fg; bg. Agents decide whether to create
a rm or not before knowing the productivity shock that the rm would receive. Given
that agents are risk neutral, the expected prots of creating a rm should be equal in
equilibrium to the expected depositors´ income. Otherwise, either all agents will decide
to become entrepreneurs, if the expected prots of the rms are higher than expected
depositors income, or to become depositors, in the opposite case. Thus, the expected
prots of a rm should be equal to the depositorsincome at equilibrium:
 g + (1  )b = (1 + r)k (21)
where g and b are the prots of the good and bad rm in the menu of contracts (14)
and (15):
j = jR(kj)  (1 + r)kj j 2 fg; bg
In this setup, the number of rms and the interest rate are endogenous variables. We will
refer to the per capita number of rms as n. Given that entrepreneurs should invest their
k units of capital in order to create a rm, the capital market clearing condition will be
as follows:
n [ kg + (1  ) kb] = (1  n)k (22)
That is, there are n rms in per capita terms and the average demand of capital by these
rm is [ kg + (1  ) kb]. Thus the per capita demand of capital by rms is equal to
n [ kg + (1  ) kb]. Since the per capita number of entrepreneurs coincides with the per
capita number of rms, n, and agents that are not entrepreneurs are depositor, there are
(1   n) per capita depositors, each of them with k units of funds. This means that the
per capita supply of capital is equal to (1  n)k.
Denition An equilibrium is an allocation of resources fkg; kb; ng and an interest rate r
such that:
 kg, kb satisfy the menu of contracts dened in (14) and (15);
 The arbitrage condition (21) is satised;
 The capital market clearing condition (22) is satised.
11The assumption that the sunk cost is equal to the per capita amount of capital implies that the optimal
per capita number of rms is constant, that is, it does not depend on the per capita amount of capital.
This feature of the model would be able to be replicated in a neoclassical model with capital and labor
in which the sunk cost would consist in a xed amount of labor, as the one in subsection ??.
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6.1. The Benchmark case: The E¢ cient allocation
Lets dene per capita income as the payment that agents receive net of their initial
capital:
y = n [ [gR(kg)-(1+r)kg]+(1-) [bR(kb)-(1+r)kb]]+(1-n)(1+r)k-k
That is, there are n per capita entrepreneurs and their payments are equal to prots
which on average are equal to  [gR(kg)-(1+r)kg]+(1-) [bR(kb)-(1+r)kb]. There are
1  n per capita depositors, their payments are equal to their capital k plus the interest
derived from it rk. The sum of the payments of entrepreneur plus depositors, minus the
capital is the income that may be rewritten as follows:
y = n [ gR(kg) + (1  )bR(kb)]  k (23)
We dene the e¢ cient allocation
 
nE; kEg ; k
E
b

as the one that maximizes per capita
income subject to the feasibility constraint (where superscript E stands for general equi-
librium):
max
n;kg ;kb
n [gR(kg) + (1  )bR(kb)]  k
s:t:: n [ (kg + k) + (1  ) (kb + k)]  k
The feasibility constraint means that the capital used by rms in per capita terms, which
is equal to the per capita number of rms n multiplied by the average amount of capital
used by rms, including both the capital used in production kj and the sunk cost k, should
be smaller than or equal as the per capita amount of capital k. The rst order conditions
of the above problem are:
gR
0(kEg ) = ` (24)
bR
0(kEb ) = ` (25)
gR(k
E
g ) + (1  )bR(kEb )

= `

 kEb + (1  ) kEb + k

(26)
n


 
kEg + k

+ (1  )  kEb + k = k (27)
where ` is the Lagrangian multiplier. Equations (24), (25) and (26) imply that:
gR
0(kEg ) = bR
0(kEb ) (28)
 g

R(kEg )-R
0(kEg )k
E
g

+ (1-) b

R(kEb )-R
0(kEb )k
E
b

= gR
0(kEg )k (29)
n


 
kEg + k

+ (1  )  kEb + k = k (30)
Solving the above system of equations we would get the optimal rm size for bad and good
type of rms, kEg and k
E
b , and the optimal per capita amount of rms n
. It is easy to
check that the e¢ cient allocation coincides with the equilibrium allocation under perfect
enforcement. In fact, if we interpret the Lagrangian multiplier as the price of the capital,
` = (1+r), we will obtain the equilibrium conditions under perfect law enforcement:
gR
0(kEg ) = (1+r
) (31)
bR
0(kEb ) = (1+r
) (32)


gR(k
E
g )-(1+r)k
E
g

+ (1-)

bR(k
E
b )-(1 + r)k
E
b

= (1+r)k (33)
n

 kEg + (1-) k
E
b

= (1-n)k (34)
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The rst two equations, (31) and (32), say that rms maximize prots without borrowing
constraints and consequently rmsmarginal productivity of capital (or marginal revenue
of capital) should be equal to the renting price of capital. The third equation is the
non-arbitrage condition that says that the expected revenues of entrepreneurs should
be equal to the capital income by depositors. The last equation is the capital market
clearing condition. Equations (31), (32) and (33) imply the same system of equation that
determine the e¢ cient allocation, equations (28) to (30). Thus, when law enforcement is
perfect, the equilibrium allocation coincides with the e¢ cient one.
Remark 22 Note that, in contrast to partial equilibrium, the optimal capital in general
equilibrium, kEj , does not depend on the interest rate, which is an endogenous variable
in such context. We denote by kj (r) the function that relates the capital that maximizes
the prots of the rm without constraints to the interest rate (dened in (1). We will
call this kj (r) the unconstrained demand for capital by rm type j. Note that k

j (r) is
what we called optimal capital in partial equilibrium, when the interest rate was exogenous
(analyzed in previous sections).
6.2. Imperfect law enforcement
As we have seen in section 3, bad rms are constrained by the non-default borrowing
limit, kndb (r; ), dened in (10), which is a decreasing function of the interest rate r and
an increasing function of the degree of law enforceability . kb (r) is the unconstrained
demand for capital by bad type for a given interest rate, dened in (1), which is decreasing
in the interest rate. Since bad rms only su¤er the non-default constraint, we may dene
the demand function for capital by a bad rm as the minimum between the unconstrained
demand for capital and the non-default borrowing limit:
kb (r; ) = min

kndb (r; ) ; k

b (r)
	
Thus, the demand for capital by a bad rm is decreasing in the interest rate r and
increasing in the degree of law enforceability  when the non-default borrowing limit is
binding. The prots of bad rms are:
b(r; ) = max
k2[0;kndb (r;)]
bR (k)  (1 + r)k = bR (kb(r; ))  (1 + r)kb(r; )
It follows from the envelope theorem that b(r; ) is a strictly decreasing function of r and
does not depend on  when the non-default constraint is not binding, and it is strictly
increasing on  when the non-default constraint is binding, kndb (r; ) < k

b (r).
12
As we have shown in section 3, good rms are constrained by the revelation borrowing
limit, krv(r; ), dened in (13), which is a decreasing function of the interest rate r and
an increasing function of the degree of law enforceability . Thus, the demand function
for capital by a good rm is the minimum between the unconstrained demand for capital
and the revelation borrowing limit:
kg (r; ) = min

krv (r; ) ; kg (r)
	
12Note that when the non-default allocation is binding then bR0
 
kndb (r; )

> (1 + r).
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Thus, the demand for capital by a good rm is decreasing in the interest rate r and
increasing in the degree of law enforceability  when the non-default borrowing limit is
binding. The prots of good rms are:
g(r; ) = max
k2[0;krv(r;)]
gR (k)  (1 + r)k = gR (kg(r; ))  (1 + r)kg(r; )
The prots of good rms are decreasing in r and increasing , being strictly increasing in
 when the revelation constraint is binding.
We know from section 4 (proposition 13) that the revelation constraint, which a¤ects
good rms, is binding for a level of  at which the non-default constraint of bad rms is
still not binding. Thus, if we depart from the case of perfect law enforcement,  = 1, and
the degree of law enforceability drops enough, we will reach a point in which the revelation
constraint would start to be binding for the good type, while the non default constraint is
not binding yet for the bad type. When this happens, the equilibrium allocation will not
coincide any more with the e¢ cient allocation. We dene rvE as the threshold degree
of law enforceability at which the revelation constraint is satised with equality for the
optimal capital of rms
 
kEg ; k
E
b

when the interest rate at equilibrium is equal to the
one that occurs when law enforcement is perfect, r:
rvE Def, bR(kEb )  (1 + r)kEb = (1  rvE)bR(kEg )
Note that if  is below rvE the revelation constraint does not hold for the optimal capital
of rms
 
kEg ; k
E
b

. Consequently, the equilibrium will not coincide with the case of perfect
enforcement and the allocation will not be any more the e¢ cient one. When  is equal or
above rvE, neither the revelation constraint nor the non-default constraint are binding,
and consequently the equilibrium will be as in the case of perfect law enforcement (the
allocation will be the e¢ cient one and the interest rate will be equal to r).
We dene ndEb as the threshold level of  such that the non default constraint of bad
type (7) holds with equality at equilibrium for the unconstrained demand of capital for
bad rms. If  is smaller than ndEb , the non default constraint is binding for the bad
type rm and the capital used for her will not be anymore her unconstrained demand. If
 is larger than ndEb , the non default constraint is not binding for the bad type rm and
the capital used for her is equal to her unconstrained demand for capital. More precisely,
ndEb is dened as the solution, together with a value of r, of the following system of
equations13:
bR (kb(r; ))  (1 + r)kb (r) =
 
1  ndEb

bR (kb(r; )) (35)
 g(r; ) + (1  )b(r; )  (1 + r)k = 0 (36)
where the rst equation is the non-default constraint of bad type (7) holding with equality
for the unconstrained demand for capital of bad type rm. The second equation is the
arbitrage condition (21), which determines the equilibrium interest rate.
13Unlike the case of rvE , when law enforcement is at the level of ndEb the interest rate is not anymore
r and needs to be determined jointly with ndEb .
25
Remark 23 Note that rvE and ndEb are di¤erent from the denitions of 
rv(r) and
ndb (r) in section 4, where we used partial equilibrium. In the previous sections, both 
rv
and ndb were dened for a given interest rate (r was an exogenous variable). Thus, 
rv
and ndb in previous sections were functions of the interest rate. In this section, since the
interest rate is an endogenous variable, rvE and ndEb are not any more functions of the
interest rate.
Lemma 24 There exists a unique threshold value of , denoted by ndEb < 
rvE, such
that the non-default constraint of bad type (7) holds with equality at equilibrium when
 = ndEb . When  > 
ndE
b the non default constraint of bad type (7) is not binding, and
when  < ndEb it is binding.
Thus, it follows from lemma 24 and discussion above that: i) when   rvE, incentive
constraints are not binding and the market allocation is the same as with perfect law
enforcement; ii) when  2 ndE; rvE, the revelation constraint is binding for good
rms while non-default constraints are not binding; iii) when  2  0; ndE, the revelation
constraint is binding for the good type and the non-default constraint is binding for the
bad type and the amount of capital used in both rms are the same (see lemma 15).
Proposition 25 When  2  0; rvE, the capital of good rms kg at the equilibrium
increase with the degree of law enforceability . For the bad rms, there is e < ndE, such
that if  2
e; rvE then kb > kEb . Furthermore, if  2  ndEb ; rvE, kb is a decreasing
function of  (being kb = kEb when  = 
rvE). If  2  0; ndE, kb is an increasing
function of .
The above proposition says that when law enforcement is imperfect, the size of good
rms is ine¢ ciently small. Furthermore, the size of bad rms may be ine¢ ciently large.
That is, the amount of capital allocated to bad rms is above its optimal level. The
intuition of the above proposition is that when law enforcement is imperfect, good rms
are constrained, and so is their demand for funds. A lower demand for funds by good rms
implies lower interest rate (see proposition 27 below), which implies that bad rms (when
not constrained) demand more capital than the optimal level kEb . When law enforcement
improves, good rms are less constrained and their demand for funds is higher, increasing
the equilibrium interest rate, and reducing the demand for funds of bad rms. Thus, an
improvement in law enforcement will make good rms grow, while the evolution of bad
rms would not be monotonic (their size will grow for low levels of , exceeding their
optimal size). If law enforcement keeps rising, the size of bad rms eventually starts
shrinking, becoming closer to their optimal size.
Proposition 26 When  2  0; rvE, the average rm size and the share of the capital
that goes to good rms are ine¢ ciently small: kg + (1  ) kb < kEg + (1  ) kEb ;
kg
kg+(1 )kb <
kEg
kEg +(1 )kEb
.
Thus, propositions 25 and 26 show that when law enforcement is weak ( < rvE), rm
size distribution is ine¢ cient in three aspects: i) the size of the good type rm is always
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ine¢ ciently small, while the size of the bad type rm is also ine¢ cient, but it may be
ine¢ ciently small when  is small enough ( < e) or even ine¢ ciently large, when  is
not too small ( > e); ii) the average rm size is ine¢ ciently small; iii) the share of the
capital that goes to good rms is ine¢ ciently small also. When law enforcement improves,
incentive constraints loosen, and the rm size distribution becomes closer to the e¢ cient
rm size distribution in these three aspects. First, good rms grow and the e¤ect on the
rm size of bad rms is not monotonic, but eventually these rms will also get closer to
their optimal level. Second, on average rm size increases, becoming closer to the e¢ cient
level. Third, this positive e¤ect benets specially the good rms, which su¤er a tighter
incentive constraint and consequently the share of the capital that goes to them rises,
getting closer to its e¢ cient level. Thus, the improvement of law enforcement contributes
to make the rm size distribution closer to the e¢ cient one. As a corollary, these e¤ects
of law enforceability on rm size distribution involve also e¤ects in per capita income, as
the following proposition shows.
Proposition 27 When  2  0; rvE, the per capita income y, the average productivity
y=k and the interest rate r increase with the degree of law enforceability .
The mechanism behind these results is quite intuitive: when law enforcement improves,
the incentive constraints and borrowing limits of rms are relaxed, and rms may choose
on average a larger and more productive size. This positive e¤ect a¤ects especially the
good rms, which in some sense have tighter incentive constraints than the bad rms (since
the revelation constraint a¤ecting good rms is tighter that the non-default constraint
a¤ecting bad rms). Thus, better law enforcement implies a more e¢ cient rm size and a
higher allocation of capital to the more productive rms, which entail higher productivity,
per capita income and prots. The larger expected prots imply at equilibrium higher
interest rates.
The results of this section are summarized in the following table:
7. Extension:
7.1. The Role of Own Capital and Collateral
Another interesting extension is to consider that each rm type has a certain amount
of own capital a. We assume that a < kb , which implies that the own capital is not
enough to nance the optimal capital of rms, hence external nance is needed. This
extension of the model would not a¤ect any of the conclusions of the benchmark model.
The interesting thing about it is the e¤ect that the own capital and the collateral would
have on the equilibrium allocation of capital. The basic e¤ect of own capital and collateral
is to ease the incentive constraints: given that the rm debt is smaller (due to own capital)
and the remaining part of the capital is used as a collateral, it becomes more likely that
the recoverable fraction of revenues of the rm plus the collateral exceed the debt of the
rm, providing incentives for the rm to fulll the contract. As in the previous subsection,
we assume that the portion (1   ) of the capital of the rm remains after production
and the fraction  is depreciated. This remaining part of the capital will be pledged as
collateral.
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The non-default constraint when there is own capital and the remaining part of the
capital can be used as a collateral would be as follows:
j R (kj) + (1  )kj   (1 + r) (kj   a)  (1  )j R (kj) 8j 2 fg; bg , (37)
( + r)kj   (1 + r)a  j R (kj) 8j 2 fg; bg , (38)
Thus, the non-default constraint is similar to the one in the benchmark model, there are
only two di¤erences: i) for a given amount of capital used by the rm, kj, the amount of
the debt of the rm, (1 + r) (kj   a), is smaller since the rm uses also own capital; ii)
furthermore, if the rm defaults, she loses the collateral, (1   )kj. Both the existence
of own capital and the use of collateral increase the incentives of rms to fulll the
contract. The non-default borrowing limit is an increasing function of the own capital
and a decreasing function of the part of the capital that cannot be used as a collateral:
the depreciation:
kndj (r; ; a; )
Def, j
R
 
kndj (r; )

kndj (r; )
= ( + r)  (1 + r) a
kndj (r; )
(39)
@kndj (r; ; a; )
@a
=  
(1 + r) 1
kndj
j
@
 
R(kndj )
knd
j
!
@k
  (1 + r) a
(kndj )
2
> 0 (40)
@kndj (r; ; a; )
@
=
1
j
@
 
R(kndj )
knd
j
!
@k
  ( + r) a
(kndj )
2
< 0 (41)
The revelation constraint would be as follows:
b + (1  )k + (1 + r)a  (1  )bR(kg) (42)
where b is dened similarly as in the rest of the paper:
b(r; ; a; ) = max
k2[0;kndb (r;;a;)]
bR (k)  (1 + r)k
Thus, the revelation borrowing limit would be:
krv (r; ; a; ) =
def, (1  )bR (krv (r; ; a)) = b (r; ; a; ) + (1  )k + (1 + r)a(43)
@kndj (r; ; a)
@a
=
@b(r;;a)
@a
+ 1
(1  )b @(R(k
nd
j ))
@k
  (1  )
> 0 (44)
@kndj (r; ; a)
@
=
@b(r;;a)
@
  k
(1  )b @(R(k
nd
j ))
@k
  (1  )
< 0 (45)
Given that if the bad type rm decides not to truly reveal her type its because she will
default, and the gains from default decrease with the own capital and with the collateral, it
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follows that when bad rms have own capital, a, they have more incentives to truly reveal
their type, and this makes the revelation borrowing limit higher. At the same time, the
higher the depreciation, the lower is the part of capital that can be used as collateral, and
hence the more incentives bad rms have to not reveal their type and default. Thus, the
existence of own capital and the use of collateral ease the incentive constraints expanding
both the non-default and the revelation borrowing limits.
8. Conclusions
Empirical evidence supports the idea that law enforcement plays an important role in
determining the performance of the nancial system and the rm size distribution. This
paper has analyzed how the degree of law enforceability a¤ects the way in which the
nancial system allocates capital to rms of di¤erent productivity levels and variable size,
in a framework of imperfect enforcement and asymmetric information. Entrepreneurs use
credit to fund a project, but they have di¤erent productivity (ability) which is known
only to them, and this generates an adverse selection problem. Entrepreneurs can default
and nancial intermediaries can recover only a fraction of their revenue. We interpret this
recoverable fraction as the degree of law enforceability of our economy. The imperfect
enforceability of contracts and the asymmetric information imply that nancial contracts
should satisfy two types of incentive constraints: i) the non-default constraint, which
means that rms should have incentive to repay their debts; and ii) the revelation con-
straint, which means that rms should truly reveal their type. These incentive constraints
entail borrowing limits for rms and a¤ect the allocation of capital to di¤erent rms by
the nancial system. Capital is not e¢ ciently allocated because of two main reasons.
Firstly, rm size is ine¢ ciently small in the sense that the amount of capital that they
use is below the optimal level. Secondly, the lenders do not always allocate e¢ ciently the
capital to rms of di¤erent productivity, as they cannot distinguish among borrowers. In
fact, the good rms su¤er tighter constraints than bad rms, since their level of borrowing
is limited by the revelation constraint, which we showed that it is always more restrictive
than the non-default constraint experienced by the bad rms.
These problems are worsened with imperfect law enforcement. There are tree types of
equilibrium depending on the degree of law enforceability: i) When the law enforcement
is e¤ective enough, but not necessarily perfect, the incentive constrains are not binding
and the allocation of capital to rms is e¢ cient. ii) When the law enforcement is in a
certain middle interval, incentive constraints are binding just for the good rms, which are
undernanced in the sense that get less capital than their optimal level, while incentive
constraint of bad rms are not binding. Thus, the size of good rms is ine¢ ciently
small while the size of bad rms is optimal in a partial equilibrium framework while
it is ine¢ ciently large in general equilibrium. iii) Finally, when the law enforcement
is weaker than a certain threshold, both good and bad rms are constrained. It turns
out that in this type of equilibrium both rm types receive the same amount of capital,
which is ine¢ ciently small in the sense that is smaller than their optimal level. Thus,
more e¤ective law enforcement eases incentive constraints and, as a consequence, the rm
size distribution improves with law enforcement, getting closer to the optimal rm size
distribution. This implies that per capita output, productivity and lenders interest rate
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all increase with law enforcement.
We have also extended our model to include own capital and the use of capital as
a collateral and the main results of the benchmark model do not change with these
modications.
Thus, we have constructed a theory that links the degree of law enforceability with
the functioning of the nancial system, the rm size distribution and the productivity.
Information asymmetries and the heterogeneity in rmsproductivity generate an adverse
selection problem, which plays a crucial role in our theory.
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9. Appendix
Proof Lemma 5:
Let be (big;bkg;bib;bkb; ) the equilibrium menu of contracts and assume that there is j 2
fg; bg such that j(1+bij)bkj + (1-j) h(- )jR(bkj)i-(1+r)bkj > 0. There are two cases:
1 If rm j defaults at equilibrium:
jR(bkj) > (1 +bij)bkj ) (46)h
(- )jR(bkj)i > (1+r)bkj ) jR(bkj) > (1+r)bkj +  jR(bkj) ) (47)bj = (1  )jR(bkj) < jR(bkj)  (1+r)bkj    jR(bkj) (48)
Consider the contract (eij;ekj) such that ekj = bkj and 1 + eij = (1 + r) +  jR(bkj). It
follows from (47) and (48) that rm j does not default with the contract (eij;ekj) and
has more prots with the contract (bij;bkj) than at equilibrium. Obviously the nancial
intermediary has positive prots with the contract (eij;ekj). Furthermore, given that the
revelation constraint for type j0 6= j is satised at equilibrium:
bj0  maxnj0R(bkj)  (1 +bij)bkj; (1  )j0R(bkj)o  (1  )j0R(bkj) (49)
Thus:
 If the revelation constraint holds for the type j0 6= j with the contract (eij;ekj), then
in the contract (eij;ekj) rm j is better o¤ than in the equilibrium contract, nancial
intermediary has positive prot and the revelation constraint holds for j0 6= j. Thus,
(big;bkg;bib;bkb; ) is not an equilibrium contract )(
 If the revelation constraint does not hold for the type j0 for the contract (eij;ekj),
then using (49) it follows that:
(1  )j0R(bkj)  maxnj0R(bkj)  (1 +bij)bkj; (1  )j0R(bkj)o  bj0
< j0R(bkj)  (1 +eij)bkj
Thus, if a nancial intermediary o¤ers the contract (eij;ekj) to both types, according
to the above equation, type j0 would not default and would be better o¤ than at
equilibrium, exactly the same happens for type j and the nancial intermediary
would have positive prots. Thus, (big;bkg;bib;bkb; ) is not an equilibrium menu of
contracts )(
2 If rm j does not default at equilibrium. Then the non-default constraint and the
positive prots of nancial intermediary imply that:
jR(bkj)  (1 +bij)bkj < (1 + r)bkj (50)
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Consider the contract (eij;ekj) = (r;bkj). It follows from the above equation that at
such contract the non-default constraint holds for type j, nancial intermediary has
zero prots and rms of type j are better o¤. Thus:
 If the revelation constraint holds for the type j0 for the contract (eij;ekj), then in the
contract (eij;ekj) the nancial intermediaries has zero prots and rms of type j are
better o¤ than at the equilibrium contract. Thus, (big;bkg;bib;bkb) is not an equilibrium
contract. )(
 If the revelation constraint does not hold for the type j0 for the contract (eij;ekj),
then using (49) it follows that:
(1  )j0R(bkj)  maxnj0R(bkj)  (1 +bij)bkj; (1  )j0R(bkj)o  bj0
< j0R(bkj)  (1 +eij)bkj
Thus, if a nancial intermediary o¤ers the contract (eij;ekj) to both types, according
to the above equation type j0 would not default and would be better o¤ than at
equilibrium, exactly the same happens for type j and the nancial intermediary
would have zero prots. Thus, (big;bkg;bib;bkb; ) is not an equilibriummenu of contracts.
)(
Proof lemma 7
Lets be (big;bkg;bib;bkb; ) the equilibrium menu of contracts and assume that there is a
type of rm j 2 fg; bg that defaults at equilibrium. Thus, it follows from lemma 5 that:h
(- )jR(bkj)i = (1+r)bkj ) jR(bkj) = (1+r)bkj +  jR(bkj) (51)
Consider the contract (eij;ekj) = (r;bkj). It follows from the above equation that in such
contract the non-default constraint holds and rms of type j are better o¤:
jR(bkj) = (1+r)bkj +  jR(bkj) > (1+r)bkjbj = jR(bkj)  (1+r)bkj    jR(bkj) < jR(bkj)  (1 + r)bkj = ej
Thus:
 If the revelation constraint holds for the type j0 for the contract (eij;ekj), then in the
contract (eij;ekj) the nancial intermediaries have zero prots and rms of type j are
better o¤ than at the equilibrium contract. Thus, (big;bkg;bib;bkb) is not an equilibrium
contract. )(
 If the revelation constraint does not hold for the type j0 for the contract (eij;ekj),
then using (49) it follows that:
(1  )j0R(bkj)  maxnj0R(bkj)  (1 +bij)bkj; (1  )j0R(bkj)o  bj0
< j0R(bkj)  (1 +eij)bkj
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Thus, if a nancial intermediary o¤ers the contract (eij;ekj) to both types, according
to the above equation type j0 would not default and would be better o¤ than at
equilibrium, exactly the same happens for type j and the nancial intermediary
would have zero prots. Thus, (big;bkg;bib;bkb; ) is not an equilibriummenu of contracts.
)(
Proof lemma 9:
There are two cases:
1. If the non-default constraint is not binding for the bad type, then:
bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb = max fbR(kg)  (1 + r)kg; (1  )bR(kg)g
bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb = max
k
bR(k)  (1 + r)k  bR(kg)  (1 + r)kg
)
)
max fbR(kg)  (1 + r)kg; (1  )bR(kg)g  bR(kg)  (1 + r)kg )
max fbR(kg)  (1 + r)kg; (1  )bR(kg)g = (1  )bR(kg)
2. If the non-default constraint is binding for the bad type: then it follows from the
non-default constraint and the fact that the revenue function R(k) is increasing that
8kg > kb the revelation constraint does not hold:
8kg > kb bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb = (1  )bR(kb) < (1  )bR(kg)
 max fbR(kg)  (1 + r)kg; (1  )bR(kg)g
Thus, in this case kg = kb. Since the non-default constraint is binding for the bad type:
bR(kb)  (1 + r)kb = (1  )bR(kb)
kg = kb

)
bR(kg)  (1 + r)kg = (1  )bR(kg) )
max fbR(kg)  (1 + r)kg; (1  )bR(kg)g = (1  )bR(kg)
Proof Lemma 10:
If the non-default constraint is binding for the good type then kg > k
nd
g , which implies
that the prots are increasing in the capital at the non-default borrowing limit:
@
@k
= gR
0( kndg )  (1 + r) > gR0( kg)  (1 + r) = 0
Using the denition of non-default borrowing limit:
(1  )gR( kndg ) = gR( kndg )  (1 + r) kndg )
(1  )bR( kndg ) =
b
g

gR( k
nd
g )  (1 + r) kndg

>
b
g

gR( k
nd
b )  (1 + r) kndb

>
b
g
[gR( kb)  (1 + r) kb] = bR( kb)  (1 + r)b
g
kb > bR( kb)  (1 + r) kb
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Proof Lemma 15:
The revelation constraint in the case that kb = kndb is as follows:
bR(k
nd
b )  (1 + r)kndb  (1  )bR(kg)
Take any kg > kndb , it follows from the denition of k
nd
b that:
bR(k
nd
b )  (1 + r)kndb = (1  )bR(kndb ) < (1  )bR(kg)
Proof Lemma 19
Assume that the bad type rm fullls the contract bR(k)  (1 + i)k  (1  )bR(k)
, (1 + i)k  bR(k) < gR(k), then the good type rm does not default either. Then
the zero prot condition of nancial intermediary implies that i is equal to r:
 [(1+i)k-(1+r)k] + (1-) [(1+i)k-(1+r)k] = (i  r)k = 0) i = r
Therefore, the zero prot condition of the nancial intermediary holds separately for
the two rms type, therefore the contract is not a pooling contract according with our
denition (see denition 4).
Proof Lemma 20
Consider that the good type defaults in equilibrium g R (k) (1+i)k < (1 )g R (k).
Then, this implies that the bad type defaults also
g R (k)  (1 + i)k < (1  )g R (k), (1 + i)k > g R (k) > bR (k)
Since both rm types default, the zero prot condition of nancial intermediary would be
as follows:
 [(- )gR(k)-(1+r)k] + (1-) [(- )bR(k)-(1+r)k] = 0 (52)
Note that g > b )
(   )gR(k)  (1 + r)k > (   )gR(k)  (1 + r)k
Thus, the above two equations implies that the good rms are cross-subsidizing the bad
rms:
(   )gR(k)  (1 + r)k > 0 > (   )bR(k)  (1 + r)k
Consider another pooling contract (k0; i0) dened as follows: k0 = k and
i0 Denition,  [((1+i0)k-(1+r)k] + (1  ) [(- )bR(k)-(1+r)k] = 0 ,
(1+i0)k = (1 + r)k +
1  

[(1+r)k   (- )bR(k)]
Note also that the zero prot condition of the nancial intermediary (52) implies that:
gR(k) = [ gR(k) + (1+r)k] +
(1-)

[(1+r)k   (- )bR(k)]
=  gR(k) + (1+i0)k > (1+i0)k
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Thus, in the contract (i0; k0) the good rm type does not default. Furthermore, using the
above equation it follows that the good rm type is better o¤:
R(k0)  (1 + i0)k0 = R(k)  (1 + i0)k > gR(k)
The bad type rm is exactly as in the initial contract if gR(k)  (1 + i0)k, and it is
better of if gR(k) > (1 + i0)k.
Proof proposition 21
The constraints in the pooling contract are the following:
gR(k)  (1 + i)k  [1  ] gR(k)
(1 + r)k = (1  ) (   ) bR(k)+ (1 + i)k
These two constraints imply that:
 (1 + i)k    gR(k)
 (1 + r)k + (1 + i)k =   (1  ) (   ) bR(k)
 (1 + r)k     [ (g + (1  )b)  (1  ) ]R(k)
 [[g + (1  )b]  (1  ) b]R(k)  (1 + r)k
(1 + i)k =
(1 + r)k   (1  ) [   ] bR(k)

Lets consider the maximization problem:
max
k;
gR(k)  (1 + r)k + (1  ) (   ) bR(k)

s:t:: [g + (1  )(   )b]R(k)  (1 + r)k
Consider the case in which   rv [g+(1 )b]
(1 )b . In this case the only feasible capital would
be k = 0 and then the prots of good rms would be equal to zero. Then, we dene the
prot functions for good rms in the case of pooling equilibrium:
poolingg (;  ) = max
k;i;
gR(k)  (1 + i)k
s:t: gR(k)  (1 + i)k  (1  )gR(k)
(1 + r)k  (1  ) [(   ) bR(k)]+ (1 + i)k
(53)
We dene the prot functions for good rms in the case of separating equilibrium:
separatingb () = argmax
k
bR(k)  (1 + r)k
s:t: bR(k)  (1 + r)k  (1  )bR(k)
(54)
separatingg () = argmax
k
gR(k)  (1 + r)k
s:t: separatingb ()  (1  )bR(k)
(55)
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We have seen that when   rv [g+(1 )b]
(1 )b and   
rv poolingg (;  ) = 0 while 8 > 0
separatingg () > 0. Then, it is possible to dene  as follows:
 = max
(
inf
(
 2 < s. t. sup
2[0;rv ]

poolingg (;  )  separatingb ()
	  0) ; 0)
Proof Lemma 24
It follows from the denition of ndEb that when  = 
ndE
b the non default constraint
for the bad type holds with equality for the optimal capital of the bad type for the
equilibrium interest rate. Furthermore, it follows from lemma 15 that the good and the
bad type receive the same amount of capital. Thus, the following equations should hold
when  = ndEb :
ndEb bR (k

b (r))  (1 + r)kb (r) = 0 (56)
kg = kb = k

b (r) (57)
 [gR (kg)  (1 + r)kg] + (1  ) [bR (kb)  (1 + r)kb]  (1 + r)k = 0 (58)
where the last equation is the equilibrium condition (21). Combining the two last equa-
tions we get:
 [gR (k

b (r))  (1 + r)kb (r)] + (1  ) [bR (kb (r))  (1 + r)kb (r)]  (1 + r)k = 0
Let´s dene z(r) as the function in the left hand of the above equation:
z(r) =  [gR (kb (r))  (1 + r)kb (r)] + (1  ) [bR (kb (r))  (1 + r)kb (r)]  (1 + r)k
Note that:
z(r) =
 [gR (k

b (r
))  (1 + r)kb (r)] + (1  ) [bR (kb (r))  (1 + r)kb (r)]  (1 + r)k <


gR
 
kg(r
)
  (1 + r)kb (r)+ (1  ) [bR (kb (r))  (1 + r)kb (r)]  (1 + r)k = 0
where we have used equation (33). Furthermore, lim
r! 1
z(r) > 0: Thus, it follows from the
Medium Value Theorem that there is a interest rate er such that z(er) = 0. Furthermore,
z(r) is an increasing function:
z0(r) = [ [gR0 (kb (r))  (1 + r)] + (1  ) [bR0 (kb (r))  (1 + r)]]
@kb (r)
@r
=
 (g   b)R0 (kb (r))
1
 R" (kb (r))
> 0
where we have used the denition of kb (r) (see equation 1). Therefore there is a unique
interest rate er such that z(er) = 0. Thus, there is a unique ndEb which satises equations
(56) to (58), ndEb =
(1+er)kb (er)
bR(kb (er)) =
R0(kb (er))kb (er)
R(kb (er)) = "R (kb (er)). Proposition 27 establishes
that the interest rate is a strictly increasing function of  when  < rvE (see proof
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below). Thus, when  > ndEb then r () > r
 
ndEb

, and z (r ()) < 0 which implies
that at equilibrium kg > kb (r ()). This implies according with lemma 15 that the non-
default constraint of bad type is not binding. When  < ndEb then r () > r
 
ndEb

, and
z (r ()) > 0 which implies that at equilibrium kb > kb (r ()). Thus, in this case the
non-default borrowing constraint is binding for the bad type.
Proof Proposition 27
Using the non arbitrage condition (21), it follows that
 g(r; ) + (1  )b(r; )  (1 + r)k = 0
@r
@
=
 @g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
k    @g(r;)
@r
  (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
> 0
It is easy to check that y = rk:
y = n [ gR(kg) + (1  )bR(kb)]  k =
n [ gg + (1  )bb + (1 + r) [ kg + (1  )kb]]  k =
n

(1 + r)k + (1 + r)
(1  n)
n
k

  k = rk
Thus:
@y
@
=
@r
@
k < 0;
@(y=k)
@
=
@r
@
< 0
Proof Proposition 26
The following system of equations determines the equilibrium interest rate and the per
capita number of rms:
 g(r; ) + (1  )b(r; )  (1 + r)k = 0
n [ kg(r; ) + (1  )kb(r; )]  (1  n)k = 0
Di¤erentiating the above system of equations:
"
 @g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
  k 0
n
h
 @g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
i
[ kg(r; ) + (1  )kb(r; )] + k
# 
dr
dn

=
 
"
 @g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
n
h
 @g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
i # d
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Applying the Cramers rule:
@r
@
=  
 
@g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
0
n
h
 @g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
i
[ kg(r; ) + (1  )kb(r; )] + k
 
@g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
  k 0
n
h
 @g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
i
[ kg(r; ) + (1  )kb(r; )] + k

> 0
0BB@@r@ =  
  0 
 	 0	 
 > 0
1CCA
@n
@
=  
 
@g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
  k  @g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
n
h
 @g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
i
n
h
 @g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
i  
@g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
  k 0
n
h
 @g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
i
[ kg(r; ) + (1  )kb(r; )] + k

=
h
 @g(r;)
@
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@
i
[ nk]h
k  
h
 @g(r;)
@r
+ (1  ) @b(r;)
@r
ii
[ kg(r; ) + (1  )kb(r; )] + k
< 0
Using capital market clearing condition (22) it follows that:
kg + (1  ) kb =

1
n
  1

k <

1
n
  1

k = kEg + (1  ) kEb
Thus, the average rm size, measured as the average amount of capital per rm, is below
the optimal level. Furthermore, it was proven in section 4 that the share of the capital
that goes to good rms is ine¢ ciently small.
Proof Proposition 25
When  2  ndEb ; rvE kb = kb (r). Since the .optimal level of capital kb (r) is strictly
decreasing in the equilibrium interest rate and the interest rate is increasing in  (propo-
sition 27), it follows that kb is decreasing in :
@kb
@
=
@kb
@r|{z}
	
@r
@|{z}

< 0
When  = rvE the equilibrium interest rate is r. Thus, when  2  ndEb ; rvE, r <
r(proposition 27) ) kb = kb (r) > kb (r) = kEb .
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Figure 1. Non-Default Constraint
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Figure 2. The Non-Default Borrowing Limit
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Figure 3. Incentive constraints are not binding:  > rv
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Figure 4. Revelation constraint is binding for the good type:  2 (ndb ; rv)
44
Figure 5. Revelation constraint is binding for the good type and non-default constraint
is binding for the bad type:  < ndb
Chapter 2
Aggregate Consequences of Adverse Selection
March 18, 2014
Abstract
We develop a model where nancial intermediation is a¤ected by imper-
fect property rights and by adverse selection. These two frictions inuence
the factor allocation across rms which di¤er in their productivity and have
endogenous size. The model allows us to quantify the e¤ect of property
rights and of adverse selection on output, rm size and productivity. While
conrming the importance of property rights for development, our results
suggest a signicant role for adverse selection as well (with potential output
gains of up to 20%).
1. Introduction
Many developing countries fail to achieve a successful development process (see
Quah 1996, 1997 and Parente and Prescott, 1993)1. Explaining these di¤erences
in development has been one of the main themes of growth and development
theory. While it is acknowledged that di¤erences in physical and human capital
per worker play an important role, several authors, like Prescott (1998) or Hall and
We would like to thank Antonia Díaz, Marco Celentani, Nezih Guner, Tim Kehoe, Victor
Rios-Rull, Dilip Mookherjee, Juan Carlos Conesa, Huberto Ennis, and Carlos Benthecourt for
their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1A worldwide statistical partnership, the International Comparison Program (ICP), collects
o¢ cial data that makes possible to compare the output of economies controlling for di¤erences in
price levels. Based on the ICP data, the Penn World Table (PWT) provides additional statistics
which are widely used in the literature.
Jones (1999) have argued that di¤erences in capital are not able to fully account
for the di¤erences in output in the data. This implies that not only the capital
per worker, but also the TFP varies across countries. Therefore, to understand
the huge di¤erences in output per worker, we need to better understand not only
the capital accumulation process, but also what factors lay behind TFP variation.
Among various possible explanations for the empirical fact considered, one
recurrent theme in recent years has been the level of institutional development
of countries, sometimes also called social infrastructure(Hall and Jones 1999).
While this term is quite broad, it is considered to encompass various aspects like
the quality of property rights and the level of contract enforcement. In a seminal
paper, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) documented that
better law enforcement and accounting standards, positively impact on the devel-
opment of nancial markets. If we consider their nding together with the long
tradition, going back to McKinnon (1973) up to Fry (1995) and King and Levine
(1993), underlining that the development of the nancial sector spurs economic
growth, an empirical pattern emerges, where the quality of property rights en-
forcement stimulates nancial development, and both contribute to the economic
development. This pattern is consistent with the analysis of institutions as a fun-
damental cause of long term growth done by Acemoglu et all (2005), where they
document with data and historical examples that the quality of property rights
and the market imperfections a¤ect development.
Empirical evidence suggesting that rm size is positively related to nancial
development and property rights protection (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksi-
movic 2006) motivates us to pay particular attention to the role of rm size. It
could be that a lower quality of property rights acted as a constraint impeding
rms to operate at their optimal scale. If rms cannot operate at their optimal
scale, this will a¤ect the aggregate output and TFP. This hypothesis is consistent
with observations by Kuznets (1966), Lucas (1978) and Tybout (2000), who argue
that the average business size tends to increase with development.
In this paper we build a neoclassical growth model with adverse selection
and endogenous rm size in order to examine and quantify the above mentioned
relationships between the quality of property rights, the rm size distribution,
per capita output and TFP. We nd out that the introduction of adverse selection
not only lls in a gap in the literature, it has also an important e¤ect from the
quantitative point of view.
Firms in our model are of two types, one (good rms) having higher produc-
tivity than the another (bad rms). Firms are of variable size, which means that
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rm size distribution is endogenous. Both types of rms nance their capital via a
nancial intermediary. However there are two types of imperfections in the nan-
cial market with a¤ect nancial contract between rms and nancial intermediary:
i) there is imperfect enforcement; ii) nancial intermediaries cannot distinguish
whether a rms is good or bad; that is, there is asymmetric information between
nancial intermediaries and rms, which involves an adverse selection problem.
Imperfect enforcement in our model means that if rms default, the repayment of
their debt can only be enforced up to a fraction of rmscash ow. This fraction
of rmscash ow that can be seized by nancial intermediaries is interpreted
as an index of property rights quality. We nd out that when property rights
are perfect, or nearly perfect, there is neither borrowing constraint nor adverse
selection problems, which means that the rm size distribution is optimal and the
TFP attains the maximum possible level. When property rights are not perfect,
rms are borrowing constrained due to two types of incentive constraints: i) non
default incentive constraint, which means that nancial intermediaries only lend
to rms up to the point where the rm has incentive to repay her debt and not
to default; ii) revelation constraint, which means that both types of rms have
incentive to correctly revel their type. This last constraint is the one that it is
specic to adverse selection problems. It turns out that this second type of con-
straint only a¤ects the good type rms and that such constraint is tighter than the
non default constraint. In this sense, good rms su¤er tighter incentive constraint
than bad rms. These incentive constraints entail borrowing constraints which
generate two types of distortions: i) rms may be borrowing constrained, which
implies that the rm size is smaller than their optimal size; ii) since the revelation
constraint only a¤ects good type rms, and this constraint is tighter than the non
default constraint, it turns out that the amount of resources that are allocated to
good type rms is smaller than the optimal level. This last distortion is specic to
the adverse selection problem. Both types of incentive constraints become tighter
when property rights worse o¤. This twists the rm size distribution, which a¤ects
aggregate variables such as the TFP and the per capita income.
We calibrate the parameters of the model to match aggregate and rm size
data on the US economy and we compare steady states with di¤erent quality of
property rights enforcement. Variations in the quality of property rights generate
large variations in output per worker, though not so large variations in TFP. The
rm size distribution is also a¤ected, a lower quality of property rights being
associated, in general, to a smaller average rm size. Furthermore, the share
of factors, capital and labor, going to good type rms decreases dramatically
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when property rights deteriorate (from around 80% to around 20% in the worse
case). The reallocation of capital and labor from good to bad rms is due to
adverse selection and amplies the e¤ect of weak property rights on the economy.
According to our results, countries could increase their output per worker, on
average, by 20 % if they would completely eliminate the adverse selection problem
(but not the enforcement problem). The gains would be even higher for the less
developed countries.
To map these results against data, we use available statistics on average rm
size (which in our model evolves monotonically with the quality of property rights)
for a cross section of 30 developing and developed countries. The data shows a
clear positive correlation between the rm size and the output per worker. This
correlation is noticeable not only between the two country income groups (middle
and high income), but also within these groups. Our model based on di¤erences in
property rights and adverse selection explains a signicant part from the output
gap between US and the countries in our sample. Besides the experiment with
average rm size, we perform an additional test using a measure for the debt
recovery rate compiled by Djankov et all (2008) on the basis of a case study for 88
countries. The debt recovery rate appears to be strongly correlated with output,
and also with the average rm size. Moreover, it renders additional testimony that
our model, based on the di¤erences in property rights and the adverse selection
mechanism, is able to explain a signicant part of the variation in output across
countries.
Nonetheless, the model displays a more modest performance in generating dif-
ferences in TFP. Like most neoclassical literature on growth, we looked at the
economy in the aggregate and we consider that all the production is realized
by the same technology in a single sector. But this approach has a limitation:
Rajan and Zingales (1998) have shown that nancial frictions do not a¤ect sym-
metrically every sector, instead di¤erent industries di¤ers in their dependence on
external nance. There are sectors that have more nancial needs due to their
large scale of operation and that, consequently, are more vulnerable to nancial
marker imperfections than other sectors where the scale of operation are not that
large. This feature has been enphasized in the paper by Erosa and Hidalgo (2008),
Buera, Kabosky and Shin (2011) and Midrigan and Xu (2012). To incorporate
this feature to the model, we propose an extension where, in addition to the two
types of rms (representing the large scale of operation" technology) there is a
technology, called self-funding technology, which is not a¤ected by the scale of
operation and that can be directly nanced by household. Consequently this type
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of technology do not need nancial intermediaries and is not a¤ected by the qual-
ity of property rights. A decrease in the quality of property rights determines a
reallocation of resources from the large scale technology to the self-funding one.
After these modications, the model generate important di¤erences in TFP that
replicate remarkably well the across countries di¤erences in TFP.
Our paper is related to the literature that studies how nancial intermediaries
emerge to improve resource allocation, starting with Townsend (1978) and contin-
uing with Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1990) and a survey by Levine (1997). However, these papers do
not focus on the rm size distribution and do not quantify the importance of
adverse selection. The occupational choice and the endogenous rm size are ele-
ments employed also by Erosa (2001), but his main concern is the intermediation
cost and not the quality of property rights. The theoretical contribution closest
to our model is Erosa and Hidalgo (2008) who develop a theory of capital markets
a¤ected by imperfect property rights and asymmetric information. However, rm
size, which is central to our results, is exogenous in their model and they focus
on how low enforcement a¤ects the allocation of resources among entrepreneurs
of di¤erent types. Another important di¤erence is that their contract is writ-
ten before entrepreneur learns their type. In contrast with the adverse selection
literature and our model, this assumption implies that a once that the contract
is o¤ered by a nancial entrepreneur, a competing nancial intermediary cannot
o¤er a better contract to a particular type of entrepreneur and, consequently,
cross-subsidy across types occurs at equilibrium.
There are also several quantitatively oriented studies, although fewer than
the theoretical contributions. Amaral and Quintin (2010) propose a model with
imperfect property rights, and provide calibrated simulations that reveal signif-
icant e¤ects on output. Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) also measure the role
of imperfect property rights for output and TFP. They provide a rich framework
emphasizing the role of sector specic xed costs that cause di¤erences in scale
of production and forward looking savings behavior to overcome nancial con-
straints. Both Amaral and Quintin (2010) and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011),
with their methodology and ndings, are an important advance in the quantitative
study of the aggregate implications of di¤erences in property rights and nancial
development. However, they abstract from the adverse selection e¤ect, which
plays an important role in our analysis: we show that, once taken into account,
adverse selection signicantly increases the e¤ect of property rights enforcement
on output. We can also mention Greenwood et all (2013) who examine the e¤ects
5
of nancial development on economic development with a model of costly state
verication. However, their framework is not one of di¤erent quality of property
rights, but one of di¤erent e¢ ciency of the nancial sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model economy
and Section 3 the agents decisions. The optimal nancial contract is discussed in
Section 4, and the equilibrium and steady state are dened in Section 5. In Section
6 we study the implications of imperfect property rights and adverse selection for
economic development. In Section 7 we propose an extension of the model with
a self-funding technology. Section 8 concludes. Proofs and calibration details are
collected in the Appendix.
2. The Model
This is an innite horizon economy where the time is discrete and indexed by
t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g. There are three types of agents: households, rms and nancial
intermediaries.
2.1. Technology
There is one nal good that may be used for consumption or for investment and
is produced using three factors: capital, labor and managerial time according with
the following production function at rm level:
yjt =

jk

jtl

w;jt if lm;jt  
0 otherwise
(2.1)
where yj denotes the production by the rm j, kj is the capital used by the rm j,
lw;j is the amount of labor, lm;j the amount of managerial time. j, with j 2 fg; bg,
denotes a rm specic technological shock that may take two values: good g or
bad b, where g > b. The technological shock allows us to model the asymmetric
information in the capital market and also to generate a rm size distribution2.
The rms receiving the good technological shock g represent the more productive
rms in the economy and will be referred to in this paper as good type rms.
The rms receiving the bad technological shock b represent the less productive
rms in the economy and will be referred to in this paper as bad type rms.
The probability of getting the good shock is  2 (0; 1). For the maximization
2We used only two values, good and bad, for the technological shock for tractability (the
adverse selection problem becomes di¢ cult to solve for more types).
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problem of the rm to be well dened, we assume that  +  2 (0; 1). This
production function allows us to obtain an endogenous rm size. This type of
production function has been used, among others, by Perera-Tallo (2003, 2011),
Guner, Ventura and Xu (2007), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) and Amaral and
Quintin (2010). Firms are perfectly competitive and there is free entry. Hence,
their prots will be zero.
Firms nance the capital from a nancial intermediary. This simplifying as-
sumption helps the tractability of the model and we discuss it in section 6.3.
Capital in the economy accumulates according to the standard neoclassical capi-
tal accumulation equation:
Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt (2.2)
where K denotes the stock of capital, I investment and  is the depreciation rate.
2.2. Households
There are many identical households, each with a continuum of members of mea-
sure one. Each household values streams of the nal consumption good according
to the utility function:
1X
t=0
(
1
1 + 
)tu(ct)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate of the household and ct is the average con-
sumption of the households members. Each household member is endowed with
one unit of labor every period, and may chose between becoming manager or
worker. The assumption that households are composed of a continuum of agents
implies that agents may diversify perfectly the risk associated with the technolog-
ical shock j.
2.3. Financial Intermediaries
We will assume that households cannot invest directly in rms (they do not have
the ability to deal with the capital market imperfection examined in this paper).
It will be the role of the nancial intermediaries to borrow from households and
lend to rms. We will also assume that there is free entry and perfect competition
in the nancial intermediation sector.
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There are two types of imperfections in the capital market: First of all, -
nancial intermediaries cannot observe the idiosyncratic technological shock of the
rms (there is an asymmetric information problem). Second, in case the rm
defaults, the nancial intermediary can only enforce the contract with probabil-
ity  2 [0; 1], which is an index of the quality of the property rights (imperfect
property rights quality).
3. Agents Decisions
In this section we will examine the economic decisions taken by households and
rms. The relationship between rms and nancial intermediaries will be studied
in section 4.
3.1. Household decision
At the beginning of every period t each member of the household makes an oc-
cupational choice between being a worker or a manager. The di¤erence between
being worker or manager is that the payment of the worker is independent of the
idiosyncratic shock of the rm, while the payment of the manager is contingent
on it. More precisely, if a member of the household decides to be a worker, she
will earn a wage wt. If she decides to be a manager, she will earn a payment wMjt
contingent on the shock of the rm. That is, she will earn wMgt if the rm she
manages receives a good technological shock (j = g, with probability ) and
wMbt if the rm receives a bad technological shock (j = b, with probability 1 ).
Hence the expected managerial wage will be wMt = w
M
gt + (1  )wMbt .
The household chooses at every period t the per capita consumption ct, and the
portion of household members who become workers denoted lt, where lt 2 (0; 1).
The households per capita assets at each period at are deposited with nancial
intermediaries which pay an interest rt on them. The household takes as given
the prices frt; wt; wMt gt=0;1 when making its decision on fct; lt;gt=0;1.
The household problem is:
Max
ct;lt
1P
t=0
( 1
1+
)tu(ct)
s:t: ct + at+1   at  wtlt + wMt (1  lt) + rtat;8t
(3.1)
That is, the household maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint. The left
hand part of the budget constraint is the expenditure, that may be in consumption
8
ct or in assets at+1 at (the savings). This expenditures should be equal or smaller
than income, the left hand side of the budget constraint. The income consist of
labor income of household members that become workers wtlt, the labor income
of household members that become managers wMt (1  lt), and income from assets
rtat (capital income). Note that the assumption that each household is composed
by an innite number of members, implies that households can perfectly diversify
the risk of the manager payment. This is the reason why the wageassociated
to the labor devoted to management is the expected payment of managers wMt =
wMgt + (1  )wMbt .
The rst order conditions of the household problem are:
u0(ct+1)
1 + rt+1
1 + 
= u0(ct) (3.2)
wt = w
M
t (3.3)
where the rst equation is the Euler Equation, while the second is an arbitrage
condition: the wage of the workers should be equal to the expected payment
to managers. Since households can perfectly diversify the risk of the manager
payment, the wage is equal to the expected payment of managers (otherwise, in
equilibrium managers would receive some risk premium).
The following transversality condition should hold:
lim
t!1
at
tY
i=0
(1 + ri)
= 0
3.2. Firms decision
At the beginning of period t, rms hire the managers, before the realization of the
productivity shock. This means that the number of managers cannot be contingent
on the realization of the technological shock. Since the productivity shock is at
this stage not known, the rm will specify the payment to the manager contingent
on the productivity shock. Then the productivity shock j is realized. Once they
realize their productivity, rms engage capital kjt, which is nanced through a
nancial intermediary, according to a contract we will analyze in the next section.
After borrowing the capital, rms hire labor njt, and use it together with the
capital to produce the unique nal good. After they produce, they sell the output
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to the households and pay the workers the wage w for their labor services. Thus,
they chose the amount of workers in order to maximize the di¤erence between
revenues (production) and labor costs; such di¤erence will be referred to as cash
ow:
j(k; w) = max
lw;j
jk
lw;j   wlw;j (3.4)
The rst order condition of the above function says that rm chooses an amount
of workers such that the marginal productivity of these is equal to the wage:
jk
l 1w;j = w
Substituting the above rst order condition in the denition of cash ow, we
obtain the following:
j(k; w) = (1  )
 

w

jk

! 1
1 
As mentioned in subsection 2.3, the rms either fulll the contract paying the
principal plus the interest rate (1 + rj)kjt or they default. By defaulting, we
mean that rms refuse to return the loan. When a rm defaults, the nancial
intermediary can recover the capital of the rm and with probability  can take
also the cash ow of the rm j(kj; w).
After the payment to the nancial intermediary, managers are paid. It follows
from the rm zero prot condition that managers receive the cash ow of the rms
minus the payment to the nancial intermediary.
4. The optimal nancial contract
In this section we analyze the optimal contract between nancial intermediaries
and rms. Along this section we will consider both wages and deposit interest
rates as given. Taking wages as given, we will denote the cash ow function simply
as j (kj) (instead of j (kj; w)), making the notation more compact. To simplify
the exposition, along this section we will refer to the prots of rm before paying
the managers simply as prots: j (kj)  (rj + )kj.
The nancial intermediaries will o¤er, for each of the two types of rms (good
and bad), a contract consisting of an amount of capital kj and an interest rate rj.
Given that nancial intermediaries act perfectly competitive, expected (average)
prots of nancial intermediaries should be zero. In order to dene the expected
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prot of nancial intermediary, we will use the indicator function j(rj; kj;) to
denote the range of interest rate and capital at which the rm of type j will not
default:
j(rj; kj;) =

1 if j (kj)  (1 + rj)kj  (1  )j (kj)
0 if j (kj)  (1 + rj)kj < (1  )j (kj)
The above indicator function means that if j = 1, the rm fullls the contract,
while if j = 0, the rm defaults. Thus, the expected prot by nancial interme-
diaries is as follows:


g(1+rg)kg + (1-g)g(kg)-(1+r)kg

+ (4.1)
(1-) [b(1+rb)kb + (1-b)b(kb)-(1+r)kb] = 0
The revenue of a nancial intermediary from a contract is equal to (1+rj)kj when
the rm fullls the contract (j = 1) and j(kj) when the rm does not fulll
the contract (j = 0), while the cost of a contract in terms of the payment to
depositors is (1+r)kj.This condition will be referred to as nancial intermediaries
zero prot condition.
At equilibrium it should not be possible for a nancial intermediary to make
a better o¤er to any type j rm, without incurring a loss. Due to the two im-
perfections in the functioning of the nancial markets (imperfect property rights
quality and asymmetric information), the menu of contracts will maximize prots
for each rm type, taking into account two incentive constraints: one of them in
order that rms have incentives to repay their loans and another one in order that
rms truly reveal their type.
The rst constraint refers to the incentive for rms to repay the nancial
intermediary and it will be called the non-default constraint:
j (kj)  (rj + )kj  (1  )j (kj) ; j 2 fg; bg (4.2)
If a rm defaults, the nancial intermediary gets the capital after depreciation
(1  )k, and with probability  she also gets rms cash ow, while the rm gets
the expected amount (1   )j (kj). If the rm fullls the contract she gets her
cash ow minus the payment to the nancial intermediary: j (kj)   (rj + )kj.
This incentive constraint is saying that the rm is better o¤paying to the nancial
intermediary, in which case she gets j (kj)  (rj + )kj than defaulting, in which
case she gets (1  )j (kj).
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The second constraint refers to the incentive for each rm to correctly reveal
her type, and we will call it revelation constraint:
b (kb)  (rb + )kb  max f(1  )b (kg) ; b (kg)  (rg + )kgg
g (kg)  (rg + )kg  max f(1  )g (kb) ; g (kb)  (rb + )kbg (4.3)
This incentive constraint says that the bad type rm should be better o¤ to sign
the contract destined to her own type, getting b(kb) (r+)kb as a payo¤, rather
than pretending to be an good type, getting the payo¤
max f(1  )b (kg) ; b (kg)  (rg + )kgg
The same should be true for the good type rm.
4.1. The equilibrium menu of contracts
Denition 4.1. A menu of contracts f(rg; kg); (rb; kb)g satisfying the nancial
intermediary zero prot condition (4.1) and the revelation constraints (4.3) rep-
resents an equilibrium menu of contracts if
1. 8j 2 fg; bg there is no other contract (r0j; k0j) for the type j in which the rm
j is better o¤ j(k0j)  (1+ r0j)k0j > j(kj)  (1+ rj)kj and in which nancial
intermediary gets at least zero prot j(1+rj)kj + (1-j)j(kj)  (1+r)kj
and in which the revelation constraints (4.3) hold.
2. There is no other menu of contracts f(r0g; k0g); (r0b; k0b)g, in which nancial
intermediary gets at least zero prot (4.1) and in which j(k0j) (r0j+1)k0j 
j(kj)  (1+ rj)kj 8j 2 fg; bg , being the last inequality strict for one of the
types, and in which the revelation constraints (4.3) hold.
Thus, a menu of contracts is an equilibrium if it satises the nancial interme-
diary zero prot condition (4.1) and the revelation constraints (4.3), and it is not
possible to nd, for one or both rm types, a better contract where non-negative
nancial intermediary prot condition is satised. It is still possible a di¤erent
contract in which both types have the same contract and in which the bad type
defaults: it is the pooling contract. Nevertheless, it is well known that this type
of pooling contract is never an equilibrium. Furthermore, Chapter 1 shows that if
there are enforcement cost (or state verication cost) in case of default, and these
costs are high enough, the pooling contract is never superior to the separating
menu of contract. Thus, we do not consider pooling contracts.
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We note that an equilibrium menu of contracts will have rb = rg = r. Other-
wise, the nancial intermediary would be making positive prots with the contract
of at least one rm type. This couldnt be sustained as an equilibrium because it
would always be possible to o¤er a better contract to this type.
As the good type rm has higher productivity, and the interest rate of both
types are equal, non default constraint (4.2) implies that good type rm gets a
larger amount of capital than the bad type rm3. This means that the good
type rm has never the incentive to pretend to be a bad type. Only the bad
type rm has incentives not to correctly reveal her type. This means that the
revelation constraint (4.3) is never binding for the good type rm and consequently
is irrelevant for the subsequent analysis. From the perfect competition in the
nancial sector it follows that the bad type rm is o¤ered the best contract such
that the nancial intermediary gets zero prot and the Non-Default Constraint is
satised for the bad type rm. This means that if the bad type rm is asking for
the contract of the good type, it is because she plans to default. If she wouldnt
plan to default, she would be better o¤ accepting the contract o¤ered to her type.
Thus, the revelation constrain for the bad type is the only revelation constraint
which is relevant for the equilibrium and may be rewritten as follows:
b (kb)  (rb + )kb  (1  )b (kg) (4.4)
It is possible to prove that for the good type the revelation constraint (4.4)
is always tighter than its non-default constraint 4. Hence, the only incentive
constraint relevant for the good type is the revelation constraint.
To sum up, if f(rg; kg); (rb; kb)g is a menu of contracts, then rg = rb = r and:
kb = argmax
k
b (k)  (r + )k
s:t: b (k)  (r + )k  (1  )b (k)
(4.5)
kg = argmax
k
g (k)  (r + )k
s:t: b (kb)  (r + )kb  (1  )b (kg)
(4.6)
Thus, the menu of contracts is characterized by the following features: i) the
interest rate that nancial intermediaries charge rms is the depositors interest
rate; ii) there is no default in equilibrium since non default constraint is satised,
3Chapter 1 o¤ers a formal proof for the statements in this section.
4Chapter 1 o¤ers a formal proof for the statements in this section.
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this and the above features guarantee the zero prots of nancial intermediaries;
iii) The only incentive constraint that is relevant for the bad type is the non
default constraint, since the good type never has incentives to cloak his type. The
only incentive constraint that the good type faces is the revelation constraint,
which is always tighter than the non-default constraint for the good type. iv) The
menu of contracts is such that rms of each type maximize prots subject to the
relevant incentive constraint for each type (the non-default constraint for the bad
type and the revelation constraint for the good type).
The non default constraint (4.2) may be rewritten as follows:

j (kj)
kj
 (r + ); j 2 fg; bg (4.7)
The above equation means that the rm has incentive to fulll the contract if
the expected average payment to the nancial intermediary in case of default
j (kj) =kj is higher than in case of fullling the contract
The upper part of Figure 1 displays the non default constraint (4.2) for the bad
type: the non default constraint is satised when the prot in case of fullling the
contract, which is hump-shaped, is superior to the prot in case of default, which
is an increasing curve. In the lower part of Figure 1 is represented another version
of the non default constraint, corresponding to equation (4.7): the bad type rm
has incentive to fulll the contract if the expected average payment to the nancial
intermediary in case of default, which is a decreasing function in kj, is higher than
in case of fullling the contract, which is constant. It is apparent from lower part
of Figure 1 that the non-default constraint holds when the amount of capital is
smaller than a certain threshold capital in which the non-default constraint holds
with equality. Such level of capital is the maximum amount that the bad rm is
going to be able to borrow. This will be called the non default borrowing limit,
and we will denote it by kndb :
kndb
def, b
 
kndb
  (r + )kndb = (1  )b  kndb 
Figure 2 displays the revelation constraint which a¤ects the good type: the prot
of the bad rm fullling her contract should be larger than the prot of bad rm
when she accepts the contract of the good type and defaults. It follows from the
fact the cash ow function is strictly increasing (which implies that the prot of
the bad rm in case of default is increasing) that the revelation constraint holds
when the amount of capital is smaller that certain threshold capital in which the
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revelation constraint holds with equality. Such level of capital is the maximum
amount that the good rm is going to be able to borrow. This will be called the
revelation borrowing limit and we will denote it by krvg :
krvg , b (kb)  (r + )kb = (1  )b
 
krvg

(and krvg > 0)
Thus, another way to write the menu of contracts is as follows:
kb = argmax
k
b (k)  (r + )k
s:t: k  kndb
(4.8)
kg = argmax
k
g (k)  (r + )k
s:t: k  krvg
(4.9)
4.2. Financial contract and the quality of property rights
In this subsection we characterize the optimal nancial contract that the nancial
intermediary o¤ers in equilibrium to each rm type (good and bad), as a function
of the quality of property rights .
When the quality of property rights goes down, the punishment for default
falls as well, which implies that the maximum amount of capital that the bad rm
can receive, the non default borrowing limit kndb , decreases. Thus, after a drop
in property rights enforcement, it is more likely that the rm is constraint, or, in
order words, that the non-default constraint is binding. If the bad type rm was
already constrained, then the fall in the property rights enforcement may further
reduce the non default borrowing limit and consequently the amount borrowed by
the bad type rm, diminishing her prots.
But the fall in property rights enforcement also a¤ects the good rm. As we
have seen, the fall in property rights enforcement reduces the prots of the bad
rm (left hand side of the revelation constraint 4.4), which reduces the positive
incentivesto reveal her type. Furthermore, a drop in property rights enforcement
also reduces the punishment in case the bad rm does not reveal her type (see
right hand side of the revelation constraint 4.4). Thus, the fall in property rights
enforcement reduces also the revelation borrowing limit krvg , which a¤ects the good
rms, making more likely that such rms are constrained and reducing the capital
received by them in case that these rms were already constrained.
Summarizing, the fall in property rights enforcement will reduce both the non
default borrowing limit for bad rms and the revelation borrowing limit for good
rms, making more likely that rms are constrained and reducing the amount of
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capital that good rms borrow in case that these rms are already constrained.
Thus, a fall of property rights enforcement tights the incentive constraints and
a¤ects rm size distribution by making rms smaller than their optimal size.
The unconstrained maximization of prots implies optimum amounts of capital
for each of the two rm types, which we will denote by kj with j 2 fg; bg:
kj = argmax
k
j (k)  (r + )k ,
@j
 
kj

@k
= (r + )
It follows from the implicit function theorem that good rms receive more capital
than bad ones (i.e. kg > k

b ). We will use this particular case a benchmark/starting
point for our analysis.
Proposition 4.2. There are two thresholds for the quality of property rights
enforcement5 1 and 2, where 1 > 2 > 1 > 0 and such that: g) If   2 then
neither the good or the bad rms are constrained: kj = kj . ii) If  2 [1; 2) then
good rms are constrained, kg < kg , while bad rms are not, kb = k

b , the amount
of capital received by good rms kg increases with . iii) If  < 1, both types of
rms are constrained and the amount of capital received by each type is the same:
kg = kb < k

b ; furthermore, the amount of capital that rms receive increases with
 (proof in appendix).
Thus, when the quality of property rights enforcement drops, the incentives for
rms to fulll the contracts and to truly reveal their type fall as well. This makes
incentive constraints tighter, reducing the non default borrowing limit, which
a¤ects bad rms, and the revelation borrowing limit, which a¤ects good rms.
There are three possible situations depending on the quality of property rights.
When the quality of property rights is good enough but not necessarily perfect,
i.e. larger than 2, the incentive constraint are not binding and rms choose
their optimal capital level. When the quality of property rights lies in a middle
range,  2 [1; 2), only the good rms are constrained while bad rms are not.
In this sense, good rms su¤er an incentive constraint (the revelation incentive
constraint) that is tighter than the one that a¤ects bad rms (the non default
constraint). Finally, when the level of contract enforcement is poor,  < 1, both
rms are constrained and receive the same ine¢ ciently small amount of capital.
5The exact denition of these thresholds are: 1  1  and 2  1  
b
g
 
(1 )(1  )

1  
1 

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Furthermore, when rms are constrained and the level of contract enforcement
improves, borrowing limits expand making rms closer to their optimal level and
consequently more productive.
Thus, the link between property rights quality and productivity is clear from
proposition 4.2. Weak property rights make rms have an ine¢ ciently small size.
Furthermore, weak property rights a¤ect more good rms, and a¤ect the way
capital is distributed to rms, pouring relatively more resources in bad and less
productive rms and less resources in good and more productive rms. These
two mechanisms, the reduction of rms size and the redistribution of resources
from more productive to less productive rms, imply that the quality of property
rights will a¤ect positively the productivity. This will be analyzed in more detail
in section 6.
5. Equilibrium and Steady State
An equilibrium is an allocation fct; at; fkjt; rjt; lw;jtgj2fg;bg; nt; ltg1t=0 and a vector
of prices frt; wt; wMgt ; wMbt ; wMt g1t=0 such that 8t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g:
1. Households maximize their utility according with problem ( 3:1).
2. Financial intermediaries o¤er to each rm of type j 2 fg; bg a contract
fkjt; rjtgj2fg;bg that is an equilibrium contract according to denition 4.1.
3. Type j rm chooses how many workers flw;jtgj2fg;bg to hire in order to
maximize the prots, taking as given the worker wage wt, and the amount of
capital kjt and the interest rate rjt o¤ered by the nancial intermediary.
4. Zero prot condition (or free entry condition):
wMgt " = g(wt; kgt)  rgtkgt
wMbt " = b(wt; kbt)  rbtkbt
wMt = w
M
gt + (1  )wMbt .
5. Labor market clears:
nt[lw;gt + (1  )lw;bt] = lt
nt" = 1  lt.
6. Capital market clears:
nt[kgt + (1  )kbt] = at.
where nt denotes the per capita number of rms. Thus, households, rms
and nancial intermediaries should maximize their respective objective function
in equilibrium. This means that households maximize their utility according with
household maximization problem ( 3:1), the menu of contract in accordance of the
maximization problems (4.5)-(4.6) (or (4.8)-(4.9)) and rms chose the amount of
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labor that maximize prots according with problem (3.4). Furthermore, free entry
conditions hold, which means that prots by rms are zero. This implies that the
payment to the managers in the good type rm wMgt " should be equal to the cash
ow minus the payment to the nancial intermediaries g(wt; kgt)   rgtkgt and
the same should be true for the bad type of rms (wMbt " = b(wt; kbt)   rbtkbt).
Finally, markets should clear, which means that in the labor market the per capita
demand of workers by rms should be equal to the per capita supply of workers
by households lt. The per capita demand for workers is equal to the per capita
number of rms nt multiplied by the average (or expected) demand for workers
by rms [lw;gt+(1 )lw;bt]. The same should occur for managers: the per capita
demand for managers by rms, which is equal to the per capita amount of rms
nt multiplied by the demand for managers by each rm ", should be equal to the
supply of workers by households, 1   lt. In the capital market, the per capita
demand for capital, which is equal to the per capita number of rms nt multiplied
by the average demand for capital by rms [kgt + (1  )kbt], should be equal to
the supply of capital by households at.
Steady state is an equilibrium where fct; at; fkjt; rjt; lw;jtgj2fg;bg; nt; ltg1t=0 and
frt; wt; wMgt ; wMbt ; wMt g1t=0 are constant over time.
6. Economies with di¤erent Quality of Property Rights
In this section we consider steady state equilibria of economies that di¤er in only
one aspect: the quality of property rights enforcement . We analyze how the
output, the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and the average establishment size
change when we move from a lower to a higher quality of property rights enforce-
ment.
We are aware that our quantitative experiments over-estimate the importance
of nancial frictions due to several reasons. Due to the complexity of adverse
selection problems, we abstract from the dynamic aspects of the rm. Thus, we
do not incorporate to the model the existence of internal funds or accumulated
capital to collateralize loans, we do not consider dynamic contracts or the possible
correlation of shocks. All these features would reduce the incentive problems as
Cole, Greenwood, and Sanchez (2012) have shown. Furthermore, we consider
in our calibration that all the heterogeneity in establishment size in the data is
driven by the shock process on productivity, without taking into account other
important factors (like age).
It is important to notice that in our benchmark case, with perfect property
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rights, the technology presented in the model implies that the aggregate produc-
tion function is of the Cobb-Douglas type:
y = (k) (  l)1 
where   =
 
1  
"
1   
(1 )1 
h
 (g)
1
1   + (1  ) (b)
1
1  
i1   11 
and
l is the per capita amount of labor devoted to production (both workers and man-
agers). Following Hall and Jones (1999), we dene the TFP of the economy such
that y = k(TFP  l)1 , where y, k and l are respectively per capita output,
capital and labor of the economy. Throughout this paper we consider managers
as part of the working force so the total labor is unity, which means that the TFP
can be calculated as:
TFP =
 y
k
 1
1 
(6.1a)
We note that in our model, as population is constant and equal to unity, the
aggregate output and capital can also be considered as output and respectively
capital per capita. This denition of TFP has the advantage that if we consider a
neoclassical growth model with the Cobb-Douglas production function, there is a
one to one relationship between the ratio of per capita GDP in two countries in
the steady state and the ratio of TFP in these countries:
ycountry A;ss
ycountry B;ss
=
TFP country A
TFP country B
Thus, with this denition we will get a clearer idea of the di¤erence between the
predictions of our model and the predictions of the neoclassical growth model
The following proposition establishes in our framework a formal relationship
between the quality of property rights enforcement and the aggregate productivity.
Proposition 6.1. The aggregate productivity (TFP) of the economy at the steady
state is increasing in the quality of property rights (proof in appendix).
The intuition is as follows. When the quality of property rights enforcement is
very low, the nancial intermediaries cannot o¤er the optimal amount of capital
to any of the two rm types. As the quality of property rights starts improving,
both rm types benet from more capital, getting closer to their optimal produc-
tion level (a higher quality of property rights allows the nancial intermediaries
to punish harder rm misbehavior). Once the economy reaches a su¢ ciently high
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quality of property rights, the nancial intermediaries can separate between the
two rm types, which permits them to allocate a relatively higher share of capi-
tal to the highly productive rms, in accordance to their larger optimal scale of
production. This amplies the increase in TFP, as the nancial system becomes
better at fullling its function of allocating productive resources in the economy.
In this way the nancing of production is able to overcome the imperfections of
the credit market which act in our model as an impediment to development.
6.1. Calibration
We chose the parameter values so that our model, with perfect quality of property
rights ( equal to one), matches at the steady state data for the United States
economy. We take the United States economy as a good approximation, for our
purposes, of a distortion-free economy (having no signicant problems with the
quality of property rights). Table 6.1 o¤ers a summary of the calibration proce-
dure.
Parameter Value Target
 0.36 Capital elasticity based on Cooley and Prescott (1995)
 0.09 Ratio between investment and capital
 0.05 Capital-output ratio
 0.16 High productive rms are the ones who have more employees than
the average number of employees (source 2002 US Economic Census)
 0.58 The share of labor and the share of output corresponding to the high
productive rms (source 2002 US Economic Census)
" 3.9 Average number of employees for manufacturing establishments
(source 2002 US Economic Census)
g
b
1.24 The share of output corresponding to the high productive rms
Table 6.1: Parameter values (source: authors calculations)
Some parameters like , , r are widely used in macroeconomic models and
we follow the standard procedure used in the literature which consists in choosing
the parameters that make the model match some statistical regularity of the US
economy. Other parameters relate to the rm size distribution and their calibra-
tion is based on the replication of relevant features for the rm size distribution
in the US.
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The calibration of the macroeconomic parameters is relatively clear-cut. Thus,
for , the share of capital in total output, we apply the methodology described
in Cooley and Prescott (1995) on data from the National Income and Product
Accounts. The share of capital  averages 0.36 for the period 1950-2010. We
compute, using the same data source, the depreciation rate  as the ratio between
investment and capital and we obtain a value of 0.09.
At steady state the discount rate is equal to the net interest rate. We compute
the net interest rate using the formula:
r = 
Y
K
   (6.2)
For the capital-output ratio, we use data from the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis for the period 1950-2010. We dene the stock of capital as being comprised by
private xed capital (nonresidential plus residential), durable goods and invento-
ries. The denition for output Y is the same we use when computing the capital
share . The result is a capital-output ratio of 2.42 and a net interest rate of 0.05.
We are left with four parameters: the coe¢ cient of labor in the production
function ; the managerial time "; the proportion of highly productive establish-
ments  and the ratio between the levels of high type and low type productivity
g
b
. For these parameters, we try to match in the best possible way the distribu-
tion of rm size generated by our model with the distribution of rm size given by
available data for the U.S. We use the 2007 U.S. Economic Census which provides
information on number of employees, valued added and other variables for the
establishments grouped by the North American Industry Classication System
(NAICS)6. Appendix 9.3 o¤ers supplementary details on the rm size calibration.
First we need to decide which industry sectors from NAICS we want our model
to describe. Our objective is to make cross-country comparisons regarding the
importance of di¤erent property rights enforcement on output, rm size and TFP,
therefore we would like to use data on rm size as comparable as possible across
countries. Various industry sectors covered by NAICS vary as importance across
economies; given the di¤erent optimal rm size across industry sectors, we focus
6As a classication of economic activities used in North America, NAICS is based on the
United NationsStandard Industrial Classication (SIC), just as the Statistical Classication of
Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE).
The data from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census that we used is freely available at the U.S.
Census Bureau website.
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on manufacturing. In this way, we try to minimize the e¤ect of di¤erent industry
structure across countries (which is not the focus in our model) and to isolate
as much as possible the e¤ect of property rights from other factors that may a¤ect
rm size.
In our model there are two types of rms, larger (and more productive) and
smaller (and less productive). The US Economic Census groups establishments in
10 size classes (starting with 1-4employees up to more than 2500employees, see
Table 9.1). We note that the average value added per employee is increasing with
rm size. Hence, the Census data seems consistent with the models implication
that the larger rms are also the more productive ones.
We need to match the rm size classes reported in the Census to the two rm
types in our model. For this purpose we take those size classes employing on
average more workers than the sector average to belong the good type (with
larger and more productive rms). In this way we avoid imposing a denition of
what is a largerm. From Table 9.1 is becomes apparent that in our setting rms
will be large(or belong to the goodtype) if they employ 50 or more workers.
The resulting share of large rms is 16% of the total number of rms, and
we use it to match the share of labor and output corresponding to large rms.
In this way we obtain the coe¢ cient of labor in the production function  equal
to 0.58. The managerial time per establishment, ", is determined by the average
establishment size in the data of 55,3 employees. Finally, the ratio between the
levels of high type and low type rm productivity g
b
of 1.24 is obtained from
matching the share of output corresponding to large rms. The resulting returns
to scale  +  are 0.94, close to values used by Guner, Ventura and Xu (2006),
Basu and Fernald (1997), Chang (1998) or Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007).
6.2. Results
Our experiments consist of comparing steady state equilibria in economies that
di¤er in their quality of property rights, indexed by the parameter . In these
comparisons we focus on output, average establishment size and total factor pro-
ductivity.
The output is plotted in Figure 3 against the quality of property rights  (in
continuous line). It can be noticed that our model is consistent qualitatively with
the empirical positive correlation between property rights quality and output. As
property rights improve, relatively more capital and labor are hired by the high
productivity rms: in Figure 4 it can be seen that the share of labor going to
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good rms is increasing from 0.2 when property rights quality is close to zero up
to 0.8 when enforcement is perfect.
The model is able to generate large output di¤erences between countries, and
it could even account for development disasters (assuming the parameter 
reecting the quality of property rights is low enough). Although this parameter
is di¢ cult to measure, in the next section we will use some subsidiary implications
on average rm size (which is observable) to compare the predictions of the model
with the data.
Figure 5 depicts the behavior of rm size, for good rms, bad rms and the
economy average, as property rights quality varies. Here there are two e¤ects at
work. The rst is the optimal nancial contract e¤ect7: taking the wage and in-
terest rate as given, the two rm types will receive more capital as property rights
improve. Once the bad type rm has reached its optimal scale of production, only
the good type continues to receive more capital, until reaching its own optimal
scale. The second e¤ect is due to general equilibrium interactions. The improve-
ment in property rights increases the wage, but not the steady state interest rate;
this implies that rms use a lower ratio labor/capital, which acts towards reducing
the labor employed by rms and therefore their size. This second type of e¤ect
can be observed in the rm size of bad rms, which reach maximum size when
property rights are at the threshold level 2, at which bad rms cease to be con-
strained (see proposition 4.2). Thus, in a certain middle interval (between 2 and
1) bad rms are oversized when they are compared with the size of bad rms in
the benchmark case of perfect property rights. For the good rms, the equilibrium
contract e¤ect outweights the wage e¤ect, resulting in a rm size increasing with
enforcement. Having these opposed e¤ects at work, the resulting average rm size
will depend on the quantitative importance of each of them. For the numerical
values employed in our model, we get an increasing average rm size up to the
point when bad type rms reach their maximum scale ( = 2). Once the bad
rms have reached their maximum size, general equilibrium e¤ects will make the
average rm size to slightly decrease before going up to its benchmark level of
41.9 employees for the case of perfect enforcement. The result is an average rm
size which is monotonic for the most part of the interval considered.
Concerning aggregate productivity, we have shown in Proposition 6.1 that in
our model higher property rights enforcement implies higher productivity. Now
we are able to look at the quantitative importance of this e¤ect. Figure 6 plots
the TFP against the property rights parameter (in continuos line). The model
7We could also name this e¤ect as the "pure" property rights e¤ect.
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is only able to generate variation across countries in TFP of up to 30% due to
di¤erences in enforcement. Obviously, these variation in TFP are too narrow to
be able to explain the variation obtained in the data (see for instant Hall and
Jones, 1999). To understand the mechanism behind, notice that the xed cost
consist of a labor cost, which implies that the labor intensity of the rm declines
with the rm size. Thus, when property rights worsen, rms size shrinks, reducing
the capital intensity of the rm, which implies that at the steady state the per
capita capital declines more the per capita income; this entails that TFP does
not declines much (see denition of TFP in equation 6.1a). Consequently, the
e¤ect of reducing the per capita capital seems to be the most important from the
quantitative point of view.
6.3. The importance of adverse selection
A main novelty of our quantitative study has been to explicitly take into account
the adverse selection in the neoclassical framework. At this stage we are able to
verify if adverse selection has a signicant inuence on output and productivity,
by comparing the results of the model with and without adverse selection. The
predictions of the model are illustrated in Figure 3 for output and in Figure 6 for
productivity (TFP): the continuos lines correspond to the economy with adverse
selection, while the dotted lines represent the economy without adverse selection.
It is apparent from these gures that with adverse selection, the model predicts
a stronger e¤ect on output and productivity. To make this point clearer, we
computed the output gain for a country that would eliminate the adverse selection
friction (see Figure 7). By this feat, most countries would achieve a one-o¤increase
in output per worker of around 20%, clearly a non negligible quantity8. One
could argue that we assumed that all capital used in production is intermediated,
while in reality, not all capital is intermediated; hence the e¤ects of property
rights and adverse selection are overstated in our model. Amaral and Quintin
(2010) measured the stock of intermediated capital as the sum of the credit rms
obtain from banks and from issuing bonds, and the funds they obtain from issuing
stock. In this sense, all funds that are brought by the manager can be considered
intermediated capital9. They nd that in the US most capital is intermediated,
8To illustrate the importance of such an increase in output: with the average growth rate of
output per worker in the US for the last 50 years, of approximately 1,5%, a country would need
more than a decade to increase its output by 20%.
9They underline that retained earnings are funds that corporations e¤ectively borrow from
their shareholders, hence in this framework can be treated as external, instead of internal nance.
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which can be explained by the fact that corporations are the leading form of
ownership, and most of their capital is nanced either by debt or stock. These
ndings suggests that, while not all capital is intermediated (especially in less
developed economies), most capital used in production in a certain country is
subject, one way or the other, to the quality of property rights enforcement in
that country.
Why does adverse selection display such a strong e¤ect on output? Our analy-
sis suggests that this informational friction a¤ects mainly the highly productive
rms in an economy. If we take out adverse selection from our model, highly
productive rms receive a higher amount of capital in equilibrium, as the low pro-
ductive types are not allowed to deviate and choose the contract of the high type.
On the contrary, with adverse selection, in equilibrium nancial intermediaries
cannot o¤er to the highly productive rms a su¢ cient amount of capital because
low productive rms can falsely report their type.
Therefore, in our theory, the quality of property rights a¤ects both the low
and the highly productive rms, while adverse selection tends to punish harder the
highly productive rms. One implication for development is that policies aimed at
reducing informational frictions may be worth pursuing (in terms of e¢ ciencies to
be gained at the aggregate level). Amaral and Quintin (2010) and Buera, Kaboski
and Shin (2011) performed a quantitative analysis of how imperfect enforcement
a¤ects development, and found those e¤ects to be signicant. However they did
not specically include an informational imperfection in their model. Erosa and
Hidalgo (2008) performed a study with asymmetric information, but their focus
was not quantitative. Our model provides an answer on how the quantitative
ndings about the relationship between enforcement, output and productivity
are a¤ected by the introduction of informational frictions. We view our paper
as complementary to these contributions, as it approaches quantitatively the re-
lationship between enforcement and development, considering also the e¤ect of
adverse selection.
6.4. Model vs cross-country data
In this section we compare the predictions of the model regarding output per
worker with data available for several countries. To compute the predicted output
per worker, we feed in data for the average rm size. In our model average rm
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size varies monotonically with the quality of property rights10. One could ask why
we did not directly used data on the quality of property rights. Qualitative ratings
of the law enforcement (e.g. those done by the International Country Risk Guide),
while certainly useful for a relative ranking of countries (such as those performed
by LaPorta et all 1996), do not o¤er absolute values needed to feed the model.
Djankov et all (2008) use a case study to construct a measure for the e¢ ciency
of debt enforcement for 88 countries. While providing a quantitative measure of
property rights quality, there are limits in extending the results of their case study
to the overall economy. Nonetheless, at the end of this section we will use their
quantitative measure as an additional test for our model.
We investigated the publicly available data on rm size, considering both the
quality and comparability of data for our purposes. Countries that undertake pe-
riodically an economic census may be expected to have more reliable data on rm
size. Data from surveys may be sometimes less prone to cross country comparisons
if the surveys were not carried out with a similar methodology11. Taking account
of this, we used as a main data source the OECD database on Structural Business
Statistics, which contains the number of employees and the number of rms for all
businesses and by industry sector for the OECD countries. The advantage of this
source is that data are organized based on a common industry classication, ISIC
rev 3. We added the data for Argentina from the economic census, whose national
classication is compatible with ISIC rev 3 used by OECD. In this way we have
a sample of 30 countries, consisting of countries usually characterized as either
middle incomeor developed. We could not include any low incomecountries
in our sample. We could not nd any reliable data (e.g. economic census) which
is publicly available. There are some surveys but the coverage seemed insu¢ cient
and the average rm size is highly dependent on the coverage12.
10As seen in previous section, there is a slight variation in monotonicity of average rm size
when the quality of property rights is very close to one, but this does not restrict our analysis.
From a conceptual point of view, countries in that interval have a level of development very
similar to US, and are not the object of our study. From a practical point of view, it does not
a¤ect the sample we use.
11Di¤erent purpose of the survey, di¤erent geographical or size class coverage may signicantly
inuence the results of the survey. This can be seen for instance in data available for the
same country (India, China) from more sources ( Asian Development Bank or United Nations
Statistics Division).
12In general, data on rm size for lower income countries is hardly available and of much lower
quality than the data from developped countries. The high level of non-declared activities, usu-
ally combined with an insu¢ cient statistical capacity imply that it is di¢ cult for these countries
to compile data with similar methodology (and reliability) as in the developped countries.
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The average rm size varies signicantly across the one digit level ISIC sectors
(mining, manufacturing, construction, transport, etc.) - within and across the
countries in our sample. Given that our model abstracts from relative shares
of sectors in total economy, and factor shares vary across sectors (Herrendorf
and Valentinyi 2008), we decide to focus on manufacturing in our cross country
comparisons, which is also consistent with the calibration procedure13. The data
on two digit level manufacturing industries reveals, across countries, that there
is still a signicant variation in rm size also within the manufacturing sector.
For example, for the U.S., average rm size varies from 19 for machinery and
equipment n.e.c. to 78 for energy, chemical and plastic products. However, this
issue is not the object of our analysis. Therefore, for each country in our sample,
we compute the average rm size as a weighted average of rm size in the two
digit industries, keeping the industry weights constant and equal to the ones of
US, which is the benchmark country in our analysis.
As a measure of output, from the Penn World Table (PWT) version 7.0 we
take the GDP per worker (rgdpwok). The variable, used also by Amaral and
Quintin (2010), is intended to control for di¤erences in rates of employment and
price levels across countries (which are not the focus of our analysis). Although
for the countries in our sample the GDP per worker relative to US displays a
certain variation over time, we are interested in its long term average. We used
the average for the period 1995 up to most recent data, for two reasons: on the
one hand, for this period the series are more stable and at the same time, the
closer we are to present, generally the more reliable can be considered the series.
Figure 8 illustrates the relative output predicted by the model given the coun-
try data on average rm size, and the relative output implied by PWT data. The
triangles are from model simulations, and the rhombuses represent country-level
data. For both the model and the data, the quantities are normalized by the US
level. First of all, the country data conrm the prediction of the model. There
is a clear positive correlation between the average rm size and the relative GDP
per worker, as shown by the regression line from country data. We nd that the
models predictions for output are reasonable given available data. If we com-
pare the data regression line with the model prediction, we note that in general
the model predicts a higher GDP per worker than in the data. The unexplained
13The distribution of rm size is quite dispersed. Although it could be rightfully argued
that the mean does not fully describe the distribution, for the purpose of our cross country
comparisons the mean seems to works well as a summary indicator of the rm size distribution
and it has been used in several studies like Guner et all (2008) or Amaral and Quintin (2010).
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part could be due to the fact that we abstracted from other relevant factors for
development (such as human capital di¤erences). Nonetheless, the di¤erences in
the quality of property rights combined with the e¤ects of adverse selection seem
able to explain a great deal of the output disparities between U.S. and the rest
of countries in our sample, especially considering that we are varying one single
factor - the quality of property rights - across countries.
The data covers both countries that could be characterized as having a high
incomeand countries with a middle income. While we have seen that the quality
of property rights plays an important role for sample of countries as a whole, it
may be useful to have a look also separately at each income group. Although
there is no universal, agreed-upon denition for what makes a country developing
versus developed, international organizations (IMF, UN, the World Bank) classify
countries based on various criteria such as GNI per capita, or Human Development
Index. In our case we use the variable at hand, the GDP per worker. Figure 9
displays how the data and the model behave for the countries in our sample with
a GDP per worker of less than 60% of the US level, compared to the rest14.
There are two empirical observations that deserve to be highlighted. First of all,
the positive correlation between the property rights quality and rm size, on one
hand, and relative GDP per worker, on the other hand, is not driven only by
having in our sample two di¤erent income country groups, but exists also within
these groups, as it is apparent from the regression lines for each group. Secondly,
the output variation not explained by di¤erences in property rights quality seems
more signicant for the middle income group of countries. This is consistent
with the view that these countries, in particular, may be a¤ected by additional
problems of development, not included in the current framework.
We conclude this section by providing an additional test for our model, based
on the case study by Djankov et all (2008). They construct a measure for the e¢ -
ciency of debt enforcement in 88 countries, by presenting insolvency practitioners
in each country with the same questionnaire of a defaulting rm. Their debt
enforcement measure covers several aspects related to time, cost, and the likely
disposition of the assets in case of default. For our purposes, we are interested in
their measure for the recovery rate (cents per dollar), which represents the part
of the debt that the nancial intermediary can recover from the rm in case of
default. This is a reection of the parameter  that in our model characterizes
14While we have used a slightly higher threshold than the IMF or the World Bank (given that
we do not have any low-income country in our sample), our classication is broadly consistent
with theirs.
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the quality of property rights. We rescale the recovery rate by its US level, and
feed it to our model. The predictions for GDP per worker are displayed in Figure
10. The recovery rate compiled by Djankov et all (2008) reinforces the available
evidence for a strong correlation between the quality of property rights and out-
put. Figure 11 displays the country data and model predictions for the average
rm size, and provides empirical support to the view that rm size is positively
correlated to the quality of property rights.
We keep in mind that their case study referred to a medium rm (from a spe-
cic industry), and their ndings may not be fully representative for the economy
as a whole, in particular for larger rms, which although less in number, account
for a signicant share of total output15. Nonetheless, this exercise reinforces the
conclusions of this section with new empirical evidence and renders additional tes-
timony for the signicant explanatory power of our model, based on the di¤erences
in property rights and the adverse selection mechanism.
7. Model with a Self-funding sector
In our model the di¤erences in the quality of property rights can explain a signif-
icant part of the output variation but only a small fraction of the TFP variation
across countries. Like most neoclassical literature on growth, we looked at the
economy in the aggregate and we consider that all the production is realized by
the manufacturing sector. But this approach has a limitation: Rajan and Zingales
(1998) have shown that di¤erent industries have di¤erent dependence on external
nance. The manufacturing sector, which is characterized by large scale of op-
eration, is more vulnerable to nancial marker imperfections than other sectors
where the scale of operation are not that large. As Buera, Kabosky and Shin
(2011) pointed out "sectors with larger scales of operation (e.g. manufacturing)
have more nancing needs, and are hence disproportionately vulnerable to nan-
cial frictions". Buera, Kabosky and Shin (2011) incorporate to the model this idea
of the special vulnerability of sectors with large scale by introducing two sectors
with di¤erent scale of operations, namely manufacture and services (character-
ized by di¤erent xed costs, as in Erosa and Hidalgo, 2008). Another approach is
the one by Midrigan and Xu (2012), where entrepreneur may chose two type of
technologies: one that do not uses capital and consequently do not requires any
outside nance, in this sense is a self-funding technology, and another technology
15The authors aknowledge that for large rms the bankrupcy procedure is likely to be politi-
cised (especially in developing countries).
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which uses capital and that consequently requires external nance and is a¤ected
by nancial frictions.
Our approach follows the same spirit that these previous contributions: there
is two technologies, the rst tecnology is the one introduced in the benchmark
model characterized by xed cost which implies large scale of operation and re-
quires external fund; the second tecnology is characterized by a smaller scale of
operation (like Buera, Kabosky and Shin, 2011 and Erosa and Hidalgo, 2008)
and by being self-funding and not requiring external funds (like Midrigan and
Xu, 2012). We will refer as large scale technology to the rst technology and
self-funding technology to the second one.
We identify the self-funding technology in our calibration as the agriculture.
The reasons for that agriculture is as a sector which is less vulnerable to nan-
cial frictions due to several factors: i) agriculture is characterized by small scale of
operation, ii) The type of organization that agricultural rms has, which is charac-
terized by self-employment and family and individual business, can be more easily
adapted to self-funding than other type of organizations more common in other
sectors, namely in manufacturing, iii) agriculture has more weight in developing
countries than in developed ones.
The average rm size measured by the number of employees according with
the American Census Bureau 2007 is about 55 in manufacture and 14 in services.
According with 2007 Agriculture Census16 and using the same methodology as
the one used in calculate the average rm size in manufacture and services, the
rm size measure by the number of employees is 0.41 in agriculture, smaller than
one. Thus, the average rm size in services is 34 times larger than agriculture
and in manufacturing is 133 times larger. The reason for such small size is that
only the 9% of farms hire workers. This means that self-employment is the main
source of labor in agriculture. Furthermore, the vast majority of farms, the 86%,
are organized as familiar or individual business. This type of organization and
the small scale of operation suggest that rms in the agricultural sector (farms)
are characterized by self-employment and can be more easily self-funding and less
vulnerable to the nancial frictions than other sectors, like manufacturing.
Another reason to consider agriculture as a sector that is less vulnerable to
16Since Agriculture is clearly characterized by seasonal employment, we have consider only
hired workers for more than 150 days a year on the farm. If it is consider the total amount of
hired workers (included those with less than 150 days per year in the farm) then the rm size in
agriculture would be still vey small, on average 1.2 workers per farm, and the self employment
still very important, only the 22% of the farms would hire workers.
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nancial friction is the higher weight that this sector has in less developed countries
as table *** shows. The percentage of employment in agriculture in countries with
less that the 40% of the US per capita GDP is on average 24%, while in countries
with a per capita GDP larger than the 40% of US per capital GDP is smaller than
the 4%. If we consider only countries with less than 20% of US per capita GDP, the
average percentage of employment in agriculture increases up to 32%. Thus, there
is a very clear pattern in the data: the weight of agriculture is more important
in poor countries than in rich ones. As Rajan and Zingales (1998) pointed out,
industries with more needs of extemal nance develop disproportionately faster in
countries with more-developed nancial markets. Thus, following the same logic,
agriculture which has more weight in countries with weaker property rigths and
higher nancial friccions should be a sector with less nancial needs than others.
The above considerations motivate us to propose in this section an extension
of our model including a self-funding technology, which is not as a¤ected by weak
property rights as other technologies. To be more precise, for the sake of simplicity
we will consider that self-funding technology does not need nancial intermedia-
tion and, consequently, is not a¤ected by the quality of property rights. We will
use the agricultural sector as a proxy for this self-funding technology.
In this section we will consider that in order to produce goods there are two
types of technologies, a large scale one, which is exactly as the one described in the
main model, and another technology that will be called self-funding technology.
The basic di¤erence between large scale and self-funding technology is that the use
of large scale technology requires nancial intermediation, while the self-funding
technology can be nanced directly by households, and, consequently does not
need nancial intermediation. Since, in our model, property rights a¤ect the
economy via the nancial contract, they will concern rms that use nancial
intermediation, that is, those that use large scale technology. However, there will
be no mechanism via which property rights directly a¤ect the rms using self-
funding technologies. We assume that the self-funding technology is characterized
by the following production function, which uses labor lsf , capital ksf and land
zsf to produce a quantity ysf of the consumption good:
ysf =  sf (lsf )
 (ksf )
(zsf )
1  
We have included a specic factor in the self-funding sector: land. The reason is
smoothing the reallocation of resources from the self-funding to the large scale
sector. Otherwise, there would be a threshold level of property rights above
which the self-funding technology is not used and below which the large scale
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technology is not used. The self-funding technology will employ labor and capital
by maximizing prot, according to the FOCs:

 sf (lsf )
 (ksf )
(zsf )
1  
lsf
= w , ysf
lsf
= w

 sf (lsf )
 (ksf )
(zsf )
1  
ksf
= (r + ), ysf
ksf
=  + r
We will assume that capital goods are only produced by the large scale sector.
Given that the relative share of this sector will diminish with the quality of prop-
erty rights, as property rights drop, at some point the large scale sector will only
be producing capital for the self-funding sector. This creates a bound for the
self-funding sector, in the sense that, once the quality of property rights drops
enough, self-funding output will be limited by the amount of capital produced by
the large scale sector.
7.1. Calibration of self-funding technology
As explained above, since information about informal economy is very imprecise,
and one of the most salient facts about sectorial di¤erences among developing
and developed countries is the much higher weight of agriculture in developing
countries than in developed countries, we will use the agricultural sector as a proxy
for the self-funding technology. We used exactly the same parameters as in our
benchmark calibration for the large scale technology, preferences and depreciation
of capital.
To calibrate the self-funding production function, we take the US economy as
a benchmark, considering agriculture as the self-funding sector. We draw from
measures of factor income shares of Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2008), and from
statistics on agriculture value added (% of GDP) as published by the World Bank
and OECD. Mapping the model to the industry data is not straightforward, given
that our model only uses labor, capital and land to produce the nal output,
while the industries in the data use intermediate inputs, capital, and labor to
produce intermediate inputs for other industries and nal output. Given that our
production function has constant returns to scale, it su¢ ces to x the share of
labor and the share of capital (in our framework the capital consists of structures
and equipment, excluding land, which is a separate factor supplied in a xed
amount).
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Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2008) have proposed a mapping between the Input-
Output data and the most common two sector models. Among their ndings,
they noted that if we take the land share out, then the remaining capital share
in agriculture is close to the economy-wide average. Thus, we take the capital
share in the self-funding technology (agriculture) to be the same as in the large
scale technology, 0:36. We then use Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2008) income
share of labor in agriculture of 0:5917. Finally, the constant factor  sf (zsf )1  
encompassing the total factor productivity in agriculture and the xed stock of
land is deduced from matching the US agriculture value added (% of GDP), as
published by the World Bank and OECD. For consistency with the rest of the
paper, we used the average for years 1995-2010 (of 1:3%).
7.2. Results with self-funding technology
The model with self-funding technology generates a stronger variation of TFP,
as shown in Figure 12. When property rights drop, this a¤ects the large scale
technology, but not the self-funding technology; this generates a reallocation of
resources from the large scale sector to the self-funding one. More precisely, when
property rights worsen, the highly productive establishments using large scale
technology become ine¢ ciently small, using less capital and workers than the op-
timum. Then, the large scale technology generates a lower output. The novelty
of this exercise is this reallocation of resources which takes place from the large
scale technology to the self-funding one: as the quality of property rights dimin-
ishes, the self-funding sector employs relatively more labor and capital. On the
aggregate, given that the self-funding technology is less productive than the large
scale one, the economy-wide TFP drops much more than before.
This is closer to what cross country data suggest. To see this we plotted in
Figure 13 the TFP against the output per worker: the line shows the prediction
of the model with self-funding technology, while the rhombuses represent data for
190 countries from PWT for the year 2005, the base year of the PWT database
17Here we have two options, as they provide the factor income shares at sector level both
at producer and purchaser prices. The di¤erence is that when factor shares are computed at
purchaser prices, the distribution costs are included as part of the sector output. The result
in this case is a lower capital share for agriculture, which could be intuitively explained by the
lower capital intensity of distribution services compared to agriculture. Given that the PPP
adjusted data on GDP per worker that we use to compare output among countries is based on
purchaser prices, we decided to follow the same line, resulting in a labor income share of 0:59.
However, we have experimented both options, and the results do not change by much.
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(both TFP and output are normalized by the US level). TFP is computed, as in
the rest of this paper, by the equation 6.1a. We compute the capital using the
perpetual inventory method, where the depreciation rate is the one in our model
and we consider the initial capital as the one predicted by the neoclassical model
at the steady state. That is:
kinitial period =


 + 

yinitial period
kt+1 = it + (1  )kt
where we use as the initial period the rst year available in the PWT for each
country. A convincing pattern emerges, with TFP varying across countries in a
clear one-to-one relationship with the output per worker, both in the data and in
the model, in accordance with the implications of the neoclassical growth frame-
work. Quite remarkably, this relationship holds for the 190 countries in the PWT
sample, covering countries with very di¤erent levels of output.
8. Conclusion
Our quantitative experiments attempt to contribute to the literature analyzing the
relationship between the quality of property rights enforcement, nancial develop-
ment and economic development. We are particularly interested in the aggregate
e¤ects of adverse selection. The contribution of this paper is to model property
rights enforcement and adverse selection in an intuitive way which, at the same
time captures several features of the real world so as to be suitable for a quanti-
tative analysis.
Following the literature, we introduce the imperfect quality of property rights
in the context of the credit market. Firms need to borrow in order to produce
and the quality of property rights is given by the variable ability of nancial
intermediaries to recover the credit from rms. Firms have di¤erent productivity
which will a¤ect their size. We introduce asymmetric information about this
ability, and this induces an adverse selection e¤ect. Our main objective is to
assess the e¤ects on the aggregate economy. In our experiments, we focus on
output, productivity and rm size. To keep computations tractable, we consider
two types of managers: with high and low productivity. In this way, we have a
general equilibrium model which encompasses two capital market imperfections
(imperfect property rights and adverse selection) and which is suitable for numeric
experiments.
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We calibrate our model and perform some experiments by varying the degree
of property rights enforcement so as to match the average rm size in a sample
of 30 middle and high income countries for which comparable data is available.
Through di¤erences in the quality of property rights enforcement, our model is
able to explain to a great deal of the di¤erences in output between countries.
When adverse selection is taken into account, the explanatory power of the model
is signicantly increased: the experiments indicate that alleviating informational
problems can raise output by up to 20%. This suggests that informational prob-
lems have important e¤ects on the aggregated output and policies targeted at this
issues may be worth pursuing.
The model is able to generate some variation in productivity too, but there
remains variation in the data which is not accounted for. To address this, one
could enrich the model in several ways. We performed one experiment by including
a self-funding technology, which in less developed countries is more important and
which could be expected to be less a¤ected by the quality of property rights. The
quantitative e¤ects on TFP proved to be signicant. The model could also be
extended, for instance, by taking into account the e¤ect of property rights on the
process of technology accumulation. We leave this however for future research.
Finally, it could be useful to put our work in the broader context. Throughout
the analysis, one question that emerges quite naturally is how and why countries
end up with di¤erent level of property rights enforcement? Acemoglu et all (2005,
2011) provided some examples of how economic institutions, which shape economic
outcomes, are determined by political power, which is in turn determined by
political institutions and the distribution of resources in society. They identied
constructing formal models incorporating and extending their theory to be an
important task ahead.
At the same time, the recent economic and nancial developments a¤ecting
the world economy suggest that considering the growing interactions among na-
tional economies may also contribute to a better understanding of the phenomena
studied in this paper. All these e¤orts are likely to contribute to a better under-
standing of the economic inequalities between countries.
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9. Appendix
9.1. Proof proposition 4.2
We showed that the NDC is equivalent to kj  k1;j(). We denoted the level
of capital which maximizes the manager payo¤ as kj;. NDC is binding if and
only if kj;  k1;j(). But kj; is argmax
k
(j; k)   (r + )k, so by FOC we
get kj; = [j( r+ )
1    
w

]
1
1   . Also from denition of k1;j() we get that
k1;j = [j(
(1 )
r+
)1 
 

w

]
1
1   . Then kj;  k1;j() is equivalent to 1   , so
NDC is binding if and only if   
1  .
we show that in case 1,   
1  , the RC is also binding and the equilibrium
menu of contracts is kg = kb = k1;b().
If NDC is binding then kb = k1;b:
8k > k1;b
 (b; kb)  (r + )kb =  (b; k1;b)  (r + )k1;b =
(1  ) (b; k1;b) < (1  ) (b; k)
Thus k1;b() = k2(; k1;b). Since If NDC is binding kb = k1;b  kb. It is follows
from the assumption that @
2(;k)
@k@
> 0 that kg > kb. Thus k2(; k1;b) = k1;b() 
kb < kg ) kg = k2(; k1;b) = k1;b().
will prove lemma 3 in four steps:
Step 1: Given r, there is 2 > 1 such that 8 2 (1; 2) we have kb = kb <
kg = k2 < kg.
It follows from denition of 1 that when  = 1 kb = k2 = k1;b < k1;g and
k2 = kb < kg. It follows from the denitions of k2 and k1;g, and Implicit Function
Theorem that both k2 and k1;g are continuous increasing functions of  for  > 1:
@k2
@
=
 (b; k2)
(1  )@(b;k2)
@k
> 0
@k1;g
@
=    (g; k1;g)
@(g ;k1;g)
@k
  (r + )
=    (g; k1;g)

h
@(g ;k1;g)
@k
  (g ;k1;g)
k1;g
i > 0
Lets dene 2 = min
n
(g ;kg) (b;kb)+(r+)kb
(g ;kg) ;min f 2 [1; 1] such that k2 = k1;gg
o
,
it follows from denition of 2 that 8 2 (1; 2) k1;g > k2 > kb = kb and kg > k2,
therefore kg = k2 < kg.
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Step 2: Given r, there is 2 > 1 such that 8 2 (1; 2) we have kb = kb <
kg = k2 < kg.
Lets dene 3 = max
n
(g ;kg) (b;kb)+(r+)kb
(g ;kg) ;
(r+)kg
(g ;kg)
o
. It follows from the
denition of 3 that when  = 3, min fk1;g; k2g = kg = kg. Since both k1;g and
k2 are increasing functions of , it follows that 8 > 3, min fk1;g; k2g > kg = kg.
Step 3: If (; k) = g()k, being g(:) a continuous increasing function and
 > 0, then 3 = 2.
In this case
kb , (r + ) = @ (b; kb)
@k
= 
 (b; kb)
kb
kg , (r + ) = @ (g; kg)
@k
= 
 (g; kg)
kg
This implies that:
1  (r + )kb
 (b; kb)
=  =
(r + )kg
 (b; kg)
Therefore when  = 1 k1;g = kg > kb = k2. Therefore, for  > 1, the
IC1 is not binding (Neither for the good nor the bad type). Thus, if  2
1;
(g ;kg) (b;kb)+(r+)kb
(g ;kg)
i
k2  kg < k1;g ) 2 = (g ;kg) (b;kb)+(r+)kb(g ;kg) .
Furthermore, if  = 2 =
(g ;kg) (b;kb)+(r+)kb
(g ;kg) k2  kg < k1;g )  (g; kg)  
(r + )kg > (1   2) (g; kg) ) 2 = (g ;kg) (b;kb)+(r+)kb(g ;kg) >
(r+)kg
(g ;kg) )
3 =
(g ;kg) (b;kb)+(r+)kb
(g ;kg) = 2.
Step 4: Computing 2 and k2(; kb) for Case 2,   1  .
We have seen that in Case 2, when   
1  , the NDC is not binding so we do
not need worry for it.
Going to RC, we showed in section 4.1 that it is equivalent to kg  k2(; kb),
where k2(; kb) is the value of kg such that the RC holds with equality:
 (b; kb)  (r + )kb = (1  ) (b; k2(; kb))
As k2(; kb) is an increasing function of kb on [0, kb], the optimal contract will
be kb = kb and kg = minfk2(; kb); kgg. Now let us nd k2(; kb).
We use the fact that 
1 
(b;kb)
kb
= r +  so we substitute (r + )kb with

1  (b; kb) in ?? and then by using also that  (b; k) =

bk
( 
w
)
 1
1  (1  )
we get that:
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k2(; kb) = kb(
1    
(1  )(1  ))
1 

Then the RC is binding if and only if k2(; kb)  kg which is equivalent to
  1  (b
g
)

(1 )(1  ) (
1    
1   )
Then 2  1 

b
g
 
(1 )(1  )

1  
1 

.
9.2. Proof proposition 6.1
We dened TFP as
 
Y
K
 1
1  . We will show that @
Y
K
@
> 0. The most di¢ cult case
is  2 (1; 2). When 0 <   1 the formulas are much simpler and when   2
we are in the perfect information case.
Let us start with some simplifying notation. Denote s = ( 1  
(1 )(1 ))
1 
 , f =
b
g
, a1 = s+ (1  ), a2 = f
1
1  s

1  + (1  ).
Note that  2 (1; 2) implies
1 < s < f
1
1   (9.1)
. Then we get:
TFP = Y
K
=
1 l
"
a2(

r+
)

1   ( 
w
)

1  
1 l
"
a1(

r+
)
1 
1   ( 
w
)

1  
 = [(1 )a2 a1]1  a2
(a2 a1)1 a1
const().
As s() is strictly increasing in  on (0; 1), it is equivalent to show that TFP
is increasing in s. Due to the size of the expression of TFP when substituting for
a1 and a2, we put it in Mathematica, simplify it, then take its derivative w. r. to
s, simplify it.
The last step is to show that all the factors of the resulting product are positive
 s+ f 11  s 1  > 0 and 1 + ( 1 + s)v > 0 directly from 9.1
( 1+    s)  ( 1+ )[1 + ( 1+ f 11  s 1  )] > 0, (1   )(1  ) 
as + (1  )f 11  s 1  > 0, true by using 1     > 0 and 9.1.
The last inequality to prove is:
2[1+( 1+s)]( 1++ +f
1
1  s

1  )
( 1+)s +
f 2++[2+(1+s)]g[1+( 1+f
1
1  s

1  )]
s
+
+ ( 1+)( 1+)[1+( 1+f
1
1  s

1  )]2
s+( 1+s)s > 0.
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We simplify it in Mathematica using the constraints fs > 1;  < 1;  > 0;  <
1g and we get:
[+( 1+s)]2( 1++ +f 11  s 1  )+( 1+) f 2 +  + [2 + (1 + s)]g [1+
( 1+ s)]+ ( 1+)2( 1+)[1+( 1+f 11  s 1  )]2 < 0 which is equivalent to:
( 1 + )f + ( 1 + s) + ( 1 + )[1 + ( 1 + f 11  s 1  )g2 + ( 1 +  +
)[1 + ( 1 + s)]2[1 + ( 1 + f 11  s 1  )] < 0, which is true as  1 +  < 0 and
 1 + +  < 0.
9.3. Calibration details
We want our model at Steady State to match the Firm Size Distribution (FSD)
for the U.S. At the same time, we want to use the FSD in other countries to
assign a value to the enforcement parameter  for those countries. For the U.S.,
the economic census provides probably the best available data on FSD (together
with the County Business Patterns).
For the calibration, we consider that large rms in the data are those which
have an amount of workers above the sector average which is 41.9. From Table
9.1 it can be seen that the size classes which have on average establishments with
more than 41.9 are those size classes with more than 50 employees. These will be
considered to be the larger (and more productive) group in our economy. This
implies a share of large rms in the total number of rms,  = 0; 16.
We set  such that the model matches the portion of output and labor of rms
with high productivity. According with the model:
lg
E(l)
=
h
(1    ) +  yg
E(y)
i
(1  ) ,
 =
h
lg
E(l)
  
i
(1  )
yg
E(y)
   =
h
lg
E(l)
  1
i
(1  )
yg
E(y)
  1 = 0; 58
We chose " such that the model match the average rm size:
E(l) =
(1  )"
1     , " =
(1    )
1   E(l) = 3; 96
We set (g=b) such that the portion of output that produce rms with high
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Size class Number of Number of Average number of Value Added Average
establishments employees employees per Value Added
establishment per employee
All 350.828 14.699.536 41,9 1.887,7 128,4
1_4 141.992 279.481 1,97 21,6 77,3
5_9 49.284 334.459 6,79 28,3 84,6
10_19 50.824 702.428 13,82 58,0 82,6
20_49 51.660 1.615.349 31,27 142,8 88,4
50_99 25.883 1.814.999 70,12 181,7 100,1
100-249 20.346 3.133.384 154,00 357,4 114,1
250_499 6.853 2.357.917 344,07 297,0 126,0
500_999 2.720 1.835.386 674,77 286,1 155,9
1000_2499 1.025 1.494.936 1458,47 262,0 175,3
2500_ 241 1.131.197 4693,76 252,4 223,1
Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics for the establishments in U.S. manufacturing
sector (source: the 2002 U.S. Economic Census)
productivity match the data:
yg
E(y)
=

1
1  
g

1
1  
g + (1  )
1
1  
b
=
 (g=b)
1
1  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1
1 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,
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Chapter 3
Learning-by-doing, Financial Frictions and TFP
March 20, 2014
Abstract
In this paper we inquire quantitatively whether the ine¤ective capital
allocation across rms generated by nancial frictions acts as a barrier that
withholds developing countries from adopting more advanced technologies
and increasing their TFP. The nancial market is a¤ected by imperfect
property rights and adverse selection, while rmscurrent ability in using
technology depends on the advancement level of technologies used in the
past. The model reveals non-trivial consequences for the technological
gap across rms in the economy, which in turn exacerbate the adverse
selection problems and signicantly amplify the e¤ect on TFP.
1 Introduction
There is a vast literature trying to explain existing di¤erences in levels of income
per capita among economies1 . Why some countries produce so much more per
capita then others? Using growth models, documented di¤erences in capital
seem not able to account for the observed di¤erences in output (total factor
productivity varies greatly across countries)2 . At the same time, capital market
imperfections have gured prominently in the literature as being highly corre-
lated to development3 . Moreover, the average rm size in developing countries
has been found to be often ine¢ ciently small4 . These observations raise some
questions on economic development: How much of the measured di¤erences in
output per worker could be explained by taking into account the capital market
imperfections? How much of the cross country variation in the average scale of
production could be explained by the imperfections in contract enforcement?
These questions prove to be important from several perspectives. Thus,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states
in its Policy for investment frameworkthat the ability to make and enforce
1This is one of the main questions in development economics.
2See for example Prescott (1998), or Hall and Jones (1999).
3See for example Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), or King and Levine
(1993).
4See Tybout (2000).
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contracts and resolve disputes is fundamental if markets are to function prop-
erly...When procedures for enforcing commercial transactions are bureaucratic
and cumbersome, economies rely on less e¢ cient commercial practices... banks
reduce the amount of lending because they cannot be assured of the ability to
collect on debts... This limits the funding available for business expansion and
slows down trade, investment, economic growth and development5 .
The World Bank devotes important resources to its Doing Businessproject
which provides objective measures of business regulations for rms in 183 economies6 .
One dimension of this project covers contract enforcement. The indicators mea-
sure the e¢ ciency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute.
These international institutions closely monitor the evolution of contract
enforcement in developing economies as they consider that e¤ective commer-
cial dispute resolution has many benets for development. From a theoretical
perspective, this seems justied: Several models have established a qualitative
link between contract enforcement, nancial development and economic devel-
opment7 . Also, econometric studies using cross-country regressions indicate
that nancial development could have a signicant impact on economic devel-
opment8 . Our goal is to contribute to this debate by quantifying the e¤ects of
limited enforcement on economic development and rm size in the context of a
dynamic general equilibrium model.
Below we document the observations we quantify with our model. The rst
one is that better contract enforcement has a positive e¤ect on nancial de-
velopment which in turn positively a¤ects output. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) documented that better law enforcement and ac-
counting standards, positively impact on the development of nancial markets.
At the same time, many economists (e.g. McKinnon, 1973; Fry, 1995, King and
Levine 1993) have discussed the relationship between nancial development and
output growth9 .
The second empirical fact we aim to quantify refers to the rm size gen-
erally displaying a positive correlation with the level of contract enforcement
and nancial development. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006) nd
that rm size is positively related to nancial intermediary development, the
e¢ ciency of the legal system and property rights protection10 . Moreover, a re-
cent study by Garcia-Santana and Ramos (2013) has shown that countries with
larger distortions allocate more resources to small unproductive units and that
the capacity of the economy to provide credit is crucial to understand the large
cross-country di¤erences in the allocation of labor across production units of
di¤erent size. Their results suggest that this type of distortions is important to
5See oecd.org
6See www.doingbusiness.org
7See, among many others, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991),
Banerjee and Newman (1993), Khan (2001), Erosa and Hidalgo (2008).
8See, among others, Pagano (1993), Levine (1997, 1998).
9Other empirical work in this vein includes Gelb (1989), Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1992),
Pagano (1993), Levine (1997, 1998), Levine et al. (2000), and Beck et al. (2000).
10Analysing the manufacturing sector in developing countries, Tybout (2000) illustrates that
the emphasis on small scale production correlates negatively with the level of development
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understand cross-country di¤erences in TFP.
This is related to the third empirical fact we want to quantify, namely the
positive e¤ect of nancial development on total factor productivity. Cross-
country studies on the impact of credit market development on productivity
are abundant. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Levine and Zervos (1998),
among others, show that nancial development positively and signicantly af-
fects total factor productivity11 .
While the link between nancial frictions and misallocation has been studied
before (e.g. Amaral and Quintin 2010 or Buera, Kaboski and Shin 2011), the
focus of this paper will be on how the process of technology adoption and the
learning-by-doing can be a¤ected by nancial frictions. More precisely, our the-
ory builds on the previous chapter to develop an exogenous growth model where
rms have di¤erent degree of access to the most advanced technology. The nan-
cial market is a¤ected by the same two frictions from previous chapter, namely
the imperfect enforcement and the asymmetric information. However, in this
paper there is technological change and technology adoption with learning-by-
doing. The frontier technology (the most advanced technology) grows exoge-
nously. As the technology gradually spreads across rms, the learning-by-doing
e¤ect allows for better use of available technology. The technological experience
(the weighted average of technology used in the past in the economy) a¤ects
also productivity.
There are two types of rms: Innovative, which have access to the fron-
tier technology and improve technological experience (via the learning by doing
process) and Backward which do not have access to frontier technology and
do not contribute to the learning by doing process. Due to adverse selection, a
higher contract enforcement increases resources allocated to the innovative rms
and this will have two e¤ects on productivity: 1) a static e¤ect: they are more
productive (as in the previous chapters) and 2) a dynamic e¤ect: they have
more weight and this increases the speed of learning by doing process, reducing
the technological gap (with respect to the frontier technology).
Therefore, in our economy, the degree of enforcement will determine the op-
timal way to provide incentives (via the contracting environment) and, at the
same time, will inuence the e¢ ciency of using available technologies (via the
learning by doing process). We can then quantify how an exogenous variation
in the capacity to enforce contracts a¤ects resource allocation and the result-
ing output and productivity. To measure the importance of these e¤ects, we
calibrate our model to reproduce relevant features of the U.S. economy: We
calibrate the productivity distribution for available technologies to t salient
features of the rm size distribution in the United States. Then we use the
calibrated model to compare the predicted output and productivity with data
available for a sample of 30 middle and high income countries, where the degree
11Hartmann et al. (2007) show that nancial development in European countries has in-
creased economy-wide productivity. Fisman and Love (2004) nd that nancial development
promotes growth by allocating funds towards the most protable investments. Arizala, Cav-
allo and Galindo (2009) nd a signicant impact of nancial development on industry-level
total factor productivity.
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of contract enforcement is chosen such that our model generates average rm
size of the magnitude observed in the data.
Amaral and Quintin (2010) and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) also quan-
tify the importance of limited enforcement and its e¤ects on nancial interme-
diation in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model. However, the
novelty of our approach resides in measuring the e¤ects of limited enforcement
in a framework which explicitly models adverse selection and the learning by
doing process. Both of these channels have been mentioned in the theoretical
literature as important for the process of nancial and economic development
(for a theory of enforcement with adverse selection see Erosa and Hidalgo 2008).
Firm size is a¤ected in several ways. On the one hand, there is the static
e¤ect due to imperfect enforcement and asymmetric information. On the other
hand, there is also the dynamic e¤ect due to the technological gap between
innovative and backward rms. As a consequence, the e¤ect of nancial frictions
on rm size is amplied.
The dynamic e¤ect of technological adoption in the presence of learning-by-
doing also improves the prediction power of the model with respect to aggregate
productivity in the economy. Our experiments indicate the technology adoption
channel to be quantitatively important.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model economy.
Section 3 characterizes agents decisions, section 4 the optimal nancial con-
tract (developed in the rst chapter) and section 5 the equilibrium and balanced
growth path. Then, section 6 introduces the numerical experiments, while sec-
tion 7 concludes.
2 The economy
This is an innite horizon economy where the time is discrete and indexed by
t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g. There are three types of agents: households, rms and nancial
intermediaries. There is one nal good that may be used for consumption or
for investment.
2.1 Technology
There is a continuous technology indexed by its advancement level Z. At each
period t, this technology can take values in the interval [0; At], where At is
the technological frontier, or the most advanced technology available at period
t. We assume that the technological frontier evolves exogenously and grows at
constant rate:
At+1 =  At
where   > 1. We call technological experience Ht 2 [0; At) a weighted aver-
age of the technology used by workers in the past, where the previous period
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technologys weight is :
Ht+1 = 
Z At
0
Z dt(Z)+ (1  )Ht = 
1X
n=0
(1  )n
"Z At n
0
Z dt n(Z)
#
(1)
where t(Z) is the measure of workers that work with technology Z at time t.
The technology Z is represented by a production function at rm level which
uses three factors: rms capital kj , labor lw;j and managerial time lm;j , where
j is the rm index:
f(kj ; lw;j ; lm;j ;Z;H;A; ) =

0 if lm;j  "
Z	(Z;H;A; ) (kj)

lw;j if lm;j  "
where 	(Z;H;A; ) is the state of know-how, and  2 f0; 1g is a rm specic
shock. A minimum level " of managerial inputs is needed for the capital and
labor to produce output. For the maximization problem of the rm to be well
dened, we assume that  +  2 (0; 1). This production function allows us
to obtain an endogenous rm size. This type of production function has been
used, among others, by Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007), Guner, Ventura and Xu
(2007), Perera-Tallo (2003, 2011), Amaral and Quintin (2010).
We assume the state of know how takes the form:
	(Z;H;A; ) =
(
e 
Z [(1 )H+A]
(1 )H+A if Z  (1  )H + A
1 otherwise
The state of know how is a decreasing function of the advancement level of the
technology Z and an increasing function of the technological experience H and
the technological frontier A. Since the technological experience H is always
smaller than the technological frontier A, the shock  has a positive e¤ect on
the state of know how.
Both the technological experience H and the technological frontier A may be
considered stocks of knowledge. The rst stock of knowledge H represents the
ability of using advanced technologies due to learning by doing: the advance-
ment level of the technologies used by workers in the past increases the ability
of workers to use more advanced technology in the present (for other models of
learning-by-doing see among others Arrow 1962, Krugman 1988; Stokey 1988;
Lucas 1988, 1993; Matsuyama 1992; Young 1991; Perera-Tallo 2011).The sec-
ond stock of knowledge A represents the state of the artin the most advanced
scientic knowledge. Both stocks of knowledge have positive e¤ect on the ability
of workers to use e¢ ciently advanced technology. That is, both of them rise the
state of know-how.
The larger , the larger the positive e¤ect that the technological frontier A
will have on the productivity of the rm. Thus, the shock  may be interpreted
as the degree in which the rm has access to information about the most ad-
vanced technology. In order to simplify, we will consider that rms either have
full access to the technological frontier, that is  = 1, or they do not have any
5
access at all,  = 0. The probability that the rm has full access to the tech-
nological frontier ( = 1) is denoted by , hence the probability of not acceding
at all to the technological frontier ( = 0) is 1  .
Firms are perfectly competitive, there is free entry.
2.2 Households
In our model there are many identical households, each with a continuum of
agents of measure one. The household values streams of the nal consumption
good according to the utility function:
1X
t=0

1
1 + 
t
u(ct) (2)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate of the household, ct is the average consump-
tion of the households members and the utility function is the CES utility:
u(c) =

c1 
1  if  2 (0; 1) [ (1;+1)
ln c if  = 1
The continuum of members in each household is introduced in the model in
order to simplify, since this feature implies that households can perfectly diver-
sify risk. As we will show, this assumption implies that we can represent the
households behavior as the solution of a conventional representative household
maximization problem with innite horizon in a deterministic environment, and
we can focus the analysis in the asymmetric information problem of rms and
the learnig by doing e¤ects that are really the contribution of our paper.
2.3 Financial intermediaries and the level of contract en-
forcement
Firms nance their production by signing contracts with nancial intermedi-
aries. These contracts are a¤ected by two imperfections. On the one hand,
the contracts are not fully enforceable. On the other hand, nancial intermedi-
aries cannot observe the idiosyncratic technological shock of the rms, therefore
they dont know which rms have access to the frontier technology and which
rms dont. Because contracts are not fully enforceable, rms can default. By
defaulting, we mean that rms refuse to return the whole loan. When rm
j defaults, the nancial intermediary can recover the capital borrowed to the
rm kj and with probability  can take also the cash ow of the rm, dened
as output minus the payment to the workers: j(kj) = yj   wlw;j . After the
payment to the nancial intermediary, managers are paid. It follows from the
rm zero prot condition that managers receive the cash ow of the rms minus
the payment to the nancial intermediary.
Therefore, in case the rm defaults, the nancial intermediary can only
enforce the contract with probability  2 [0; 1], which is an index of the quality
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of the property rights. In this paper we will compare economies which di¤er
only in this parameter  of contract enforcement.
3 Agent decisions
3.1 Firms decision
At the beginning of period t, rms hire the managers, before the realization of
the technological shock. This means that the number of managers cannot be
contingent on the realization of the technological shock. Since the productivity
shock is at this stage not known, the rm will specify the payment to the
manager contingent on the productivity shock. Then the technological shock
j is realized. In order to produce rms need capital kjt, which is nanced
through a nancial intermediary, according to a contract we will analyze in
the next section. After borrowing the capital, rms hire labor lw;j , and use it
together with the capital to produce the unique nal good. After they produce,
they sell the output to the households and pay the workers the wage w for their
labor services.
Thus, rms chose the technology Z and the labor lw once that they have
chosen the amount of capital. This means that the maximization problem of
the rm after they chose the capital is as follows:
max
lw;Z2[0;A]
Ze
 Z [(1 j)H+jA]
(1 j)H+jA (kj)

lw   wlw
First order conditions with respect to Zj and lw:
e
 Z [(1 j)H+jA]
(1 j)H+jA   Ze 
Z [(1 j)H+jA]
(1 j)H+jA
1
(1  j)H + jA

(kj)

lw = 0 ,
Z = (1  j)H + jA (3)
Ze
 Z [(1 j)H+jA]
(1 j)H+jA (kj)

l 1w = w ,
lw =
0B@Ze 
Z [(1 j)H+jA]
(1 j)H+jA (kj)

w
1CA
1
1 
=

Z (kj)

w
 1
1 
(4)
Thus, the technological choice by the rms is a function of the shock j :
Z(j) =

A if j = 1
H if j = 0
The rms that adopt more advanced technologies (A) are the one that have full
access to the technological frontier (j = 1), and this is why we will call them
from now on innovative rms and we will index them by i. The rms that do
not have access to the technological frontier (j = 1) use a technology which is
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behind the most advanced one, and we will call them backward rms and we
will index by b.
Notice that if we substitute the rst order condition of the technology in the
production function yields:
yj = [(1  j)H + jA] (kj) lw =
"

w

[(1  j)H + jA] (kj)
# 1
1 
Therefore, the production of innovative and standard rms are respectively as
follows
yi = A (ki)

lw =
"

w

A (ki)

# 1
1 
yb = H (kb)

lw =
"

w

H (kb)

# 1
1 
Using equation (3) and (4), it follows that the cash ow of rms is as follows:
j(kj) = (1  )
"

w

[(1  j)H + jA] kj
# 1
1 
That is:
i(ki) = (1  )
"

w

Aki
# 1
1 
b(kb) = (1  )
"

w

H kb
# 1
1 
The decision about the amount of capital that rms get will be analyzed in
section 4, where the optimal contract between rms and nancial intermediaries
is examined.
3.2 Households decision:
Every period t households are endowed with one unit of labor. At the beginning
of each period, each member of the household makes an occupational choice
between being a worker or a manager. If she decides to be a worker, she will earn
a wage wt. If she decides to be a manager, she will earn a payment contingent
on the technological shock of the rm: she will earn wMit when the rm she
manages is innovative (it receives the shock j = 1, which means that the rm
has access to the technological frontier) and wMbt when the rm is backward (it
8
receives the shock j = 0, which means that the rm does not have access to
the frontier technology).
The household chooses at every period t the per capita consumption ct and
the share of household members who become workers denoted lt, where lt 2
(0; 1). The households per capita assets at each period at are deposited with
nancial intermediaries which pay an interest rt on them. The household takes
as given the prices frt; wt; wMt gt=0;1 when making its decision on fct; lt;g+1t=0 .
The maximization problem of the households is as follows:
max
fct;lt;g+1t=0
1X
t=0

1
1 + 
t
u(ct)
ct + at+1   at = wtlt + (1  lt)wMt + rtat (5)
where wMt =  w
M
it + (1  )wMbt is the average wage of managers. Notice that,
since there is a continuum of members in each household, the household can
perfectly diversify the risk associated to the managerspayment. This is why,
when choosing how many households members are devoted to be worker or to
be manager, the relevant variables are the wage and the expected payment of
managers. The rst order conditions of the household problem are:
u0(ct+1)
1 + rt+1
1 + 
= u0(ct) (6)
wt = w
M
t (7)
where the rst equation is the Euler Equation, while the second is an arbitrage
condition: the wage of the workers wt should be equal to the expected payment
to managers wMt . Since, due to the continuum of members, the households can
perfectly diversify the risk of the manager payment, the wage of workers is equal
to the expected payment of managers.
4 The optimal nancial contract
In this section we analyze the optimal nancial contract. In order to simplify
the exposition, along this section we will refer to the prots of rm before paying
the managers simply as prots: j (kj)  (rj + )kj . Along this section we will
consider both wages and deposit interest rates as given.
Weve seen that there are two types of rms operating: innovative (highly
productive rms) and backward (less productive rms). The nancial interme-
diaries will o¤er, for each of the two types of rms, a contract consisting in an
amount of capital kj and an interest rate rj . Given that nancial intermediaries
act perfectly competitive, expected (average) prots of nancial intermediaries
should be zero. In order to dene the expected prot of nancial intermediary,
we will use the indicator function j(rj ; kj ;) to denote the range of interest
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rate and capital at which the rm of type j will not default:
j(rj ; kj ;) =

1 if j (kj)  (1 + rj)kj  (1  )j (kj)
0 if j (kj)  (1 + rj)kj < (1  )j (kj)
The above indicator function means that if j = 1, the rm fullls the con-
tract, while if j = 0, the rm defaults. Thus, the expected prot by nancial
intermediaries is as follows:
 [i(1+ri)ki + (1-i)i(ki)-(1+r)ki] + (8)
(1-) [b(1+rb)kb + (1-b)b(kb)-(1+r)kb] = 0
The revenue of a nancial intermediary from a contract is equal to (1+rj)kj
when the rm fullls the contract (j = 1) and j(kj) when the rm does not
fulll the contract (j = 0), while the cost of a contract in terms of the payment
to depositors is (1+r)kj .
This condition will be referred as nancial intermediaries zero prot condi-
tion.
At equilibrium it should not be possible for a nancial intermediary to make
a better o¤er to any type j rm, without incurring a loss. Due to the two imper-
fections in the functioning of the nancial markets (imperfect enforcement and
asymmetric information), the menu of contracts will maximize prots for each
rm type, taking into account two incentive constraints: i) rst, rms should
have incentives to repay their loans, ii) second, rms should have incentive to
truly reveal their type.
The rst constraint refers to the incentive for rms to repay the nancial
intermediary and we will call it the non-default constraint:
j (kj)  (rj + )kj  (1  )j (kj) ; j 2 fi; bg (9)
If a rm defaults, the nancial intermediary gets her capital after depreciation
(1 )kj , and with probability  he also gets her cash ow, while the rm gets the
expected amount (1 )j (kj). If the rm fullls the contract she gets her cash
ow minus the payment to the nancial intermediary: j (kj)  (rj+ )kj . This
incentive constraint is saying that the rm is better o¤ paying to the nancial
intermediary, in which case she gets j (kj) (rj+)kj than defaulting, in which
case she gets (1  )j (kj).
The second constraint refers to the incentive for each rm to correctly reveal
her type, and we will call it revelation constraint:
b (kb)  (rb + )kb  max f(1  )b (ki) ; b (ki)  (ri + )kig (10)
i (ki)  (ri + )ki  max f(1  )i (kb) ; i (kb)  (rb + )kbg (11)
This incentive constraint says that the backward type rm should be better
o¤ to sign the contract destined to her own type, getting b(kb)   (r + )kb
as a payo¤, rather than pretending to be an innovative type, getting the pay-
o¤ max f(1  )b (ki) ; b (ki)  (ri + )kig. The same should be true for the
innovative type rm.
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4.1 The equilibrium menu of contracts
Denition 1 A menu of contracts f(ri; ki); (rb; kb)g satisfying the nancial in-
termediary zero prot condition (8) and the revelation constraints (10,11) rep-
resents an equilibrium menu of contracts if
1. 8j 2 fi; bg there is no other contract (r0j ; k0j) for the type j in which the
rm j is better o¤ jj(k0j)   (1 + r0j)k0j > jj(kj)   (1 + rj)kj and
in which nancial intermediary gets at least zero prot j(1+rj)kj + (1-
j)jj(kj)  (1+r)kj and in which the revelation constraints (10,11)
hold.
2. There is no other menu of contracts f(r0i; k0i); (r0b; k0b)g, in which nancial
intermediary gets at least zero prot (8) and in which jj(k0j)   (r0j +
1)k0j  jj(kj)   (1 + rj)kj 8j 2 fi; bg , being the last inequality strict
for one of the types, and in which the revelation constraints (10,11) hold.
Thus, a menu of contracts is an equilibrium if it satises the nancial inter-
mediary zero prot condition (8) and the revelation constraints (10, 11), and it
is not possible to nd, for one or both rm types, a better contract where non-
negative nancial intermediary prot condition is satised. It is still possible
a di¤erent contract in which both types have the same contract and in which
the backward type defaults: it is the pooling contract. Nevertheless, it is well
known that this type of pooling contract is never an equilibrium. Furthermore,
Chapter 1 shows that if there are enforcement cost (or state verication cost) in
case of default, and these costs are high enough, the pooling contract is never
superior to the separating menu of contract.
We note that an equilibrium menu of contracts will have rb = ri = r. Oth-
erwise, the nancial intermediary would be making positive prots with the
contract of at least one rm type. This couldnt be sustained as an equilibrium
because it would always be possible to o¤er a better contract to this type.
As the innovative type rm has higher productivity, she gets a larger amount
of capital than the backward type rm12 . This means that the innovative type
rm has never the incentive to pretend to be a backward type. Only the back-
ward type rm has incentives not to correctly reveal her type. This means that
the revelation constraint (11) is never binding and consequently is irrelevant for
the subsequent analysis.
It is possible to prove that the revelation constraint (10) is always tighter
than the non-default constraint for the innovative type. Thus, the only incentive
constraint relevant for the innovative type is the revelation constraint of the
backward type.
To sum up, if f(ri; ki); (rb; kb)g is a menu of contracts, then ri = rb = r and:
12Chapter 1 o¤ers a formal proof of the statements in this section.
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kb = argmax
k
b (k)  (r + )k
s:t: b (k)  (r + )k  (1  )b (k)
(12)
ki = argmax
k
i (k)  (r + )k
s:t: b (kb)  (r + )kb  (1  )b (ki)
(13)
Thus, the menu of contracts is characterized by the following features: i) the
interest rate that nancial intermediaries charge to rms is the depositors in-
terest rate; ii) there is no default in equilibrium since non default constraint is
satised, this and the above features guarantee the zero prots of nancial in-
termediaries; iii) The only incentive constraint that is relevant for the backward
type is the non default constraint, since the innovative type never has incen-
tives to cloak his type. The only incentive constraint that the innovative type
faces is the revelation constraint, which is always tighter than the non-default
constraint for the innovative type. iv) The menu of contracts is such that rms
of each type maximize prots subject to the relevant incentive constraint for
each type (the non-default constraint for the backward type and the revelation
constraint for the innovative type).
The upper part of Figure 1 displays the non default constraint (9) for the bad
type: the non default constraint is satised when the prot in case of fullling
the contract, which is hump-shaped, is superior to the prot in case of default,
which is an increasing curve. In the lower part of Figure 1 is represented another
version of the non default constraint: the bad type rm has incentive to fulll
the contract if the expected average payment to the nancial intermediary in
case of default, which is a decreasing function in kj , is higher than in case of
fullling the contract, which is constant. It is apparent from lower part of Figure
1 that the non-default constraint holds when the amount of capital is smaller
than a certain threshold capital in which the non-default constraint holds with
equality. Such level of capital is the maximum amount that the bad rm is
going to be able to borrow. This will be called the non default borrowing limit,
and we will denote it by kndb :
kndb , b
 
kndb
  (r + )kndb = (1  )b  kndb  (and kndb > 0)
Figure 2 displays the revelation constraint which will a¤ect the innovative type:
the prots of the backward rm fullling her contract should be larger than the
prots of the backward rm when she accepts the contract of the innovative
type and defaults. The cash ow function is strictly increasing, which implies
that the prots of the backward rm in case of default are increasing. It follows
that the revelation constraint holds when the amount of capital is smaller that
certain threshold capital for which the revelation constraint holds with equality.
Such level of capital is the maximum amount that the innovative rm is going
to be able to borrow, and it will be called revelation borrowing limit, denoted
by krvi :
krvi , b (kb)  (r + )kb = (1  )b (krvi ) (and krvi > 0)
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Thus, another way to write the menu of contracts is as follows:
kb = argmax
k
b (k)  (r + )k
s:t: k  kndb
(14)
ki = argmax
k
i (k)  (r + )k
s:t: k  krvi
(15)
4.2 Financial contract and the degree of contract enforce-
ment
In this subsection we characterize the optimal nancial contract that nancial
intermediary o¤ers in equilibrium to each rm type (backward and innovative),
as a function of the degree of contract enforcement.
Considering the backward rm, when the contract enforcement goes down,
the punishment for default falls as well. This implies that the maximum amount
of capital that the backward rm can receive - the non default borrowing limit
kndb - decreases. Thus, after a drop in contract enforcement, it is more likely
that the rm is constraint, or in order words that the non-default constraint is
binding. If the rm was already constrained, the fall in the contract enforcement
reduces the non default borrowing limit and consequently the amount borrowed
by the backward rm, lowering her prots.
But the fall of the contract enforcement also a¤ects the innovative rm.
As we have seen, the fall in the contract enforcement may reduce the prots
of the backward rm (left hand side of the revelation constraint 13), which
reduces the positive incentivesto reveal her type. Furthermore, a drop in the
contract enforcement also reduces the punishment when the backward rm does
not reveal her type (see right hand side of the revelation constraint 13). Thus,
the fall in the contract enforcement reduces also the revelation borrowing limit
krvi , which a¤ects the innovative rms, making more likely that such rms are
constrained and reducing the capital received by them in case that these rms
are already constrained.
Summarizing, the fall of the contract enforcement will reduce both the non
default borrowing limit of the backward rms and the revelation borrowing limit
which a¤ects innovative rms, making more likely that rms are constrained and
reducing the amount of capital that rms borrow in case that these rms are
already constrained. Thus, a fall of the contract enforcement tights the incentive
constraints and a¤ects rm size distribution by making rms smaller than their
optimal size, which in turn it reduces the productivity of rms.
The unconstrained maximization of prots implies optimum amounts of cap-
ital for each of the two rm types, which we will denote in our analysis by kj
with j 2 fi; bg:
kj = argmax
k
j (k)  (r + )k ,
@j
 
kj

@k
= (r + )
It follows from the implicit function theorem that innovative rms receive more
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capital than backward ones (i.e. ki > k

b ). We will use this particular case a
benchmark/starting point for our analysis.
The following proposition summarizes how the level of contract enforcement
a¤ects the allocation of capital for the two types of rms (proof in Chapter 2).
Proposition 1 There are two threshold contract enforcement13 1 and 2, where
1 > 2 > 1 > 0 and such that: i) If   2 then neither the innovative or
the backward rms are constrained: kj = kj . ii) If  2 [1; 2) then innov-
ative rms are constrained, ki < ki , while backward rms are not, kb = k

b ,
the amount of capital that innovative rms receive ki increases with . iii) If
 < 1, both types of rms are constrained and the amount of capital that each
type receives is the same: ki = kb < kb ; furthermore, the amount of capital that
rms receive increases with .
Thus, when the level of contract enforcement drops, the incentives that rms
have to fulll nancial contracts and to truly reveal their type fall as well. This
makes incentive constraints tighter, reducing the non default borrowing limit,
which a¤ect backward rms, and the revelation borrowing limit, which a¤ects
innovative rms. There are three possible situations depending on the level of
contract enforcement. When the contract enforcement is good enough but not
necessary perfect, i.e. larger than 2, then incentive constraints are not binding
and rms chose their optimal capital level. When the contract enforcement
is in a middle range,  2 [1; 2), then only innovative rms are constrained
while backward rms are not. In this sense, innovative rms su¤er from an
incentive constraint (the revelation incentive constraint) that is tighter than
the one that a¤ects backward rms (the non default constraint). Finally, when
the level of contract enforcement is poor,  < 1, both rms are constrained
and receive the same ine¢ ciently small amount of capital. Furthermore, when
rms are constrained and the level of contract enforcement improves, borrowing
limit expand making rms closer to their optimal level and consequently more
productive.
Thus, the link between property rights quality and productivity is clear
from this proposition. Weak property rights make rms to have an ine¢ ciently
small size. Furthermore, weak property rights a¤ect more innovative rms,
and inuence the way in which capital is distributed among rms, pouring
relatively more resources in backward, less productive rms and less resources
in the innovative, more productive rms. These two mechanisms, the reduction
of rms size and the redistribution of resources from more productive to less
productive rms, imply that the quality of property rights will a¤ect positively
the productivity. But there is still a third mechanism, which is of dynamic
nature. A fall in the level of enforcement will reduce the amount of resources
that innovative rms receive, consequently the spread of innovation, and the
learning by doing process will slow down (see equation 1). As a consequence, the
13The exact denition of these thresholds are: 1  1  and 2  1  +
1 

H
A
 
(1 )(1  )

1  
1 

, 2  1  (HA )

(1 )(1  ) ( 1  
1  )
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gap between the average technological level in the economy and the technological
frontier will rise. This means that the productivity gap between countries with
weak property rights and countries with strong property rights will exacerbate
due to the slow technological spread in countries with weak property rights.
5 Equilibrium and Balanced Growth Path
Denition 2 An equilibrium is an allocation fct; at; lt; nt; fkjt; lwjt; Zjtgj2fi;bg;Htg1t=0,
where nt is the number of rms, and a vector of prices frt; wt; frjt; wMjt gj2fi;bgg1t=0
such that 8t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g:
1. Households choose fct; at; lt;g1t=0 in order to maximize their utility (2)
by taking as given the prices frt; wt; wMt gt=0;1 and choosing subject to their
budget constraint (5).
2. Financial intermediaries o¤er to each rm of type j 2 fi; bg a contract
fkjt; rjtgj2fi;bg that is an equilibrium contract according to denition 1.
3. Firms choose how many workers flwjtgj2fi;bg to hire and the technology
fZjtgj2fi;bg to be used in order to maximize their cash-ow, taking as given the
wage wt, and the amount of capital kjt o¤ered in the menu of contracts.
4. Free entry implies that rms get zero prots: j(kj) (1+rj)kj wMjt " = 0
j 2 fi; bg.
5. Labor market clears:
- Workers Market: nt[lwit + (1  )lwbt] = lt.
- Manager Market: nt" = 1  lt
6. Capital market clears: nt[kit + (1  )kbt] = at.
7. Technological experience follows the law of motion (1).
Thus, the denition of equilibrium is the usual one: agents maximize their
objective function and markets clear.
Denition 3 Balanced growth path is an equilibrium where fct; at; wt; fkjt; wMjt ; Zjtgj2fi;bg;Htg1t=0
grow at the same rate (  1) and flt; nt; rt; frjt; lwjtgj2fi;bggt=0;1 are constant
over time.
6 Contrasting economies with di¤erent Contract
Enforceability
We consider balanced growth path equilibria of economies that di¤er only in
the property rights quality . We analyze how the output, the Total Factor
Productivity and the average establishment size change when we move from a
lower to a higher enforcement. We are particularly interested to what extent
the mechanisms linking property rights quality to these variables are able to
explain the variation of these variables observed in the data.
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6.1 Parameterization
We followed the standard practicein macro models whenever possible. When
existing work provided less guidance, we mainly relied on the models implica-
tions on the size distribution of rms. To follow the common practice in the
literature, we chose the parameter values so that our model, with perfect con-
tract enforcement , at the steady state, matched data at aggregate and cross
section level for the United States economy. We took the United States economy
as a good approximation, for our purposes, of a distortion-free economy (which
in the context of our model translates into an economy with perfect contract
enforcement. i.e. with the enforcement parameter  equal to one).
Table 1 summarizes the parameters and the targets used for calibration.
Parameter Meaning Value Target
 capital share 0.36 Capital elasticity based on Cooley and Prescott (1995)
 depreciation rate 0.09 Ratio between investment and capital
 discount rate 0.05 Capital-output ratio
   1 growth rate 0.016 Average growth rate of US output/worker (PWT 7.0)
 share of innovative 0.16 Innovative rms are the ones who hire more employees
rms than the average no of employees (2002 US Ec. Census)
 labor share 0.58 The share of labor and the share of output for
innovative rms (2002 US Ec. Census)
" managerial inputs 3.9 Average no of employees for manufacturing
per establishment establishments (2002 US Ec. Census)
A
H gap b/w tech. frontier 1.24 The share of output corresponding to innovative rms
and tech. experience
 law of motion of 0.08 Share of workers in innovative rms
technological change
 elasticity of inter- 1.7
temporal substitution
Table 1: Parameter values (source: authors calculations)
For the share of capital in total output, , we applied the methodology
described in Cooley and Prescott (1995) on data from the National Income and
Product Accounts. The share of capital  averages 0.36 for the period 1950-
2010. We compute, using the same data source, the depreciation rate  as the
ratio between investment and capital and we obtain a value of 0.09.
For the discount rate, assuming CES utility function, it follows from the
Euler Equation that:
ct+1
ct
= (1 + USA) =

1 + r
1 + 
1=
where  denotes the growth rate of per capita GDP that in our model, along the
balanced growth path, is equal to the consumption growth rate. We compute
the net interest rate as the net interest rate, that in our model (in the benchmark
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case) is equal to the net marginal productivity of capital, which is as following:
r = 
Y
K
  
Hence (1 + USA) =

1 +yk
1+
1=
,  = 1 +
y
k
(1+USA)
  1.
For the capital-output ratio, we used data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis for the period 1950-2010. We dened the stock of capital as being com-
prised by private xed capital (nonresidential plus residential), durable goods
and inventories. The denition output Y is the same we use when computing
the capital share . The result was a capital-output ratio of 2.42 and a discount
rate of 0.05.
The growth rate of the technological frontier   is chosen to match the USA
growth rate (see appendix for details):
  = (1 + USA)
1 
where USA = average growth rate of the USA output per worker, computed
from the data compiled by PWT 7.0. The average growth rate for the real GDP
per worker (series rgdpwok) for the period 1950-2010 implied a growth rate of
the technological frontier of approximately 1.6% per year.
For the rest of parameters, we tried to match in the best possible way the
distribution of rm size generated by our model with the distribution of rm
size given by available data for the U.S. We used the 2002 U.S. Economic Census
which provides information on number of employees, valued added and many
other variables for the establishments grouped by the North American Industry
Classication System (NAICS)14 . Apendix ?? o¤ers suplementary details on the
calibration of these parameters.
First we need to decide which industry sectors from NAICS we want our
model to describe. Our objective is to make cross-country comparisons regarding
the importance of di¤erent property rights enforcement on output, rm size and
TFP, therefore we would like to use data on rm size as comparable as possible
across countries. Various industry sectors covered by NAICS vary as importance
across economies; given the di¤erent optimal rm size across industry sectors,
we focus on manufacturing. In this way, we try to minimize the e¤ect of di¤erent
industry structure across countries (which is not the focus in our model) and
to isolateas much as possible the e¤ect of property rights from other factors
that may a¤ect rm size.
In our model there are two types of rms, innovative (larger and more pro-
ductive) and backward (smaller and less productive). The US Economic Census
groups establishments in 10 size classes (starting with 1-4 employees up to
more than 2500 employees, see Table 2). We note that the average value
14As a classication of economic activities used in North America, NAICS is based on the
United NationsStandard Industrial Classication (SIC), just as the Statistical Classication
of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE).
The data from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census that we used is freely available at the U.S.
Census Bureau website.
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added per employee is increasing with rm size. Hence, the Census data seems
consistent with the models implication that the larger rms are also the more
productive ones.
We need to match the rm size classes reported in the Census to the two
rm types in our model. We calculate the average across all the rms in the
data set, and we get that this average is 41,9. Then, we take those size classes
employing on average more workers than the sector average (of 41,9) to belong
the innovative type (with larger and more productive rms). In this way
we avoid imposing a denition of what is a largerm. We obtain a share of
innovative rms  of 16% of the total number of rms.
The technological gap between the two rm types AH is obtained from match-
ing the share of output corresponding to large rms. We note that once we set
the ratio of A=H, we do not have to set a specic value for H. While a¤ecting
the level of capital and output in equilibrium, H does not a¤ect the results we
are interested in - the average establishment size and the relative output. For
the parameter  from the law of motion of technological change, we note that
at Steady State AtHt is constant, so
Ht+1
Ht
=  , and
 =
   1
t(At)

At
Ht
  1

The share of workers in high productivity rms is 0; 8, resulting in  of 0; 08.
We then chose  such that the benchmark model matches the share of labor
and output corresponding to innovative (more productive) rms. In this way
we obtained that the coe¢ cient of labor (workers) in the production function
 is equal to 0.58, which implies returns to scale  +  of 0.94. We note that
this value is close to values used by Guner, Ventura and Xu (2006), Basu and
Fernald (1997), Chang (1998), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007).
The managerial inputs per establishment, ", is such that the benchmark
model matches the average establishment size, which for our data set is of 41,9
employees. We obtain a value of 3; 9 managers per rm. We note that this
implies that smaller rms have a higher fraction of managerial inputs. It seems
plausible that in small rms the e¤ort input of the managers represents a more
signicant part of the total labor e¤ort involved in the rm compared to large
rms.
6.2 Results
In this subsection we will check how our model with endogenous technological
adoption fares in explaining the di¤erences across countries in income, produc-
tivity and rm size. We will consider economies on the balanced growth path,
where capital and output grow at the same exogenous rate as the technological
frontier (   1). In our experiments, economies di¤er in one single aspect: the
degree of contract enforcement, modelled by the share  of cash ow that nan-
cial intermediaries can recover from the rms in case of default. In particular,
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one of the innovative features of our model was the explicit inclusion of tech-
nology accumulation in the spirit of the learning by doing literature. Naturally,
we would like to check if this modelling approach makes a di¤erence for the
analysis. To this purpose, we will compare the models prediction to the ver-
sion of the model where technological change is exogenous, which was treated
in Chapter 2.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the output and the total factor productivity against the
degree of property rights enforcement (the continuous lines). The rst observa-
tion is that the model is qualitatively consistent with the empirical correlation
between enforcement, output and productivity. The mechanism a¤ecting aggre-
gate output and productivity works in our model as follows. As explained in
section 4.2, when property rights are weak, rms have an ine¢ ciently small size,
which can be gauged also from the positive correlation between the contract en-
forcement and the average rm size, illustrated in Figure 5. Furthermore, weak
property rights a¤ect to a greater extent the innovative rms, inuencing the
way capital is distributed to rms: backward rms will receive relatively more
resources, while innovative rms will receive less.
This will feed into a third mechanism, which is of dynamic nature and is
driven by the process of accumulation of technological experience. The tech-
nological experience is the stock of knowledge representing the ability of using
advanced technologies due to learning by doing. Given that a fall in the level
of enforcement reduces the amount of resources that innovative rms receive,
the adoption of advanced technology and the learning by doing will slow down.
Then, the average technology (employed by backward rms) will fall behind the
technological frontier (employed by innovative rms), that is the gap between
the two will rise. This will exacerbate adverse selection problems and will in-
crease the productivity gap between countries with weak property rights and
countries with strong property rights, as backward rms employ relatively more
resources in the former than in the latter.
Therefore, although the technological frontier evolves exogenously, the ac-
cumulation of technological experience di¤ers across economies with di¤erent
property rights. More innovative rms receive relatively more capital (and con-
sequently hire more workers) in countries with higher property rights enforce-
ment. Given that more innovative rms use an advanced technology, the overall
economy benets from a higher stock of technological experience, which in turn
contributes to increase the overall productivity as explained above.
The technological gap of backward rms relative to the frontier technology,
computed as
 
H
A
 1
1  , is plotted in Figure 6 against the level of property rights
enforcement. In an economy with perfect enforcement, the backward rms use a
technology which is about 30% less productive than the frontier technology. This
holds in the model where technology adoption is exogenous, treated in Chapter 2
(dotted line in Figure 6), and also in the model where technology adoption is en-
dogenous (continous line in Figure 6). However, in the model where technology
adoption is exogenous, the technological gap of backward rms does not change
with enforcement, while in the model with endoenous technology adoption the
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technological gap does change: as illustrated in Figure 6, the technological gap
increases when enforcement deteriorates, and at very low levels of enforcement
the backward rms use a technology about 50% less productive than the frontier
technology. Therefore, our theory with endogenous technological adoption im-
plies that the di¤erences in productivity among innovative and backwards rms
are more signicant for less developed countries, which is consistent with what
Erosa and Hidalgo (2008) report on industries in the manufacturing sector.
The change in the technological gap of backward rms relative to the frontier
technology amplies the di¤erences in output per capita generated by the model.
The quantitative importance of this e¤ect can be seen in Figure 3 where the
prediction of the model with exogenous technology adoption from Chapter 2 (in
dotted line), is plotted along the prediction of the current model. On average,
the current model predicts an output about 25% smaller than the model with
exogenous technology adoption.
Nontheless, our main interest in this Chapter has been to generate a higher
variation in TFP. The predictions of the two models for TFP are compared
in Figure 4. While the model with exogenous technology adoption generates a
variation of TFP of 30%, the explanatory power of the current model is increased
to 50%.
6.3 Results vs. cross-country data
To put the above results into context, we check how the current model fares in
explaining the cross-country di¤erences in output per worker and TFP observed
in data. We decide to plot the output per worker and the TFP against the
average rm size. Alternatively, they could be plotted against a measure of
the quality of property rights . We chose to plot it against the average rm
size because for the parameter interval we are performing the comparison the
average rm size moves monotonically with the quality of property rights and
it has a clear empirical counterpart15 .
Following Amaral and Quintin (2010), as a measure of the relative economic
development across countries we used the output per worker. The data source is
Penn World Table (PWT) version 7.1 and the variable is rgdpwok. The variable
is intended to control for di¤erences rates of employment and price levels across
countries (which are not the focus of our analysis). Although the relative GDP
per worker displays variation over time, our interest is on a long term average of
the macro variables. We used the average for the period 1995 up to most recent
data, for two reasons: on the one hand, for this period the series are more stable
and at the same time, the closer we are to present, generally the more reliable
can be considered the series.
Reliable and comparable data on rm size is scarce and, in general, avail-
able in countries with a su¢ cient statistical development that usually perform
economic censuses regularly. We used data for 30 countries from the OECD
Structural Business Statistics Database, whose level of development is from
15A discussion of this issue is done in Chapter 2, section 6.4.
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middle-incomeuntil high income. The relative GDP per worker with respect
to the US value lies between 0.24 for Argentina up to 0.97 for Ireland. 13 coun-
tries in our sample have a GDP per worker below 0.6 of the US level, with the
rest with values between 0.6 and 0.9716 . We are missing in our sample the least
developed countries, because data for these countries is hardly available and of
lesser quality (the high level of non-declared activities in these countries makes
it rather di¢ cult to compile reliable statistics on rm size and GDP). The ad-
vantage of this data set is that is based on a common classication of activities
(ISIC rev3). Given that the optimal scale of production varies across industries,
we chose to focus on the manufacturing sector in our comparisons.
Figure 7 displays the relative GDP per worker predicted by our model versus
the one in the data from PWT 7.1. For comparison, we plotted in the same
graph the GDP per worker predicted by the two versions of the model (with and
without endogenous technological adoption). The data in our sample conrms
an empirical correlation between the quality of property rights and the average
rm size, on the one hand, and the output per worker, on the other hand. Taking
into account that we abstracted from several factors relevant for development
(like human capital, monopoly arrangements, etc), both versions of our model
seem to explain a large part of the variation in ouput per worker (with the model
with endogenous technology adoption doing slighly better).
However, the main reason we considered the endogenous technology adoption
was to improve the explanatory power for TFP. We compute TFP , as in the
rest of this paper, by the following equation:
TFP =
 y
k
 1
1 
We estimate the stock of capital using the perpetual inventory method, where
the depreciation rate is the one in our model and we consider the initial capital
as the one predicted by the neoclassical model at the steady state. That is:
kintial period =


 + 

yintial period
kt+1 = it + (1  )kt
where we use as the initial period the rst year available in the PWT for each
country. Figure 8 presents the model predictions vs. the data. The di¤erences
in expanatory power of the two models are more important in the case of TFP
than in case of ouput: the model with endogenous technology adoption clearly
outperforms the previous version, as it is apparent also from the linear tendency
lines.
16The World Bank maintains a classication of countries by income. The sorting for the
countries in our sample, although not based on their classication, is broadly in line with it.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated some mechanisms that may contribute to a better
understanding of the observed di¤erences across countries in output per capita,
productivity and rm size. Several papers have shown that the quality of prop-
erty rights can explain a signicant part of the variation in output (Amaral and
Quintin 2010, Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011), Chapter 2 of this thesis).
Although these papers are able to generate important di¤erences in output,
the generated di¤erences in TFP are relatively smaller. Given that TFP is
usually interpreted as an index of technological advancement, in this paper we
asked the question: what stops developing countries to adopt more advanced
technologies from developed countries? The literature has shown that weak
property rights can cause a bad allocation of funds to rms, where better (and
more innovative) rms receive ine¢ ciently low amounts of credit. We inquired
whether this ine¤ective allocation of funds acted as a barrier to the spread
of new technologies and we modelled this by introducing a learning-by-doing
process, where the advancement level of the technologies used by rms in the
past increases their ability to use more advanced technology in the present.
We investigated quantitatively this hypothesis and it turned out it has non-
trivial consequences for the technological gap between backward and advanced
rms in the economy. In our model, this technological gap is not constant any-
more, but varies with the quality of property rights. Thus, a certain di¤erence
in property rights protection will feature an increased technological gap between
backward and advanced rms, which exacerbates the asymmetric information
problems. In turn, this amplies the total e¤ect of property rights on the aggre-
gate productivity, the experiments indicating the channel to be quantitatively
important.
One way our model could be extended would be to look at additional implica-
tions of property rights protection outside the nancial intermediation process.
For instance, the problems companies face in enforcing contracts with suppliers,
but especially with clients could act as a break for expanding production and
innovation processes. Modelling this from a macroeconomic general equilibrium
perspective may be challenging but useful.
At the same time, a closer look at the di¤erences in the economic structure
and the rm size distribution among developing and industrialized economies
may bring new insights in the understanding of the economic development of
nations.
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Size class Number of Number of Average number of Value Added Average
establishments employees employees per Value Added
establishment per employee
All 350.828 14.699.536 41,9 1.887,7 128,4
1_4 141.992 279.481 1,97 21,6 77,3
5_9 49.284 334.459 6,79 28,3 84,6
10_19 50.824 702.428 13,82 58,0 82,6
20_49 51.660 1.615.349 31,27 142,8 88,4
50_99 25.883 1.814.999 70,12 181,7 100,1
100-249 20.346 3.133.384 154,00 357,4 114,1
250_499 6.853 2.357.917 344,07 297,0 126,0
500_999 2.720 1.835.386 674,77 286,1 155,9
1000_2499 1.025 1.494.936 1458,47 262,0 175,3
2500_ 241 1.131.197 4693,76 252,4 223,1
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the establishments in U.S. manufacturing
sector (source: the 2002 U.S. Economic Census)
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